

CAQ

CovertAction Quarterly

SUMMER 1997

NUMBER 61

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Conference Room Technique

ASSASSINATION PRIMER



① Enter Room Quickly But Quietly

② Stand Behind Doorway

&

② Opens fire on first Subject to React. Swings Across Group Toward Center of Mass. Times Burst to Empty Magazine at end of Swing


① Covers Group to prevent Individual Actions, if necessary, Drops Magazine, Bursts at 3 rounds

US TRAINING MANUALS DECLASSIFIED



② Finishes Burst. Commands "Shift." Drops Back Thru Door. Replaces Empty Magazine. Covers Corridor.

① On Command "Shift," Opens fire on Opposite Side of Target, Swings one Burst Flame Group



① Finishes Burst. Commands "Shift." Drops Back Thru Door. Replaces Magazine. Covers Corridor.

② On Command "Shift," Re-enters room. Covers group; kills survivors with Two-Round Bursts. Leaves Propaganda.

A N D

Turkey: Trapped in a Web of Covert Killers

Scheming to Privatize the Hanford Nuke

Policing Activists: Think Global, Spy Local

Making Trouble, Making Change


Arming Both Sides of Mexico's Drug War

Did NSA Help Russia Target Dudayev?

NATO Moves East



GENOCIDA



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Big Brother Goes High-Tech, by David Banisar;

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Also nominated was

Behind the Razor Wire: Inside INS Detention Centers, by **Mark Dow**.

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is...

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
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CAQ

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Over decades, the CIA and US military manuals have taught armies around the globe how to infiltrate and spy on civilian groups, forcibly extract information, subvert democracy, and target not only insurgency but also labor un-

ions, student groups, religious, and civic organizations. The paper trail reveals a consistent policy in which the end justifies any means.

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Mexican narcotraffickers and other criminals easily obtain their firepower north of the border. Instead of controlling the illicit flow, the Clinton administration is militarizing Mexico's drug war by providing more weapons aid and encouraging the military to take a more active role.


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Why did NATO — despite predictable problems and complications — opt for expansion, and why is it so tenaciously sticking with the plan? The answer involves old rivalries and new arms contracts.

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
Call them "fellows" or "detailees," dozens of eager helpers from the defense, corporate, and intelligence establishments are burrowing into Capitol Hill, blurring the lines between the branches of government and raising questions of conflict of interest and separation of powers.

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Cover photos: Clockwise from top right: Joe Fish, Impact Visuals; US Army; Oscar Bonilla, Impact Visuals; Terry Allen; Kenneth Lam, *Baltimore Sun*; *ibid*.

Covert Briefs

ILLUSTRATIONS BY MATT WUERKER



Mortal Force

Now that the war in Guatemala is officially over, the government is turning over some of the army's functions to the civil sector — and looking abroad for role models. What better choice than Spain, which not only has a long history of sanctioning state terror in its counterinsurgency campaign against Basque separatists, but barks orders in the same language as Guatemala's honchos.

Reluctant to see such cultural rapport and expertise go to waste, Madrid sent members of its *guardia civil* to help train Guatemala's new security forces. At least one of those participating, Lt. Lorenzo Barez Gomez, was directly implicated in the kidnaping, torture, and murder of two young Basque activists in the 1980s.

Mexico too, has been sent an officer from the notorious *guardia civil* to help impart such skills as "the use of mortal force in the police task of combating delinquents and subversive groups." As economic conditions in Mexico continue to deteriorate, and the government turns to repression rather than social services to quell popular anger, his expertise will no doubt come in handy. So far, police from the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, etc. have participated in the interna-

tional police programs which Spain touts as its way of "helping young democracies."

As for the history of abuses the Spanish bring with them? Not to worry comforts Carmen Romero, parliamentarian for the Socialist Party and the wife of ex-President Gonzalez. Groups such as the anti-Basque death squads have occurred in "all democratic countries" and are "normal in many countries." (Research assistance, Darrin Wood.)

FISA Strikes Again

If ever there were a conspiracy of nine white men in a room plotting to undermine democracy, it might look something like the FISA court. This secretive group of judges is appointed by the US Chief Justice under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and meets in sealed chambers in Washington. There, in total secrecy, it hears requests by state and federal agencies to conduct electronic surveillance and clandestine physical searches when issues of "national security" are involved. Those people or groups surveilled under FISA order may never know they were targets, and need never be given access to evidence gathered against them.

This year, FISA set a new record by rubber stamping 839 applications. This topped last year's previous all-time high of 697 approvals. But the term "rubber stamp" does not sit well with FISA Judge Royce C. Lamberth: "I bristle at the suggestion in some quarters that we are a

rubber stamp for the executive branch," he said sententiously.

"Some applications have been revised. Some have been withdrawn and resubmitted with additional information, and the process is, in fact, working."

No arguing with that, the question is, for whom? In its 18-year history, FISA has approved virtually every one of the more than 9,600 requests from FBI, NSA, and a few agencies that had blacked-out names in records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. And this year, as usual, "No orders were entered which modified or denied the requested authority." For more information on FISA, visit: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/> and <http://www.privacy.org/pi/>

Bushwhacking

At least one section of former first lady Barbara Bush's book, *A Memoir*, strayed from the usual soporific pap. In the collection of self- and George-serving anecdotes, she repeated the canard that former CIA officer Philip Agee had contributed to the 1975 assassination of Richard Welch by exposing him as the CIA's station chief in Greece. In fact, Agee hadn't


named Welch and sued Barbara Bush. After she agreed to exclude reference to Agee in the paperback editions of the book, Agee dismissed the case.

Talking Turkey

Welch's death sparked Congress to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, which effectively bars publication of the names of undercover US intelligence agents. *Top Secret*, a German magazine that faces no such restrictions, recently published an article about the intelligence activities in Turkey.

Describing the US role in Turkey, *Top Secret* editor Michael Opperskalski wrote: "In Turkey the CIA cooperates closely with the ruthless 'Counterguerilla forces,' the Turkish intelligence network (especially MIT), and the army in order to suppress the progressive, democratic and revolutionary forces and furthermore wage a systematic warfare against the Kurdish national movement. This cooperation includes — from the CIA's side — the lecturing of torture methods, collecting strategic information — internally and externally — on the progressive, democratic and revolutionary forces in Turkey and the

Kurdish national movement. Therefore the CIA network in Turkey can be seen as a corner-



stone of the extreme reactionary and repressive anti-democratic regime in Turkey serving US interests in the region." For more information: PO Box 270324, 50509 Koln, Germany.

Playing by the Rules

For everyone who thought that congressional insiders were a bunch of unscrupulous, anything-goes scoundrels, we now know that they do indeed play by the rules — and we know what the rules are. So rest easy, just as the US has imparted its values abroad (see p. 29) in the form of torture manuals, Congress is inculcating its moral standards here at home through the "Washington Rules." The list has been circulating around the Hill and is being used as a training tool for new staff members:

- "If it's worth fighting for, it's worth fighting dirty for.
- Don't lie, cheat or steal unnecessarily.
- There's always one more son of a bitch than you counted on.
- An honest answer can get you in a whole lot of trouble.
- The facts, although interesting, are irrelevant.
- Chicken Little only has to be right once.
- "No" is only an interim response.
- You can't kill a bad idea.
- If at first you don't succeed, kill all the



evidence that you ever tried.

- The truth is a variable.
- A porcupine with his quills down is just another fat rodent.
- You can agree with any concept or notional future option, in principle, but fight implementation every step of the way.
- A promise is not a guarantee.
- If you can't counter the argument, leave the meeting."

Low Body Count, No Problem

On 33 different occasions between 1949 and 1969, government researchers released powdered zinc cadmium sulfide, a known carcinogen and suspected teratogen, into the atmosphere to simulate biological attacks. According to the National Cancer Institute, "Current data indicate zinc cadmium sulfide may cause some types of cancer" and possibly birth defects. This danger paled before the happy coincidence that the chemical makes for good data since its particle size is the same as that of bacteria used in biological weapons.

Targets of the aerial spraying ranged from San Francisco to the South Carolina and Georgia coasts, from Florida to central Alaska.

Several years ago, after disclosure of the experiments caused an uproar, the Army asked the National Academy of Sciences to find out if anyone had been injured. The results are now in and we can all breathe easy. In St. Louis, Missouri, for example, which experienced the highest level of contamination, the Academy found that excess cancers among children living in the areas where the chemical fell most densely would be only 1.2 per million people. Which, by Army standards, is an insignificantly low body count, unless of course, it's you or your child who gets the cancer.

Toxic Loopholes

In any case, if the experiment followed official guidelines it would have been legal. According to the January 1994 United States Code Title 50 — War and National Defense, Chapter 32

— Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: § 1520.

Use of human subjects for testing of chemical or biological agents by Department of Defense; accounting to Congressional committees with respect to experiments and studies; notification of local civilian officials:

(a) Not later than thirty days after final approval within the Department of Defense of plans for any experiment or study to be conducted by the Department of Defense, whether directly or under contract, involving the use of human subjects for the testing of chemical or biological agents, the Secretary of Defense shall supply the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives with a full accounting of such plans for such experiment or study, and such experiment or study may then be conducted only after the expiration of the thirty-day period beginning on the date such accounting is received by such committees.

(b) (1) The Secretary of Defense may not conduct any test or experiment involving the use of any

chemical or biological agent on civilian populations unless local civilian officials in the area in which the test or experiment is to be conducted are notified in advance of such test or experiment, and such test or experiment may then be conducted only after the expiration of the thirty-day period beginning on the date of such notification.


(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply to tests and experiments conducted by Department of Defense personnel and tests and experiments conducted on behalf of the Department of Defense by contractors.

Given Congress' historical lack of oversight of Pentagon abuses and Washington's consistent pooh-poohing of the risks of everything from radiation to dioxin, the safeguards seem criminally inadequate to prevent further abuses. ■

---- Terry Allen



TURKEY



Trapped in a Web of Covert Killers

by Ertugrul Kurkcü

ISTANBUL, Turkey. Human rights activists and opposition groups have argued for decades that an uninterrupted trail of mysterious killings and extrajudicial executions leads to the highest levels of the Turkish state. An extraordinary accident in November 1996 provided missing links in that chain of evidence. It also gave further proof of the continued existence of a Turkish incarnation of Gladio — the US-orchestrated Stay Behind operation that placed covert groups around Europe at the end of World War II.

Ertugrul Kurkcü, a political analyst, is an Istanbul-based reporter for InterPress Service, a Third World news agency. Kurkcü served 14 years in prison from 1972-86 for armed resistance against the military rule of the 1970s. Photo: Axel Koester/Impact Visuals, Cüre, Turkey.

The toll of death and terror from Turkey's bitter internal strife is horrific. In the last three decades, at least 28,000 people have died. The 5,000 casualties in the 1970s served as a major pretext for the 1980 military takeover when the Turkish armed forces overthrew Süleyman Demirel's conservative minority government. Since the 1984 start of the war between the Kurdish guerrilla PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Turkish army, the country's human losses — including those of the government security forces, Kurdish guerrillas, and civilians — have totaled around 23,000, officials say.¹

1. Nadire Mater, "Behind Casualty Figures Mothers Weep For Sons," InterPress Service, Sept. 30, 1996.

This toll is not solely the result of combat in the mountains and forests of southeast Turkey, where the PKK guerrillas are fighting for greater autonomy. Many of the deaths and much of the terror resulted from a broad covert program aimed at assassination, forced exile, or imprisonment of Kurdish nationalists — "businessmen," intellectuals, journalists, local politicians, and public opinion leaders — who were suspected of providing political or material support to the PKK.

A lurid glimpse of this underbelly of the Turkish state opened suddenly on November 3, 1996, when a Mercedes-Benz overturned in a traffic accident. The driver was Hüseyin Kocadag, former Istanbul deputy police chief who was known

for his part in organizing the first special counterinsurgency police teams in southeast Turkey. Their goal was to bring the war to the Kurdish guerrillas. Also killed was Gonca Us, a former beauty queen with links to organized crime. Sedat Bucak, a pro-government Kurdish village guard chieftain and right-wing DYP (True Path Party) parliamentarian, was seriously injured. Bucak is reportedly in charge of 2,000 Kurdish mercenaries, armed and paid by the government to fight Kurdish guerrillas.

But what raised eyebrows was the seemingly incongruous presence of

The presence of the bizarre group in the same car was graphic evidence of collusion between the security forces and semi-criminal assassins --- and of their unity of purpose in targeting both leftists and Turkish Kurds.

another passenger — one Abdullah Catli — riding with the top police and government officials. Police had supposedly been hunting Catli, a convicted international drug smuggler since 1978, for his part in the killing of scores of left-wing activists. At that time, Catli had been head of the “Gray Wolves,” the youth arm of the neo-fascist MHP (National Action Party). The presence of the bizarre group in the same car was the most graphic evidence so far of collusion between the security forces and semi-criminal assassins — and of their unity of purpose in targeting both leftists and Turkish Kurds.

Further proof of the unseemly collaboration was provided by Interior Minister Mehmet Agar, head of the government's 120,000-person-strong police forces. In the wake of the scandal that followed the car accident, Agar was forced to resign his post. But in the course of his defense, he admitted that as security chief and interior minister, he had overseen “at least 1,000 secret operations.”²

In the face of growing public resentment, Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Ciller had to accept Agar's resignation, but she continued defending the “gang” — as the entire network of “licensed

killers” is known in Turkey. Apparently referring to Catli, Ciller declared during a meeting with her True Path Party deputies that “those who have fired bullets as well as those who have been shot in the name of the state are honest.”³

True “False” Licenses and “Green Passports”

The crash on the northwest Susurluk highway was striking not only for the extraordinary grouping of the victims, but also for their baggage. The crumpled car held a large arsenal of automatic weapons that was missing from police inventories, along with silencers and a small amount of cocaine.

The “Susurluk affair” — named after the accident site — gained further import when local gendarmes discovered two documents among Catli's belongings: a

in the name of Mehmet Ozbay but bore the photo of Catli, the fugitive drug trafficker.

Although Interior Minister Agar denied that the documents were real, gendarmes and forensic specialists confirmed that the Green Passport was genuine, not forged, and that the related signatures on it were authentic.⁴

The special perks and privileges given Catli, a drug dealer and suspected killer, were not unique. Haluk Kirci, his accomplice in a series of murders during the Gray Wolves days, and Yasar Oz, another international drug smuggler, also carried similar documents signed by Agar.⁵

The links between one of Turkey's most prominent security officials and organized criminals and fascist assassins were now incontrovertible. But the question remained: What was the common agenda that joined them together?

One explanation is a shared ideology. Agar's fascist sympathies are well-



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license to carry arms signed by Ciller's security aide, Mehmet Agar, and a “Green Passport” — authorized only for senior public servants — issued by the Interior Ministry. Both were made out

3. “Ciller: Devlet Icin Kursun Atan Serefliidir” (Ciller: Who Fires Bullets for the State Is Honest), *Sabah*, Nov. 27, 1996.

Kurdish children play with spent mortar shells.

4. See the special report by the Prime Minister's Investigation Commission, cited in “35 Sue Duyurusu” (35 Charges), *Hurriyet*, Jan. 10, 1997.

5. According to testimony by former Istanbul Security Chief Nejdettin Menzir, cited in “Agar's Agir Suclama” (Heavy Charges Against Agar), *Hurriyet*, Jan. 24, 1997.

2. Ertugrul Ozkok, “Agar Sonunda Suskunlugunu Bozdu” (Agar Finally Speaks), *Hurriyet*, Nov. 15, 1996.

known. Although he is a deputy in the parliament of Tansu Ciller's conservative True Path Party, he is also considered an heir to the throne of Alpaslan Turkes. After 30 years of unbroken, unrivaled command of Turkey's neo-fascist National Action Party (MHP); Turkes died in early April. The party he led is notorious for anticommunist campaigns throughout the 1960s and 1970s which involved physical attacks against left-wing activists, intellectu-

extremist-criminal alliance than shared affection for fascism. They concurred that Ciller, Agar, and other affiliates of the "gang," even including Turkes himself, are only a few of the many corrupt links in a long chain of "counterinsurgency strategies" overseen by Turkey's military high command.

The MGK vs. the PKK

"It all started in early 1992," believes Ismet Berkan, senior Ankara correspon-

cial figures from then-Interior Minister Nahit Mentese, the PKK forces grew from 200 in 1984, to 10,000 active combatants and some 50,000 militias and 375,000 sympathizers by late 1993.⁸

According to Berkan, in 1992, faced with the guerrillas' growing strength, the Turkish army units which had previously pursued a reactive strategy, shifted tactics "to bring the war to the PKK." They would not wait, they proclaimed, arms folded, while the PKK raided gendarme

posts and army garrisons. Instead, the army would seek out and attack guerrilla strongholds in urban areas, cut the rebels' local support in the southeast countryside, and forcibly depopulate remote villages and hamlets suspected of providing support to the rebels. Adopting a euphemism the US made infamous in the counterinsurgency wars it sponsors in Central America, then-Chief of Staff Gen. Dogan Gures designated the overall operation "low-intensity conflict."⁹


But the PKK was not simply a rural guerrilla force that could be easily identified and destroyed. It had considerable support both inside the country and overseas among Kurdish intellectuals and "businessmen" who were believed to funnel profits from black market operations to the PKK. Faced with a strong, well-financed foe, the military launched a two-pronged strategy: "While the army ruthlessly fought the guerrillas in the countryside, blows should have been inflicted on PKK's individual financial and moral supporters," Berkan quotes his anonymous sources.¹⁰

The second prong of this strategic shift — targeting civilian PKK support — was introduced to the National Security Council (MGK) in 1992. Berkan says that he had the opportunity to study some MGK files detailing the "new counterinsurgency concept" after

8. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

9. Mehmet Ali Kislali, *Güneydogu, Dusuk Yogunluklu Catisma* (The Southeast, Low Intensity Conflict), (Ankara: Umit Publishers, 1996), p. 26.

10. Berkan, *op. cit.*



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als, and trade union leaders. Agar was one of his key disciples.⁶

But investigative journalists, members of the parliamentary investigation commission to the Susurluk affair, and prominent "witnesses," found a broader explanation for the government-

The second prong of the secret counterinsurgency strategy: targeting civilians. Here people risked reprisals to retrieve the corpse of a Kurd killed by the army.

dent for the national daily *Radikal*. "That year, the Turkish armed forces high command underwent a dramatic shift in its counterinsurgency strategy in the combat against [the] rebel Kurdish guerrilla PKK."⁷

In 1984, seeking self-determination for Turkey's 15 million Kurds, the PKK launched its guerrilla war against Ankara. Since then, the Kurdish rebels and the Turkish army have been deadlocked in bitter war. According to semiof-

7. Ismet Berkan, "Gladjo ya MGK Onayi" (The MGK Sanctions Gladjo), *Radikal* (Istanbul), Dec. 5, 1996.

6. After the 1980 military takeover, Turkes and MHP's gunmen were indicted by a military tribunal for the assassination of hundreds of leftists and for scores of incidents of arson and sabotage during the civilian strifes of the 1970s. Turkes spent four years in prison but was released in 1984 after the High Court dropped charges. In the 1980s, he and his Gray Wolves espoused a relatively non-violent path and were granted semi-official status in the war against the PKK. According to a 1995 report by the international human rights group, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, special forces designed to spearhead the anti-PKK campaign reportedly are recruited from MHP and other far-right Turkish nationalist groups notorious for their hatred of Kurdish nationalism. (Human Rights Watch, *Weapons Transfers and Violations of Laws of War in Turkey*, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1995.)



AXEL KOESTER/IMPACT VISUALS

they were leaked to him by an anonymous former security official. "These documents," he said, "alongside tactical military schemes, included a list of the prospective members of the would-be death squads, including Abdullah Catli, some of his notorious companions from the Gray Wolves days, and some special police team members."¹¹

For a year, the second prong was not implemented because of strong opposi-

A senior police official confirmed that collaboration among fascist assassins, criminal gangs, and security officials was part of MGK's new counterinsurgency strategy.

tion, particularly from President Turgut Ozal and Gendarme High Commander Gen. Esref Bitlis. Then, in 1993, Ozal and Bitlis both died under controversial circumstances: The president succumbed to a heart attack for which he allegedly received tardy and inadequate treatment; Bitlis was killed in a mysterious plane crash. That same year, according to Berkan, the National Security Council endorsed the counterinsurgency schemes.¹²

During the three fatal years that followed, 1993-95 with Tansu Ciller as

prime minister and Suleyman Demirel as president, Kurdish civil society was shattered. Kurdish political, cultural and press organizations faced violent attacks. Their headquarters were bombed, scores of local Kurdish politicians, including pro-Kurdish DEP (Democracy Party) deputy Mehmet Sincar were killed by mysterious assassins, other Kurdish DEP deputies were expelled from parliament and jailed or forced into exile; and hundreds of Kurdish activists were disappeared.

The "gang" was particularly active in eliminating scores of Kurdish "businessmen" in an attempt to cut off the PKK's financial base. Behcet Canturk, Savas Buldan, Yusuf Ekinci, Medet Serhat, Hacı Karay, and Omer Lutfu Topal were among those kidnapped and later found killed.¹³

The High Price of Covert Ops

By the time Ciller left office in 1995, Kurdish nationalism had been dealt a heavy blow by the two-pronged approach. Although the "gang" was becoming increasingly violent, its existence and the extent of operations remained elusive. Then in February, in the wake of the car crash, a senior police official provided further confirmation of Berkan's version of the collaboration among fascist assassins, criminal gangs, and security officials as part of

Turkish army armored vehicle chases Kurds in Ciske.

MGK's new counterinsurgency strategy. Hanefi Avci, deputy intelligence department chief of Turkish Security, testified before an investigatory commission convened by parliament:

Some officials believed that the Turkish security remained incapable of eliminating the PKK supporters as long as [the security forces] functioned within legal means. Thus, they arrived at the conclusion that the PKK could have been fought only through extra-legal methods.

The first organization to be set up on this guideline was the JITEM (Gendarme Intelligence and Counter Terrorism) which was first established in the southeast. ... JITEM was effectively controlled by now Lt. Gen. Veli Kucuk. Alongside JITEM, two other units were carved out of the body of the MIT [Turkish Intelligence Organization] and Special Police Teams and henchmen were co-opted from among former PKK guerrillas who had turned informer.¹⁴

Gen. Teoman Koman, the current gendarme general commander, officially denies the existence of such a unit within his organization. "There exists a JITEM," Gen. Koman acknowledged,

11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. Testimony by Avci on Feb. 4, 1997, in Veli Ozdemir, ed., *The Susurluk Documents* (Istanbul: SCALA, April 1997), pp. 11-15.

"but not as an official intelligence organization set up by the state. [Rather it is run] by some irresponsible elements within the gendarme. ... I banned the usage of such a title as soon as I recognized counter-terrorism efforts conducted under such a name."¹⁵

Noncommissioned gendarme Huseyin Oguz, an active counterinsurgency officer in the southeast, however, contradicted Gen. Koman. In testimony before the parliamentary investigatory commission, he asserted that JITEM has existed as an official unit linked to the Intelligence Department of the Gendarme General Command.¹⁶

According to Hanefi Avci, deputy intelligence department chief of Turkish Security, "One gang was headed by ex-Interior Minister Mehmet Agar and seconded by Special Police Teams boss Ibrahim Sahin and counterinsurgency specialist former army officer Korkut Eken, with whom Catli was directly linked; and another [gang] was headed by Mehmet Eymur, chair of the Turkish Intelligence Organization's (MIT) counterterrorism department." Shortly after his resignation, Mehmet Agar testified to that same commission. He confirmed that his "operations" were in line with his National Security Council-endorsed schemes of "bringing the war to the PKK."¹⁷

The "Gang" Patrols the Heroin Highway

As the counterinsurgency campaign escalated, greed became a driving and ultimately divisive force. According to intelligence official Avci, "after 1994-95 when the ruthless army crackdown on the PKK forced the guerrillas to retreat, these [government-linked] units degenerated into corrupt gangs which were mainly concerned with grabbing the enormous revenues from drug trafficking and money laundering that had previously been controlled by organized criminals of Kurdish origin."¹⁸

Journalist Berkan concurred that the state-linked

gangs effectively took over the drug trafficking routes and drove out the Kurdish "businessmen." It was not long before the massive profits — about \$20 billion a year — set off a bitter war within the extra-legal units.¹⁹

The large arsenal of assault weapons found in the crashed car fueled widespread speculation that when the "Susurluk" trio died, they may have been on "duty" against a rival "gang" based in their point of departure Kusadasi. The district is one of Turkey's prospective casino hubs. The suspicion was further confirmed when an Istanbul State Security Court prosecutor indicted Sedat Bucak, the sole survivor of the Susurluk car crash. He was charged with carrying a quantity of unauthorized assault weapons beyond what could be justified by self-defense. The prosecutor charged that the passengers intended to assassinate as yet unknown targets.²⁰

More light was soon shed on the role of Gray Wolf Abdullah Catli. Mehmet Eymur, MIT's counterterrorism department chief, and also his rival, counterinsurgency specialist Korkut Eken admitted that Catli was not a simple "gang" henchman. Rather, he had a longstanding official role and had been "used by the state" during the 1970s, bitter conflict between right- and left-wing activists.²¹

19. Ismet Berkan, "Eroinler Elde Kalınca" (When Heroin was Left Over), *Radikal*, Nov. 30, 1996.

20. "Muthis Iddia," *Hurriyet*, March 13, 1997.

21. Testimony by Eken, Dec. 27, 1996, in Ozdemir, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-72.


Tracing the "Gang" to CIA

The parliamentary investigation commission found irrefutable links between organized criminals, fascist assassins, and senior counterinsurgency officials. It also established the existence of a widely organized gang within the state security structures. Nonetheless, many critics charge that the commission did not go far enough in digging out the roots of the problem.

"The links between the illegal right-wing organizations and the Turkish security should be traced back to Gladio," says opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) Deputy Fikri Saglar in his minority report to the parliamentary commission. "Gladio" was a network of secret security organizations set up largely by the US in almost all European NATO-member countries after the end of World War II.

A secret clause in the initial NATO agreement in 1949 required that before a nation could join, it must have already established a national security authority to fight communism through clandestine citizen cadres. This Stay Behind clause grew out of a secret committee set up at US insistence in the Atlantic Pact, the forerunner of NATO22

Under these Stay Behind programs, anticommunist elements, often overtly fascist, were organized, armed, and funded — supposedly as a bulwark against Soviet aggression. Some had links to organized crime; many were involved in terrorist incidents aimed at undermining the left. After public exposure and the disintegration of Washington's major Cold War rival, most countries shelved the US-dominated counterinsurgency schemes. Italy ("Gladio"), Belgium ("SDRA-8"), France ("Rose des Vents"), Holland ("P:26" or "NATO Command"), Greece ("Sheepskin"), Denmark, Luxembourg, Switzerland ("Schwert"), Norway, Aus-



A member of Turkey's neo-fascist Gray Wolves.

15. Sedat Ergin, "The General Speaks," *Hurriyet*, March 17, 1997.

16. Testimony by Oguz on Feb. 18, 1997, in Ozdemir, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33, p. 251.

18. Testimony at Investigative Commission.

R. MAROVERSON

22. Arthur E. Rowse, "Gladio: The Secret U.S. War to Subvert Italian Democracy," *CAQ*, n. 49, Summer 1994, p. 21, citing Jan Willems, *Gladio* (Brussels: EPO Dossier, 1991), pp. 148-52; and interview with Lord Carrington, *Newsweek*, April 21, 1986.

tria, Spain, Britain ("Secret British Network"), Portugal, and Germany have all acknowledged that they participated in the covert network. But although Gladio became public knowledge in Turkey ("Special Warfare Department") years ago and former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said "patriotic volunteers" staffed a US-funded unit that was ready to go into action in the event of a Communist takeover, Ankara officially denies that such an organization ever existed.²³

Some find this denial — coming as it does from a NATO front-line member — incredible and call for openness. "Unless the operations of the Gladio, the NATO-linked international counterinsurgency organization within the Turkish security system is investigated," says commission member Saglar, "the real source of the security corruption will not be effectively discovered. It is necessary to investigate the Special Forces Command, previously known as Special Warfare Department of the Chief of Staff."²⁴

Despite the continuing coverup, it is known that during the 1970s, the Turkish army's Special Warfare Department (Gladio) operated the Counterguerrilla Organization. The department was headquartered in the US Military Aid Mission building in Ankara and received funds and training from US advisers to create the Stay Behind squads. The Gray Wolves, headed by Catli, enjoyed official encouragement and protection.

In the late '70s, former military prosecutor and Turkish Military Supreme Court Justice Emin Deger documented collaboration between the Gray Wolves and the government's counterguerrilla forces, as well as the close ties of the latter to the CIA. The Counterguerrilla Organization provided weapons to terrorist groups such as the Gray Wolves, who instigated much of the political violence that culminated in a 1980 coup by the Turkish military that deposed Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. State security forces justified the coup in the name of restoring order and stability. Cold War realpolitik compelled the



Gray Wolves and their institutional sponsor, the ultra-right National Action Party, to favor a discreet alliance with NATO and U.S. intelligence. Led by Col. Alpaslan Turkes, the National Action Party espoused a fanatical pan-Turkish ideology that called for repatriating whole sections of the Soviet Union under the flag of a reborn Turkish empire. The Gray Wolves forged ties with the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, a CIA-backed coalition led by erstwhile fascist collaborators from Eastern Europe. ... Colleagues of Turkes controlled a Turkish chapter of the World Anti-Communist League, an umbrella group that functioned as a cat's paw for US intelligence in Latin America, Southwest Asia and other Cold War battlegrounds.²⁵

As the Susurluk affair illuminated, the clandestine dynamic had not ended with the Cold War. Citing links dating back to the 1970s between Catli and the state security units, Saglar wrote in his report that "the gangs that were formed in 1993 were actually based on an already existing extra-legal mechanism which has been publicly known as counter-guerrilla during the 1970s." Saglar quotes government Deputy Niyazi Unsal: "The counter-guerrilla organization has survived until this day without losing any of its former influence. All those who testified at the investigatory commission, says Saglar,

Bust of Turkey's first president, Mustafa Ataturk (1923-39), who established a secular "modern" state.

"have introduced serious claims regarding links between 'gangs' and the security units, that undeniably confirm moral and material support to those gangs from among high security officials."²⁶

Chief among those carrying Gladio's standard into the 1990s are the Gray Wolves. With little subtlety, Catli's companions in the neo-fascist Wolves proudly carried a banner in his funeral procession inscribed: "He fought like a Sword and died like a sword!" (Gladio means sword in Italian.)

"Our Boys Have Done It!"

The crash of the Mercedes has not only provided answers about the relationship between criminal, fascist, and security elements, but has raised new questions. Fikri Saglar, in his minority report to the parliamentary commission, expresses concerns that the presence of Catli, the fugitive drug dealer in the Mercedes of a police chief 16 years after the military takeover, might point to the fact that Catli and his kind had played an effective role in the coup. "Catli, his family and companions had left Turkey with false passports provided by the security officials immediately after the coup and under apparent protection by the state," Saglar charges, referring to Turkey's military rulers of the 1980s.²⁷

23. Charles Richards and Simon Jones, "Skeletons start emerging from Europe's closet; Operation Gladio was set up to go underground in the Cold War," *The Independent* (London), Nov. 16, 1990.

24. From Investigative Commission's Minority Report.

25. Martin A. Lee, "The cop, the gangster and the beauty queen," *In These Times*, April 28-May 11, 1997.

26. Mehmet Altan, "Susurluk'ta Bayram" (Holiday in Susurluk), *Sabah*, April 22, 1997.
27. *Ibid.*

Also being questioned is the role of the US and especially that of the CIA. Throughout the Cold War era, Turkey was the frontline state in NATO's South-eastern flank and Washington's major regional military ally against the former Soviet Bloc. It was then, and continues to be, a vanguard post for US strategic interests.

The close ties between the Turkish, US military, and intelligence circles, along with US concerns over Turkey's military cooperation, have been major obstacles in Turkey's path to broader democracy. Turkey's US-backed military has viewed movements for increased democracy with hostility and accused them of undermining the country's stability and consequently its military might. Turkey's pro-US conservative politicians and military rulers have continually targeted leftist, democratic, and labor movements that have striven for broader rights. Alongside official pressure, the military has frequently resorted to unofficial force to quell the massive opposition movements that began in the second half of the 1960s. During the last four decades, Turkey has been subjected to three military coups, all of which have declared their obedience to NATO obligations and all of which have been unreservedly backed and even encouraged by Washington. Ankara continues to be the fourth largest recipient of US aid.

Saglar charges that US interest in Turkish affairs is not confined to official NATO relations and trade ties. He points to the notorious message by the CIA's then-Turkey Station Chief Paul Henze in Ankara to his colleagues in Washington the day after the 1980 coup — "Our boys have done it!" Henze crowed.²⁸ Saglar concludes that foreign intelligence organizations including the CIA, have coopted collaborators from among the extreme-right and exploited them for their particular interests.

Saglar's charge is lent credence by the fact that Yasar Oz — one of the drug traffickers carrying the Green Passports signed by Mehmet Agar — was arrested by the Drug Enforcement Administration in New York and immediately released. There is also evidence that Catli himself entered the US in 1982 in Miami with his "false" green passport. Traveling with him was Italian Gladio agent Stefano Delle Chiaie, who has been charged with

involvement in the blast in Italy's Bologna Train Station in the 1980s.²⁹

Shifting Threats

The "Susurluk affair" has capped an overwhelming body of evidence and testimony against major military and security officials. If Turkey were a functioning democracy, the immediate outcome would at the very least have been a series of prosecutions.

However, the Turkish military, which set up, conducted, and oversaw this uninterrupted deadly counterinsurgency operation against leftists and Kurdish nationalists throughout the last three decades, is in an enviable position. It has emerged from an embar-

An army PR drive changed the public agenda from "cleansing the Turkish democracy of the gangs" to "safeguarding the secular republic against the fundamentalist threat."

assing period during the first two months of the year when sweeping public protest rang in the streets of Turkey. Every night at 9 p.m., angry crowds called for "cleansing the country from the gangs." Since February 28, the military has regained confidence and restored its reputation as the traditional watchdog of Turkish secularism. This recovery is largely due to an extensive media-backed drive launched by the military high command against the Islamist-led coalition. The army has positioned itself as champion of the secular republic against a fundamentalist "threat" posed by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's senior coalition Welfare Party (RP). The military high command has called on Erbakan and his party to enforce existing anti-fundamentalist laws and to draft new legislation for educational reforms, including closure of the religious seminaries which they consider the hotbed of Islamist fundamentalism.

Overnight, the carefully designed and precisely timed military drive has changed the public agenda from that of "cleansing the Turkish democracy of the gangs" to "safeguarding the secular republic against the fundamentalist threat." As a result, a considerable section of the opposition has realigned itself behind the military which has positioned itself as Turkey's hope for maintaining Westernist secularism and modernist aspirations.

These days, few of the "modernists" recall the era of military juntas in the early 1980s when Turkey's military rulers adopted "a green belt strategy" after the revolution in Iran and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

The idea, promoted in some Washington circles, was to construct a bulwark alliance of US-backed Muslim countries in order to confine Soviet southward expansion, and to combat radical Islamist power in Iran and elsewhere in the region.³⁰

It was in accordance with this "green belt strategy," and in the name of "secularism," that the army has seized on Erbakan's "Islamic threat" as a major justification for increasing

its already substantial powers. To a large extent, this stance is hypocritical. "The constitution drafted by military rulers, for instance, deemed religious courses obligatory for all levels of pre-university education, and set up religious seminaries which served as seedbeds for Islamist ideology. This was much more than any civilian government, in a political compromise with the Islamists might have dared to try."³¹


Turkey is now trapped between the two giants — the "gang" and the fundamentalists — both of which have been nurtured by the army to serve its needs. At the same time, as Turkey's secularist establishment seeks salvation by calling on the army for aid for a fourth time in the last four decades, the country seems to have lost its historical memory. Meanwhile, Turkey's key dilemma remains: How to set up and maintain a functioning democracy on Western standards in a majority Muslim country. ■

28. Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül Saat 04:00* (September 12:04 am) (Istanbul: Milliyet Publishers, 1985), p. 1.

29. Dogan Uluc, "Eroin Belgelendi" (Heroin Link Documented), *Hurriyet*, Feb. 2, 1997. See also Rowse, *op. cit.*

30. Ertugrul Kurkcü, "The Crisis of The Turkish State," *Middle East Report*, n. 199, v. 26, Spring 1996, p. 6.
31. *Ibid.*

How to Cure AIDS, Reinvent Government, Make H-Bombs and \$5 Billion a Year



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

by Jeffrey St. Clair and Alexander Cockburn

The story of how the AIDS plague was recruited to boost H-bomb production, but one bizarre moment in a notably amazing saga of “reinventing government” in the Clinton-Gore years, begins in Washington D.C., on November 20, 1995. For the leading players in our tale, that fall day was overshadowed by a long-dreaded and now

impending event: the final shut-down of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), a breeder reactor at the Department of Energy’s (DoE) Hanford Nuclear Reservation in eastern Washington state.

The Fast Flux, as it is familiarly known, had been placed on standby status in the Bush years, scheduled for decommissioning for the sound reason that it had long outlived its mission — to test fuels and materials for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. That Tennessee facility had pursued a spectacularly poisonous career under the

unremitting solicitude of then-Sen. Al Gore before Congress terminated the project in the early 1980s.

Glumly contemplating the Fast Flux shutdown were several hundred Department of Energy contractor employees and a consortium of about a dozen large corporate contractors at Hanford, including Westinghouse, Lockheed (now Lockheed Martin), Batelle, Bechtel, TRW Environmental, Fluor, and Informatics. This last company is a consulting firm composed of former DoE contractor officials previously employed by Rockwell,

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some of whom had worked at Hanford. Representatives of these groups were joined at the November meeting by Washington congressional delegation staffers led by Marla Marvin, a former timber industry lobbyist who now works for Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.). Murray and Rep. Richard "Doc" Hastings (R-Wash.) had fervently supported a new bomb-making mission for the Hanford reactors.¹

On the other side of the table (though the geometry of furniture scarcely does justice to the cordial nature of the relationship) was Dr. Terry R. Lash, director of the DoE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology. The impresario of the entire conclave was Richard Thompson, a former Air Force officer and Democratic Party wheeler dealer/entrepreneur in Washington state.

As a confidential DoE memo on the occasion frankly noted, the purpose of the meeting was to stave off shutdown until the Fast Flux could be transferred to private ownership, retooled at taxpayer expense, and then launched on its new tightly focused "tritium only" mission. The Consortium estimated that production of the radioactive material would net the partners from \$4 billion to \$5 billion a year. "The Consortium's interest in the Fast Flux," the

DoE memo states, "is contingent on the Consortium securing a 20-year contract with the Department for the purchase of tritium irradiation services. Without a tritium production contract, the Consortium is not interested in the facility."²

For those not intimately acquainted with the finer points of thermonuclear weapons production, let it be said that tritium is a radioactive gas that puts the

Decades of nuclear production have rendered the area a radioactive wasteland. A so-called "tritium plume" spreads out across the aquifer under the facility and seeps into the nearby Columbia River. Moreover, a new generation of H-bomb production at Hanford would arouse the hated legions of Greenpeace to disruptive activity.

Worse yet, news that tritium might be produced at Hanford would detonate the congressional delegations of New Mexico and South Carolina, led by those most puissant of legislators, Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), whose half life is five times that of tritium. Earlier in 1995, New Mexico's Los Alamos National Laboratory and South Carolina's Savannah River Nuclear Plant had been selected by the DoE as the primary sites for tritium production. A "tritium only mission" at Hanford, a secret Consortium memo emphasized with fierce underlinings, "has ZERO chance/probability of

success — the delegations from South Carolina and New Mexico will KILL the 'tritium only' mission, leaving Hanford with NO long term mission."⁴

Earlier in 1995, the DoE endorsed producing tritium through the development of a linear accelerator reactor. The Department plans to build a prototype accelerator at the Los Alamos labs and a production facility at the Savannah River Nuclear Plant, where the tritium canisters from nuclear warheads are currently replenished.

In the fraught moment, it was Thompson, the operator from Washington, who pointed a way out. Looking at the DoE's Lash, Thompson counseled: "You all should be riding the AIDS cure bandwagon." To a hushed audience, Thompson outlined his plan, distributing a memo labeled "Sensitive and Confidential" and titled "Privatize the Fast Flux."⁵ The overall strategic thrust was a plan



HEART OF AMERICA NORTHWEST

Hanford has become a bleak radioactive wasteland.

oomph into an H-bomb explosion. The compound, which is not needed for A-bomb production, has a half-life of 12.3 years. So to keep nuclear weapons user-ready, the tritium needs to be regularly replaced. If the START II (Strategic Arms Reduction) treaty is not implemented, a shortfall in the US tritium stockpile is expected by 2005,³ if the treaty is approved, the supply will last until 2015.

Tridlocy

The juxtaposition of the two words "Hanford" and "tritium" was itself—as all present at the November meeting knew well — politically fissile to the highest degree. For one thing, the specter of tritium production haunts the region around Hanford.


2. DoE, "Summary of November 20, 1995 Meeting on Privatization Proposal for Hanford FFTF," Nov. 21, 1995.

3. DoE, "Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Storage and Disposition of Weapons Usable Fissile Materials," Jan. 14, 1997.

4. "Messages to Dan Evans," the undated handwritten notes of Dick Thompson, vice president of Advanced Nuclear and Medical Systems (ANMS).

5. "Summary of November 20, 1995 Meeting ...," *op. cit.* Evans was a staffer to Sen. Murray. Thompson is concerned that unless Murray touts the medical uses of restarting the Fast Flux, the proposal will be killed by the South Carolina delegation, which wants tritium production to be the exclusive domain of the Savannah River reactor.

1. Sign-in record of Nov. 20, 1995 meeting at office of Dr. Terry Lash, Department of Energy (DoE), Washington, D.C.



"They're doing more things for more people in more places than anyone else—and now we know how."


For investigators who discovered Fluor's role in the Fast Flux scheme, this cartoon from the company's 1996 annual report is cause for cynical nods.

to transfer a public asset worth billions to private hands at no cost to the latter. The tactics were candidly outlined for the DoE bureaucrats.

It was crucial, Thompson's memo counseled, to stress the "humanitarian mission" of Fast Flux *redivivus*. Blithely ignoring the fact that the Fast Flux was producing nothing of the sort, the memo proclaimed: "We should mount a PR campaign to save America's last producer of medical isotopes." Thompson said the campaign should emphasize that more than of 95 percent of the medical isotopes now used in the US are imported. "This will capture the patriotic allegiance/flair of Congress." Under no circumstances, the memo emphasized, should the subject of tritium production be broached. Instead, "the undeniable worthiness of the humanitarian mission must be highlighted and exploited to the maximum sensitivity of our society."⁶

Prominent in Thompson's mind was the O'Leary problem. Hazel O'Leary, then-secretary of energy, had declared that all the nuclear reactors at Hanford should be shut down permanently and the mission of the reservation would become one of environmental cleanup. Tritium production would be a totally new assignment, for Hanford and would return it to the nuclear bomb business. If O'Leary were to endorse that course and renege on that public commitment to clean up, she would need political cover, and what better camouflage than the war on AIDS?

On November 28, 1995, eight days after the meeting with Lash, a letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) arrived on O'Leary's desk. It mirrored the themes Thompson had articulated just over a week earlier. Kennedy urged O'Leary to "evaluate the potential of the Fast Flux in supplying radiopharmaceuticals to meet the Nation's medical requirements." Kennedy called for an immediate halt to the decommissioning of the Fast Flux while the DoE considered the privatization-scheme offered by the Consortium. Fast Flux, he



Three months before he died, John Chidester is treated for complications of AIDS.

enthused, might "lead to a cure for cancer and AIDS."⁷ A month later on, December 22, 1995, Lash wrote Kennedy a letter acknowledging that "FFTF has not produced medical isotopes since 1990, and it is not necessary to DoE's isotope production mission."

The coincidence of views between Kennedy and Thompson was scarcely accidental. Thompson had enlisted a grad student at Central Washington University, Randall Bonebrake, to arrange financing and political support for the Consortium. Bonebrake had a friend in the Kennedy camp who lost no time in impressing Fast Flux's potential on his employer. Days after O'Leary received Kennedy's request, Hanford officials stopped draining the sodium coolant from the Fast Flux reactor core and placed the plant on "hot stand-by." Stage one of the renaissance of the Fast Flux had been successfully achieved.

Playing the Cancer Card

The Consortium now faced a delicate task: While DoE was sympathetic to

plans to produce tritium (although it favored using Savannah River's linear accelerator), the Consortium had to persuade state and federal elected officials that Fast Flux should postpone its newfound mission of medical mercy and focus on tritium. It could then sell the H-bomb ingredient to the DoE and use the profits to finance production of the medical isotopes some 15 years down the road. All this had to be done without alienating the New Mexico or South Carolina delegations. To this end, the three most powerful members of the Washington state congressional delegation paid a visit to O'Leary. Sens. Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Patty Murray, along with the redoubtable Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), ensconced themselves in the secretary's office and, as another DoE memo reported, "reinforced their united view that Fast Flux should be included as a possible tritium production option."⁸

Dicks fastened on two vital points. At that time DoE was preparing an environmental impact statement on tritium production in connection with possible output and waste disposal at Savannah River and Los Alamos. It was vital, Dicks insisted,

"You all should be riding the AIDS cure bandwagon," Thompson counseled the DoE bureaucrat.

that this report at least mention the Hanford reactor as a possible option in producing tritium. In case of any inconvenient brandishing of the nation's environmental laws, this appeal to national security would get everyone off the hook. Dicks also noted that since the Savannah River facility would not be operational until 2012, some of the political opposition to the Fast Flux's

6. Richard Thompson, "Private Industry Control and Operation of Fast Flux Test Facility: A Presentation to the US Department of Energy," Nov. 20, 1995.

7. Letter to Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary, from Sen. Edward Kennedy, Nov. 28, 1995.

8. DoE internal memo, "Follow Up on O'Leary Meeting with Washington Delegation on FFTF," April 1, 1996.

tritium mission could be deflected by labeling it an "interim" project.⁹

By now, the Consortium was running at full tilt under the name Advanced Nuclear & Medical Systems (ANMS). Its next task was to breach the ramparts of the White House itself. Mistrusting O'Leary, it turned first to the First Lady's influence-peddling brother, Hugh Rodham, at that time mingling the practice of law in Miami with the hosting of a syndicated radio show.¹⁰

We now depend on the narrative of Randall Bonebrake, who in October 1996 blew the whistle on the whole scheme, thus landing himself in deep trouble and in a state courthouse in Ellensburg, Washington, on charges of felony possession of stolen property.¹¹ According to Bonebrake, Richard Thompson and his partner William Stokes, respectively vice president and president of Advanced Nuclear & Medical Systems, approached Rodham to press their cause with the Clintons. Rodham duly wrote a letter to President Clinton touting the privatization scheme and raised the matter with his sister. Under instructions from Thompson, he strongly emphasized personal themes. Had Advanced Nuclear & Medical Systems been up and running a decade earlier, Rodham stressed to the Clintons,



Whistleblower Randall Bonebrake

COURTESY OF RANDALL BONEBRAKE

things might have gone very differently for Clinton's mother and Al Gore's sister, both felled by cancer. In April 1996, Thompson was a guest on Rodham's radio show where he vigorously touted the AIDS cure potential of the Fast Flux.

As the 1996 presidential campaign gathered momentum, so did the Consortium's lobbying offensive. Glen Phipps, a Democratic congressional hopeful in the Hanford district, had a private audience with the president in April of that year, in which he claimed that restarting the Fast Flux would generate thousands of new jobs. Vice President Al Gore and his staff received no fewer than four briefings on the subject from March through June. Thompson told Gore how beautifully the privatization of the Hanford nuclear

plant would fit with the vice president's "reinventing government" initiative.

Despite Hugh Rodham's diligence, Thompson and his cohorts had yet to attain their supreme political objective,

"I suddenly found myself in the center of an international market in nuclear waste," said Bonebrake. "It was bizarre and frightening."

face time with the president. The big corporations in the Consortium were shoveling truckloads of money at the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The Fluor Corp., for example, gave \$100,000 to the DNC on May 6; two months later, the company won the \$5 billion management contract for Hanford, previously held by Westinghouse.¹² Fluor had had the prudence to

12. Federal Election Commission files show that between Jan. 1, 1995 and Nov. 1, 1996, Fluor Corp. gave the Democrats \$203,000. The company was awarded the Hanford contract despite being under investigation for mismanagement of the Fernald DoE site in Ohio, where

hire Peter Knight as its lobbyist a year earlier. Well placed politically, he subsequently became campaign manager for the Clinton/Gore reelection effort. Despite allegations surfacing in early 1996 that Fluor's handling of the cleanup of the Fernald Nuclear Plant in Ohio was incompetent, costly, and dangerous, the Hanford contract was signed off on by Thomas Grumbly, deputy secretary of energy and a former Gore staffer.¹³

Lacking Fluor's resources, Thompson and Stokes used a more personal approach. They hired Vincent Tomaso, a Democratic Party operator from Chicago who was a close friend of White House press spokesperson Mike McCurry and of former DNC chair David Wilhelm, himself a Chicagoan. Memos (see p. 18) then passed from Thompson and Tomaso to the White House staffers.¹⁴

These memos soon found their mark and a meeting was set between Thompson, Tomaso, and senior White House aide George Stephanopoulos. According to Thompson's notes, "both Clinton and Gore had given 'thumbs up' to the project and after a one-hour briefing to George Stephanopoulos, he 'strongly endorsed the process.'"¹⁵ After the successful session, Thompson and Tomaso finally got their meeting with Clinton at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

A few days before Thompson and Tomaso imparted their vision to Clinton, they were able to ambush Hillary Rodham Clinton in Seattle, where she was visiting the Hutchinson Cancer Center. Flourishing what Bonebrake says are entirely fictitious and misrepresented research papers from the Center, Thompson and Tomaso touted the new Hanford as a "medical Mecca" with colossal potential for victory over cancer and AIDS.¹⁶ (Hanford is of course infamous for having itself caused thousands of cancers —

the company has been accused of dozens of safety violations and cost overruns approaching \$500 million.

13. Knight also represented another Hanford contractor, Lockheed Martin. The defense aerospace giant is listed in a Dec. 5, 1995 memo from Thompson to Lash as one of the companies backing privatization for Fast Flux. 14. Dick Thompson and Vincent Tomaso, "Personal and Sensitive Memo to Mike McCurry, Julie Mason, and David Wilhelm on Fast Flux Reactor," April 30, 1996.

15. "Messages to Dan Evans," *op. cit.*

16. Thompson and Tomaso, "Memo to McCurry," *op. cit.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. Interview with Randall Bonebrake, April 5 and 6, 1997.

11. Much of our story depends upon information given to us by Randall Bonebrake. We conducted a wide-ranging telephone interview with him for more than six hours on April 10 and 11, 1997. He discussed his background as a student in Europe and at Central Washington, his first contact with Dick Thompson and subsequent employment with Thompson's companies, his role in helping to broker the transfer of plutonium from the Kalkar reactor to ANMS, the moves he made to arrange financing for the project, his decision to blow the whistle on the scheme, and the events leading up to his arrest and trial. Most of Bonebrake's story is backed up by thousands of pages of documents, including internal memos from ANMS and correspondence with the DoE. Bonebrake's version of events is also substantiated by internal memos from the DoE, which document the lobbying efforts on the Fast Flux by the ANMS officers, Washington state politicians, and DoE staffers. William Stokes, Dick Thompson, and Hugh Rodham failed to respond to repeated requests for interviews.

mostly of the thyroid gland — during its 40-year history as a plutonium factory.)

Fast Flux's Continental Drift

Politically the pieces were all in place. Now the vital factors were financing and fuel. Bonebrake was assigned that mission. In August 1996, during a trip to Europe to round up venture capital, he set up a meeting in Essen, Germany, for himself and Thompson with executives from Schnell-Bruter-Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft (SBK), a conglomerate of Dutch, Belgian, and German utility companies. In the late 1980s, SBK had helped construct a German breeder reactor at Kalkar, the SNR-300, which had proved to be an economic disaster, mired in cost overruns and burdened with 205 highly radioactive plutonium fuel rods, now stored in Hannau, Germany, and Dunreay, Scotland. The SBK executives offered Thompson's firm \$35.8 million to take this liability off their hands, removing the rods to Hanford and using them to fuel the Fast Flux.¹⁷

It was not the first time SBK had looked westward for relief. The company had tried to off-load the rods to Hanford in 1991, but the Bush administration rejected the proposal when it decided to shut down the Fast Flux.¹⁸ SBK didn't give up. It secured the services of a Washington, D.C. fixer, Howard K. Shapar, a senior partner at the lobbying firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge. Shapar specializes in representing foreign nuclear companies seeking to do business in the US. His clients include the Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organization, Denmark's Rise National Laboratory, Germany's NUKEM GmbH, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Sweden's Studsvik Nuclear A.B., and the Taiwan Power Co. All of these companies are looking to the US as a potential repository for research reactor spent fuel, although they are not yet trying to unload their spent commercial fuel. Shapar was particularly attracted by the Hanford option presented by

17. J.E. Mecca, director of transition programs, "Cost Estimates for Re-Manufacture of SBK-RNE SNR-300 Fuel Assemblies," DoE, Aug. 15, 1996.

18. "Memorandum of Understanding between Schnell-Bruter-Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft and Westinghouse Hanford Co. for Study of Possible Supply of SNR-300 Fuel for FFTF Use," Sept. 13, 1991.

DAVID MAUNGIMPACT VISUALS



Thompson. To help open Hanford's gates to foreign nuclear materials, Shapar had enlisted the help of one of his other clients, Nuclear Fuels Services, Inc., an outfit with the virtue of being the only US firm with a permit to transport, internationally, any nuclear fuels or waste. The firm was headed by a man legendary in nuclear circles, Paul Shutt, a student of Albert Einstein.

Shapar, Thompson, Bonebrake, and Shutt met in Paris shortly after the meeting with the SBK executives in Germany. Bonebrake says that Shutt promised to acquire all necessary permits for the transport to and disposition at Hanford of the SBK plutonium rods. Shutt said that he would convince DoE officials that leaving the fuel in Europe presented a security risk. This ap-

Had the project been running earlier, first brother-in-law Rodham told the Clintons, things might have gone differently for Clinton's mother and Al Gore's sister, both felled by cancer.

proach yielded speedy results. A memo to Secretary O'Leary from Willis W. Bixby, deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Materials and Facilities Stabilization, recommends that "from a non-

Hanford downwinders Robert and Betty Perkes have chronic thyroid disorders. Since the '60s, area residents have complained of high rates of cancer in humans and livestock.

proliferation aspect, the US government should encourage the transfer of material from Germany to the US. If the US does not take the fuel, the Germans may be forced to reprocess it. ... Executing this transfer will require close cooperation with and support from numerous stakeholder groups, governments and agencies."¹⁹ Translation: a lucrative contract for Nuclear Fuels Services, Inc.

For his part, Shapar placed Bonebrake and Thompson in contact with some of his other European clients, arranging for further shipments of nuclear fuel. "I suddenly found myself in the center of an international market in nuclear waste," Bonebrake tells us. "It was bizarre and frightening."

In August, Bonebrake was beginning to have qualms about the entire scheme. A little late perhaps, he started to feel that Thompson, who was involved in various financial and personal scandals, was "a damn crook." Additionally, Bonebrake suddenly discerned — again, perhaps a little late —

19. Willis Bixby, deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Materials and Facilities Stabilization, "Memo to Secretary Hazel O'Leary on Storage of Enriched Plutonium at Hanford," undated.

Advanced Nuclear & Medical Systems

Date: April 30, 1996

To: Mike McCurry, Julie Mason & David Wilhelm

At Office: The White House

Office Phone: 202 456-2673

From: ANMS Bill Stokes, Vincent Tomaso & Dick Thompson

MESSAGE: Sincere Greetings!! Thank you for taking your valuable time to review this issue.

What's This All About??? The umbrella subject is "privatization of the world's most advanced nuclear reactor." Our corporation, ANMS, proposed to DOE on November 20, 1995, to use these shutdown government facilities at our own private expense. We have the private funding available to take over operational control of the facilities at no additional expense to the government. Under this umbrella are several other key issues — listed below is only a partial numeration of what the ANMS operations would include:

1. research and cure for cancers (proven success with lymphoma trials; 95% cure of terminally diagnosed patients); anticipate greater success with "Alpha's";
2. cure for AIDS (promising clinical results; need tests of population sample — see explanation in video);
3. production of other commercial isotopes (medical, agricultural, industrial and business applications); the private-public consortium will include ANMS, Texas A&M, WSU, NMSU, Baylor School of Medicine, several cancer research centers, University of Arkansas, LSU Medical School, Boston Children's Hospital, Kansas University, Department of the Army and Department of Energy;
4. production of tritium — effectively, quickly and cheaper than what DOE/DOD is presently paying; proposal offers quickest method to produce tritium and protect stockpiles at least cost;
5. establishment of a "medical mecca" — research application technology, treatment facilities and a major hospital complex of international demand;
6. re-use of government facilities — utilizes \$3.5 Billion worth of facilities scheduled for mothballing, and also saves/delays construction expenditures of \$8B to \$16B;
6. [sic] saves 600-800 jobs — creates 3000-5000 quality jobs;
7. burns nuclear waste (plutonium) at a higher rate than any other available facility; does not create (breed) additional radioactive waste materials;
8. creates an ideal opportunity — a "dream come true" to a campaign manager — for the Administration to "save" this project by supporting the consistent themes of reinventing government, efficiently using taxpayer money, non-proliferation, getting rid of nuclear waste products, curing cancer and AIDS, creating jobs, weaning America's severe dependency on foreign isotopes, and cutting health care costs approximately \$40B a year (yes ... that's Billion!)

WHY YOUR INVOLVEMENT IS CRITICAL:

Please focus on items #1, 2 & 8. Certainly you are the experts in devising campaign strategies — we are neophytes in that arena! However, from our perspective, it appears all the elements are present for a productive campaign scenario. Placing these issues of health care (not to mention the other cogent issues!) in a platform crucible may formulate an Administrative decision that will impact America and most of the world for the next 100 years or longer. It's dramatic — and it's true.

There is NO OTHER ISSUE IN THE WORLD — short range or of lengthy endurance — that will be more sensational, humanely worthy, heart touching to BILLIONS of people, and internationally acclaimed than the cure of cancer and AIDS. That's a fact. And the impact is real — it will touch two out of every three Americans.

This opportunity to succeed is within our grasp — NOW! ... The nuclear fuel is available to our corporation and the plant operations may legally come under the wing of DOE authority. The privatization proposal is unique, technically substantiated and was presented to the Secretary of the DOE in early November of 1995. The concept and planned details fit hand-in-glove with the Administration's broadcast policies of "reinventing government" and "common sense decisions."

President Clinton must be introduced to this scenario — and be convinced that with the approval of this privatization project, the Clinton/Gore team will sweep Washington and Oregon in the November election.

This is why we need your help — this is why you must get involved to expedite the appropriate message to the Oval Office.

WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS?

You are the "masters" who should answer this question. Some thoughts from our staff — we offer humbly and diplomatically:

1. A focused briefing (:05-:10 minutes) to the President and appropriate members of the White House staff.
2. An executive order from the President to privatize FFTF and FMEF;
3. Tour of the specific facilities by appropriate members of your staff, including individual discussions with ANMS' technical & management team;
4. Ceremony on Fourth of July; a ribbon-cutting which officially opens the FFTF and FMEF and recognizes the *largest successful privatization effort in the history of DOE* — attended by at least 30,000 people. (NOTE: In 1963, President Kennedy "threw the switch" at Hanford which started the world's most advanced reactor at the time — over 20,000 attended the ceremony.) Covered by national media — participants on the ceremonial platform would obviously be at your discretion. We suggest the President, joined by VP Gore, Senator Patty Murray and other Congressional delegates and candidates, labor union officials and the local Democratic Central Committee Chair;

TIMING NECESSITIES:

Urgent — critical — life-saving — of the highest priority. Without inflating the necessary timing impact, I offer this reminder: every day there are 1500 who die of cancer. Every day our government continues to vacillate with this decision, we lose friends, sons and daughters, other family members — you get the point. We don't have time to waste — we don't have time to do another six month study or to allow an "expert review committee" the luxury of a lackadaisical review of this project.

We need action — we need leadership decisions — now!

Very respectfully,
William S. Stokes, President

Vincent Tomaso, Government relations
Richard G. Thompson, Jr., Vice-president/founder


the real purpose of Advanced Nuclear & Medical Systems. Shapar confided to him that, as Bonebrake recalls it, "with a little modification, any nuclear fuel from commercial reactors in Europe could be used for almost anything, even tritium production." Bonebrake woke up to the fact that he was involved in what appeared to be a conspiracy to breach the International Atomic Energy Treaty, which forbids trade in commercial nuclear fuel for the production of nuclear weapons. He also realized that the German Constitution prohibited the government and any German company from having anything to do with the production of nuclear weapons. A final factor in Bonebrake's trepidations was his instructions from Thompson to set up labyrinthine overseas accounts in Liechtenstein and the Cayman Islands to house the cash from SBK and conduct transactions with other European nuclear companies.

As the embattled Thompson surveyed his operations in September of 1996, he must have felt a surge of pride in the Napoleonic speed and success of his campaign. Everything was now in place, and polls showed that his benefactor, the Clinton administration, faced easy victory. It looked as though O'Leary's Energy Department would OK the privatization plan. The Fast Flux was still humming away in hot standby, awaiting its new mission. Thompson could almost touch his billions.

Hear That Lonesome Whistle Blow

Thompson, however, had not reckoned on Bonebrake, who was feeling ever more deeply that "I was up to my ass with a bunch of crooks, wondering how far they were willing to go. I didn't want to be implicated in their crimes and wanted to try to undo what I had helped to create." On October 4, carrying a briefcase crammed with internal documents from Thompson and the DoE, Bonebrake met with the IRS in Seattle. He says agents listened with interest, indicated there was not much they could do, but that the *Seattle Times* was just down the street. This course was not exactly what Bonebrake, looking to cover himself, had in mind. Instead, he went to Greenpeace, where he met with Tom Clements, of the group's International Nuclear Campaign.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY



Clements counseled two courses. First, he advised Bonebrake to leak the whole affair to the media. The whistleblower decided on the German weekly, *Der Spiegel*, thus raising alarm in Europe and blocking the planned SBK shipments. Second, Clements advised Bonebrake to unburden himself to the Washington, D.C.-based Government Accountability Project, which might give him some protection as a whistleblower when Bonebrake's betrayed associates turned on him, as he accurately predicted they would.

On October 8, Bonebrake learned that Thompson was about to leave for

Bonebrake realized he might be involved in a conspiracy to breach an international treaty forbidding trade in commercial nuclear fuel for nuclear weapons production.

Washington, D.C., to sign a contract with the Energy Department, commencing the privatization of the Fast Flux. Bonebrake duly cleaned out his office in Ellensburg, northwest of Hanford, collected his files and headed to D.C. for a meeting with reporters from *Der Spiegel* and Greenpeace. He spent four days telling them his story and di-

Top-to-bottom view of a 55-foot-high section of Hanford's Fast Flux breeder reactor.

rected them to Thompson's hotel, where they confronted the schemer. The story broke in Germany, causing political uproar.²⁰

Two weeks later Bonebrake was in jail in Washington state, charged with stealing the documents. The Washington police had shown up at his Ellensburg home as the Bonebrakes were settling down to dinner. Bonebrake's father opened the door to find the police preparing to smash it down with a battering ram. They demanded Bonebrake's files. He quickly handed them over and the cops ransacked the house. Bonebrake, who faced a possible 12 years in prison and fines exceeding half a million dollars, sat in jail for two weeks before being released on bail the night of the elections — after the polls had closed. The charges had been lodged by Richard Thompson, who claimed that the material Bonebrake had given to the *Der Spiegel* reporters was "proprietary information worth millions of dollars." In fact, nearly all of the Bonebrake Papers have been made publicly available by the DoE through Freedom of Information Act requests lodged by the Government Account-

20. "Gans Heiss" (Very Hot), *Der Spiegel*, n. 43, Oct. 21, 1996, p. 118.

A Pox on MOX

The Fast Flux would be fired with mixed oxide fuel or MOX, a blend of uranium dioxide and plutonium dioxide. On January 14, 1997, the DoE endorsed the idea of disposing of tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by "burning" it in nuclear reactors, including the Fast Flux. The Fuels Materials Evaluation Facility, a plant adjacent to the Fast Flux which was originally built to reprocess spent fuels from the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, could be retooled to fabricate MOX fuel for the Fast Flux or other nuclear reactors.

Environmental and peace groups charge that the Clinton administration's proposal to produce tritium for nuclear warheads from MOX fuel risks both radioactive contamination and further weapons proliferation. "Plutonium must be considered as a doubly dangerous nuclear waste," says Tom Clements, director of Greenpeace's nuclear campaign. "It must be isolated both from the environment for thousands of years and from easy human handling if we are to guarantee nuclear non-proliferation and human security." ■

ability Project. On May 7, 1997, the trial ended in a hung jury; the prosecution announced that the state would not retry the case.

Passion to Privatize

None of these explosive goings-on appears to have perturbed the DoE, now headed by former Transportation Secretary Federico Peña. One of O'Leary's last acts — before she headed into private life and a seat on the board of the powerful energy company AES — was to approve Hanford's role as a potential site for tritium production and for the burning of commercial nuclear waste in the Fast Flux reactor.²¹ The price tag for keeping the Fast Flux in hot standby for two years is roughly \$30 million a year, money that will be diverted from Hanford's already impoverished environmental clean-up accounts.²² A decision on the reactor's status will be made in 1998.

O'Leary's Energy Department made this decision, knowing all the while that the Fast Flux was not designed for such a role. In a March 1996 report, given to us by the Government Accountability Project, DoE's Office of Defense Programs reviewed the Fast Flux's capability to burn enriched plutonium and produce tritium. The report stated explicitly, "No engineer would propose a fast reactor to make tritium from lithium, which is a thermal neutron absorber, and modifying a test reactor to the strength capacity of a production machine ... places the plant at great risk."²³

21. DoE, "Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials," Jan. 14, 1997.

22. Fiscal year 1998, DoE budget request.

23. Max Clausen, briefing to the Tritium Executive

The Office of Defense Programs cautioned that any use of the Fast Flux in this manner "could trigger a very serious accident." The results might be "catastrophic."²⁴ This report was transmitted to O'Leary on March 21, 1996, by her deputy secretary Charles Curtis, who dryly noted that it would be "fair to say that Terry Lash [before whom Thompson had made his initial pitch in 1995] would reserve judgment on this matter. However I believe that it is important to face the issue, make a decision and move on. I am convinced that the Fast Flux presents too many risks to warrant further investment or inquiry."²⁵ O'Leary ignored this advice.

This story — and if we believe Charles Curtis, it could have climaxed in a Chernobyl-type explosion — is not merely the epitaph to a scam, but an omen of what is to come. Reagan and Bush wanted to shut down the Department of Energy and turn its responsibilities over to the Defense Department. Clinton/Gore, in the name of reinventing government, want to sell off most of DoE's assets. In the coming years, we may well see scores of privatized nuclear reactors on government sites such as Hanford, importing nuclear waste to produce anything from hydrogen bombs to medical isotopes. Just look how far a couple of unsavory characters from Washington state got with their scheme. ■

Board, "Tritium Production Using the Fast Flux Test Facility," Office of Defense Programs' Tritium Production Office, DoE, April 15, 1996.

24. Maj. Gen. Eldon W. Joersz, "Memorandum to the Secretary of Energy on Use of FFTF for Tritium Production," US Air Force, Office of Defense Programs, DoE, March 22, 1996.

25. Charles Curtis, deputy secretary of energy, "Memorandum to the Secretary of Energy on Fast Flux Reactor," March 21, 1996.

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Policing Activists: Think Global, Spy Local

by Mitzi Waltz

Local political spying is on the rise, with help from above.

Like a vampire who has developed a tolerance for garlic, Red Squads are back. Throughout the Cold War, these guardians of political compliance spied on and harassed law-abiding activists who veered too far left of the political center. Dedicated civil rights advocates and others fought back and won on local, state, and federal fronts. But their success was often short-lived. New tech-

Mitzi Waltz is a Portland, Oregon-based journalist who covers the intersection of technology, politics, and social issues and is author of *The Internet International Directory* (Emeryville, Calif.: Lycos Press, 1996) and other books. Photo: **Countermedia**. A Chicago police officer leaves the Countermedia truck after illegally entering and searching it at the 1996 Democratic National Convention.

nologies; new laws; and increased interaction among international, federal, military, state, and local law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and private corporations are threatening not only to put Red Squads back in business nationwide, but to increase the scope of their power to pry, to harm, and to imprison.

With the "International Communist Conspiracy" gone, Red Squads need a new *raison d'être*. Studies by RAND the Heritage Foundation, and several private companies in the security industry have provided proponents of the Surveillance State with both a rationale and a blueprint for action. First, these

groups have presented research to the law enforcement community documenting that the public can be frightened by the specter of terrorism into accepting — and even calling for — increased spying.¹ Second, after studying anti-terrorist measures from around the world, they have decided that multi-jurisdictional taskforces offer the best way to circumvent civilian oversight. For example, the RAND report *Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness*,

1. Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce Hoffman, *Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995).

Chicago: The New Multi-Agency Red Squad in Action?

For an illustration of where these trends are leading, take a look at last fall's Active Resistance "counter-convention" during and after the Chicago Democratic Convention. "There were a half-dozen groups that were interfered with very severely," said Emile Schepers, program director for the Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights. "They were not only put under illegal surveillance, they had their space invaded by police without a warrant, they were told that they were seditious, and they had documents, tapes and other items taken by the police."¹

Active Resistance participants also allege infiltration of their planning groups months before the convention, agent provocateur activity, brutal "harassment arrests" of individuals against whom charges were later dropped, and destruction of videotape and film documenting the activities of police.²

Convention security was handled by six multi-agency committees, one of which (the Criminal Intelligence committee) included the Chicago Police Department (CPD), Illinois State Police, FBI, ATF, FAA, and Secret Service.

Since 1981, the Chicago Police Department has operated under a consent decree that, based on past abuses, curtails its ability to spy on non-criminal political activity or to use agent provocateur tactics. Chicago, of course, is also one of the cities

blessed with an FBI counterterrorism taskforce. Formally approved by all parties in mid-1996, the Chicago taskforce combines 12 CPD officers and at least 20 FBI special agents under an FBI commander. The FBI foots the bill for clerical support, high-tech equipment, payments to informants, and required overtime.³

Soon after the taskforce's inception, the CPD began rumbling publicly about the consent decree. Mayor Daley weighed in with a formal proposal to gut the decree in March of this year. Daley's request was denounced at a press conference that brought together 19 political groups and many individual activists, and was followed by a call for a consent-decree enforcement hearing over the Active Resistance violations.

In April, the FBI chimed in, claiming that Chicago's restrictions on political spying were cramping its ability to investigate terrorism.⁴ And with the weight of the Anti-Terrorism Act on its side, not to mention its new role as a funding and equipment source for the CPD, it may just get its way, brushing aside decades of work aimed at putting the Red Squad out of business. ■ —MW

1. Interview, April 1997.

2. Missy Rohe, Kristian Williams, and Jim Redden, "Chicago Police Riot Again," *PDXS* (Portland, Ore.), Oct. 11-24, 1996.

3. Chicago Counterterrorism Task Force Memorandum of Agreement, May 31, 1996.

4. Charles Nicodemus, "Local FBI Criticizes Limits on Spying," *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 25, 1997.

explicitly touts taskforce participation as a way to get around local laws restricting political intelligence work, and also promotes taskforces as a mechanism for putting such operations on the local and state agenda by providing funding, equipment, publicity, and other inducements. And as we shall see, in cities where it operates counterterrorism taskforces, the FBI pressures local police to ditch limits on political spying.

The taskforce concept and the cooperation it engenders between local and federal agencies, has another benefit, according to this report: It allows fed-

eral agencies to obtain information on a broad range of activities that do not fall under the current legal definition of "terrorism," but that are of political interest. That's because local police are much more responsive to demands from large corporations and influential organizations. These groups often have significant influence over political or budgetary matters in the local arena and are not loath to use their clout to discipline "uncooperative" police. The RAND study reports that local police will generally share freely what they gather with higher-level agencies.²

This back-scratching is not a new practice: A 1976 General Accounting Office report about FBI investigative protocol noted that local and state police were the bureau's second most prolific source of information, surpassed only by its own informants.³ In fact, in these days of grant-based "entrepreneurial" law-enforcement funding, the locals had better cooperate: Their budgets may depend on federal grants based on performing particular types of policing.

The taskforce trend began with the post-riot commissions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As an official Department of Justice (DoJ) history of community policing puts it, "The police force's inability to handle urban unrest in an effective and appropriate manner brought demands by civic leaders and politicians for a reexamination of police practices."⁴

The 1967 Kerner Commission and 1968 Eisenhower Commission focused on the growing divide between police and "civilians" as it was angrily expressed in the Watts riot and other uprisings. The recommendations of these bodies touted police-community dialogue as the key to curbing such unrest, expressing the hope that federal oversight could end abuse of protesters and minorities by "rogue cops." This goal was the foundation for community policing as we know it today. Later commissions that concentrated on reducing street crime looked to federal agencies to improve training and equipment in local law enforcement.

Although community policing has not been as successful in curbing street crime as its proponents might have hoped, it has been a public relations success and enjoys the support of many well-intentioned liberals. But heirs to the Red Squads have found it an excellent mechanism as well. Savvy law enforcement types realized that under the community policing rubric, cops, community groups, local companies, private foundations, citizen informants, and federal agencies could form alliances without causing public outcry. Riding on fears — from the trumped-up missing children campaign of the 1980s to the anti-drug hysteria of the 1990s — community policing has been the public face of under-

2. *Ibid.*

3. Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 128.

4. Community Policing Consortium, "Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action," Bureau of Justice Assistance, Aug. 1994; available in electronic form at <http://www.communitypolicing.org/chap1fw.html>.

the-radar efforts to create an impenetrable web of surveillance and enforcement.

And not surprisingly in this age of globalization, the task-force concept benefits from international support as well. Several anti-terrorism summits held by the G-7 nations since 1984 have advocated building strong national and international multi-agency taskforces, based on the models set up in Germany and the UK.⁵

Finishing the Job

The original political objectives of community policing were not fully addressed until the current decade, as Watergate and the COINTELPRO revelations of the 1970s briefly turned federal intelligence agencies into political hot potatoes. But collective memory is short. In step with RAND's 1992 and 1995 recommendations, regional taskforces that directly address political and social activism are now proliferating, and existing systems have been strengthened. The previously missing ingredients — appropriate technologies and a legal framework for cooperation — are now falling into place.

For example, the Department of Justice's Regional Information Sharing

5. John Derraut, "Disturbing 'Deja Entendu' and 'Deja Vu,'" available in electronic form at http://www.infowar.com/CLASS3/class3_7.html-ssi.



TERRY ALLEN


The friendly face of community policing in Washington, D.C., where police set up shop at a "7-Eleven." Several came out and ordered the photographer to stop shooting. One threatened, "If you do that again, I'll take pictures of you taking pictures of us."

Systems Program (RISS) includes six regional data- and equipment-sharing projects and has more than quadrupled the number of participating agencies since 1982. Most of this growth has oc-

curred since 1990. From 1993-95 alone, RISS had a 47 percent increase in the number of database inquiries; just last year, it achieved full electronic connectivity among the centers. Each regional RISS

project coordinates the intelligence efforts of hundreds of municipal, county, state, and federal agencies, as well as several Canadian provinces, the District of Columbia, and US intelligence operatives in Mexico. Funding for these centers and grants for member agencies are administered through the Bureau of Justice Assistance program.⁶


Officially, RISS projects concentrate on drug and organized crime activities, but since Criminal Intelligence units are used in many ju-



High-tech equipment is loaned to RISS members.

Officially, RISS projects concentrate on drug and organized crime activities, but since Criminal Intelligence units are used in many ju-

6. Gerard P. Lynch, statement on behalf of RISS before the House Appropriations Committee, Commerce and Justice Subcommittee, Federal News Service, April 17, 1996.



RISS Projects: Average annual growth rates for three years 1991-93. (DoJ)

It was like a date to the prom with the coolest kid at school. The FBI was asking the San Francisco police to join a counterterrorism center with other federal law enforcement agencies. The local police would get to wear the latest in black SWAT team gear and have access to high-tech gadgets and high-powered arms. With a center in San Francisco, the SFPD would also score some of the \$400 million that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1997 had allocated to the FBI to combat domestic and international terrorism.


The problem was that a few years back, the SFPD had been caught spying on hundreds of organizations during the Democratic Convention in San Francisco and it was also being sued for sharing files on 500 groups and 100,000 individuals with a private organization, B'nai Brith's Anti-Defamation League. In response to the resulting lawsuit, the city had set up guidelines: They barred police from investigating First Amendment activity, especially lawful political dissent and required them to keep their records private and to regularly submit a list of their investigations to a civilian review board for approval. To join the FBI-run center, the SF police would have to get a waiver of the seven-year-old guidelines.

Then some civil rights activists got wind that the Police Commission would take up the waiver at a public meeting. Three days before that January meeting, the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation (NCARL) was holding a 90th birthday celebration for Miriam Rothschild, a lifelong activist and organizer. After listening to my speech denouncing the newly discovered plans to void the guidelines, Mayor Willie Brown declared Sunday "Miriam Rothschild Day," and then promised me he would try to stop the commission's move. Not content with that, Rothschild buttonholed the mayor and extracted the same promise. Three days later, as public opposition mounted, the commission tabled consideration of the waiver for the foreseeable future.

Reportedly the FBI was furious, but could console itself with a relatively free run in 13 other major urban centers.

Making Trouble, Making Change

by Kit Gage



Activists like Miriam Rothschild have been fighting police abuses for decades.

Those in Chicago and New York, which have histories of abuses similar to San Francisco's, also have legal agreements limiting the police (and in some cases also the FBI) from political spying. NCARL is now working with local coalitions to monitor these centers and try to prevent further abuses.

These centers are only one example of the many ways in which the changes mandated by the anti-terrorism law will erode civil liberties. Already, hundreds of legal US residents who were once convicted of felonies and served their sentences, must now be refused reentry into the country regardless of their circumstances. The INS used to be able to look at the individual cases and keep out only people judged potentially dangerous. Now it's anyone who ever commits a felony. (Felonies include such heinous acts as possessing small quantities of drugs. In a particularly ironic case, an immigrant helped the government capture and convict major drug dealers. Now, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the US is trying to deport him for a previous minor drug offense.)

The deportation of politically active legal immigrants is also increasing. The oldest, most famous of these cases — the "L.A. Eight," involving seven Palestinians and a Kenyan — has dragged on for 10 years and mirrors the evolution of US policy concerning political activists and controversial causes. In January, their case was kept alive and their deportation stayed despite the government's use of the Antiterrorism Act as justification

to bring secret evidence against them. Resolution of the case will help determine if the government can eliminate the due process right to confront one's accuser and to deport people for controversial political, rather than criminal, activity.

The effects of the anti-terrorism legislation are just beginning to be felt, and the effort to defend the First Amendment will be long, complicated, and hard. Victories like that in San Francisco are worth celebrating and savoring. ■

Kit Gage, Washington representative of NCARL, gave the keynote address at the San Francisco celebration. For more information contact NCARL, 1313 W. 8th St. #313, Los Angeles, CA 90017, 213-484-6661, e-mail: kgage@igc.org.

risdictions to surveil political suspects as well, their personnel also have access to information that RISS systems store. RISS documents and regulations make it clear that its databases are used to exchange data about politically-motivated crimes. This phenomenon was particularly obvious in a set of guidelines passed by the DoJ in late 1993 to curb abuses of criminal intelligence data banks in such cases, presumably at

least in part owing to the Anti Defamation League (ADL) intelligence scandal earlier that year.⁷ The rules included barring data gathered in violation of local, state or federal law; mandating security measures and penalties for unauthorized dissemination of data; and prohibiting

7. In 1993, a former police officer in the employ of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) was discovered to have collected numerous files on left- and right-wing targets on behalf of that organization, and

the sharing of data on lawful political activity through taskforce databases.⁸

It is uncertain whether the limits set in these regulations have been carefully observed. When sent to taskforce members, the DoJ ruling was accompanied

also for foreign governments, including South Africa. Confidential San Francisco police files on political targets were among the items found in his possession.

8. Department of Justice, "Final Revision to the Office of Justice Programs, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies," Sept. 16, 1993.

by detailed responses to objections received from participating local police agencies. These responses appeared to serve as advice for circumventing the new rules. They helpfully note, for example, that off-site databases under private control might be used to store data, such as field interrogation records, that don't meet DoJ criteria.⁹

Anti-Terrorism in Action

The growth of taskforces has been fueled by fears of terrorism with the FBI piling on tinder from its central position in counterterrorism activities nationwide. The Bureau has quietly set up 14 counterterrorism task forces in major US cities: Boston, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Miami, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, San Francisco and Los Angeles.¹⁰ The centers recruit officers on urban police forces to work directly with the FBI. They are funded in part by the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act, which authorized \$468 million for the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts.

Until an FBI proposal to add a new center in San Francisco sparked a public fight, the program was almost completely unknown outside the Bureau. (See p. 24.) San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown opposed the center's establishment, saying that he would "not go along with or support any attempt to circumvent San Francisco's current policy on surveillance."¹¹ As a result of activist pressure and repeated scandals involving political spying, including the ADL case, San Francisco police regulations outlaw surveillance of lawful political activities.

While FBI activities that become public are subject to citizen pressure, the agency's internal operations rarely see sunshine. The recent revelations about mishandling and manufacturing of evidence at the FBI's crime lab — the first whistleblowing in years to break the code of silence — hint at the extent of the problems. Like the labs, which op-

erated for decades without safeguards, the FBI's internal databases conceal abuses. And since they are not subject to the DoJ regulations or oversight, no one can assess how much erroneous or illegally gathered information they contain.

What is apparent is that both the FBI's internal and external political intelligence systems are extensive: Its Terrorist Information System contains data on more than 200,000 individuals and 3,000 groups, institutions and busi-

The "GIGO" Factor

One reason these intelligence networks are dangerous is that they have insufficient safeguards for assuring the accuracy of information gathered. Despite the availability of high-tech tools, criminal intelligence officers and counterterrorism investigators increasingly rely on so-called Confidential Reliable Informants. In drug cases, CRIs tend to be motivated by money, personal animus, or promises of leniency for their own offenses.



Probably no group was targeted as violently and extensively by law enforcement agencies as the Black Panthers, here rallying in New York, 1970.

nesses. It is cross-referenced with criminal records; interview and surveillance transcripts; information on associates, contacts, victims and witnesses related to people in the database; plus financial, telephone, and other data if collected or obtained from other sources, such as the DoJ's FinCEN databases, which are used to track and analyze financial data linked to criminal suspects.¹²

Moreover, the National Crime Information Center 2000 (NCIC 2000) project now under way will extend the process of linking FBI information with other database systems.¹³

12. Peter F. Episcopo and Darrin L. Moor, "Focus on Information Resources: The Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File," *Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Oct. 1996.
13. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "What Is NCIC 2000?" *NCIC 2000*, v. 1, n. 1, Feb. 15, 1996.

One need only look at the recent case involving Qubilah Shabazz and Michael Fitzpatrick to see what can happen when financial incentives and political motivation drive federal investigations. Fitzpatrick, a freelance informer with an expensive drug habit and a long history of spying for cash, attempted to coerce Shabazz (the daughter of Malcolm X and a former high school classmate of Fitzpatrick's) into supporting an assassination attempt on Louis Farrakhan. Presenting himself as a suitor and playing on Shabazz's belief that Farrakhan was complicit in her father's assassination, Fitzpatrick had his FBI handlers tape their motel room conversations.

Fitzpatrick "never worried about his own illegal conduct, because quite cor-

9. *Ibid.*

10. Seth Rosenfeld, "FBI Wants S.F. Cops to Join Spy Squad," *San Francisco Examiner*, Jan. 12, 1997, p. A1.

11. Jim Herron Zamora, "S.F. Cops Say No to FBI Spy Unit," *San Francisco Examiner*, Jan. 16, 1997, p. A7.

rectly he thought that no matter what he did, he would be able to get off by ensnaring somebody else," said Shabazz's defense attorney Ronald Kuby. Letting "a small-time dirtbag" like Fitzpatrick create and then sell an entrapment scheme to the FBI, Kuby said, "resulted in humiliation and a serious threat of imprisonment for the innocent target, and increased paranoia among those activists whose paths have crossed with Fitzpatrick's."¹⁴

Unlike drug snitches, political CRIs sometimes serve private clients as well as the police, collecting cash from political opponents of the groups on which they spy.¹⁵ Many organizations also field private investigators who then share the (frequently dubious) information they have collected with law enforcement.¹⁶ Regardless of who pays the bills, one result of private intelligence operations can be an increase in agent provocateur activity, as paid inform-

ants and private security operatives attempt to justify their paychecks. In any case, whether public or private, whether snitching about drugs, politics or immigration, Confidential Reliable Informants are often anything but reliable.¹⁷ As computer programmers say, GIGO: garbage in, garbage out. In the case of number-crunching computer op-

by the Clinton administration's October 1996 airline rules. They include passenger "profiling" and movement-tracking via databases, and could easily lead to airport detentions, missed flights, and false arrests.¹⁸ Considering the US government's history of harassment and even murder of activists and the recent revelations about the FBI

lab, the easy retrieval of dubious data takes on a very sinister cast for those with long memories.¹⁹

Dangerous Dossiers

The taskforce concept so favored by the DoJ only compounds GIGO problems by spreading the misinformation. As with

many features of modern policing, the success of taskforces depends heavily on information-gathering and data manipulation. Most of the technology needed originated in the military, and the Government Technology Transfer Program has played an important part through the National Institute of Justice's (NIJ) National Law Enforcement

and Corrections Technology Center, and also through the federal government's four regional technology centers at the Ames, Rome, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories, which had

Local police defined "terrorism" much more broadly than the feds, often applying it to environmentalist, animal rights, and union activities that affect large, powerful employers.

erations, the result is bad data; in the case of files on human beings, "garbage in" could literally mean an unjust deportation, long jail term, or death sentence under the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act.

Another potentially dangerous application of the GIGO principle is provided

17. David B. Kopel, testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, May 24, 1995.


14. Interview, Feb. 1995.

15. Mitzi Waltz, "Theodore Kaczynski and the Plot to Smear the Left," *PDXS* (Portland, Ore.), May 9, 1996.

16. *Ibid.*; and Capt. Gary A. Allgeyer, "Social Protests in the 1990s: Planning a Response," *Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Jan. 1996.

18. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security's new airport procedures allow security guards to detain and interrogate passengers who meet "terrorist profiles" based on information collected in a special database to be prepared for this purpose, including the subject's airport behavior and appearance, criminal and credit history, and travel itinerary. For more information, see Rory J. O'Connor, "Privacy Groups Outraged at Anti-Terrorism Plan to Screen Airline Passengers," *San Jose Mercury*, Sept. 6, 1996. (See <http://www.sjmercury.com/business/privacy905.htm>)

19. For information on government targeting of activists, see: Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States* (Boston: South End Press, 1990); for information on improper evidence handling and possible evidence falsification at the FBI forensics lab, see Elaine Shannon, "The Gang That Couldn't Examine Straight," *Time*, April 28, 1997.



Increasingly, local and federal law enforcement agencies link databases and share information with private security firms like those that guard corporations and facilities with security concerns. Here high risk plutonium storage at Rocky Flats.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

One City's Squad

Portland, Oregon, has a Jekyll and Hyde reputation when it comes to policing. This rainy Northwestern city's police force is a test-bed for community policing. At the same time, Portland's officers have also built reputation for racism and violence — and for a high level of political spying. Groups as innocuous as Physicians for Social Responsibility have been written up in Portland Police Bureau (PPB) files in the 1990s. And while lawful political activity has been squelched by fear, truly violent activists, such as Portland-based anti-abortion militant Shelley Shannon, have often escaped scrutiny until it's too late.¹

The PPB participates in numerous regional taskforces, including RISS's Western States Information Network and the Regional Organized Crime Narcotics Task Force (ROCN). Top officers in the city's Criminal Intelligence Division are also active in a little-known private group called the Northwest Criminal Intelligence Network — described by Seattle police officer and NWCIN member Mike Ramsby as "a network of investigators up and down the West Coast and Pacific Northwest, including Canada, Washington and Oregon and other states [that deals] in criminal intelligence work."²

It appears that PPB's files on activists are shared through many channels. Unfortunately, much of the "evidence" collected in those files is inaccurate or incomplete. For example, when the East Side White Pride skinhead gang first began to make itself known with bullyings and beatings, law enforcement should have been on top of the situation: Of the gang's six known members, at least two were informants. One worked for the Anti-Defamation League, another was a Confidential Reliable Informant for the Portland Police Bureau.³ According to other sources, a third member was on the federal payroll.

Of course, informants walk after their damage is done. Some Portland activists haven't been so lucky. Douglas Squirrel, a Reed College grad student and peace activist, became the city's most infamous anarchist in 1993 when he was arrested after a standoff between angry youth and police at an all-ages nightclub. After an informant allegedly tipped police that a demonstration was being planned inside, they cordoned off the popular X-Ray Café. Emotions and invective ran high when patrons found themselves face-to-face with a line of heavily armed officers in full riot gear.

After a group of youths tried to slip through police lines, a wild chase ensued through downtown streets. Two shop windows were broken, a car damaged and 31 people arrested — including Squirrel. He had not damaged property or taunted the riot police. But his file indicated he was the "leader of the anarchists," as police spokesman Derrick Foxworth quickly announced to the local press.⁴ So Squirrel was not only individually sought out, Maced, tackled and arrested, but hit with a \$50,000 bail demand. He ended up spending several days in jail.

Since he had no arrest record, Squirrel was surprised that he had a file with Portland's Criminal Intelligence unit. He sued the city for violating an Oregon law barring police spying on lawful political activity — and won his case.

The files that PPB was forced to release were disturbing, even in their redacted form. Some material had apparently



Anarchists outside café before police arrive.

been collected by informants posing as activists and people who had tried (largely unsuccessfully) to convince others to commit illegal activities, including an attempted firebombing of parked police vehicles and violent antics at demonstrations. Other documents listed individuals and groups that had participated in legal demonstrations. Those who advocated establishing a civilian police review board, a cause which Squirrel himself promoted, got special attention.⁵

Judge Michael Marcus ordered several of the documents purged from the city's files, and mandated new guidelines for information collection and retention. The hitch? Because Portland's police participate in so many data-exchange systems, purging its own files is like sticking a finger in the dike after the flood; the information has already flowed downstream.

"That's the problem with taskforces," said Portland attorney Spencer Neal, who has gone to bat for people caught in the web of "gang" databases in the Northwest. "Everyone in the taskforce is in the loop, every agency that's related feeds its crap into it. How do you defend yourself against that?"⁶

For activists, Squirrel's prosecution produced a quick and lasting chill. "After he was arrested for the so-called 'anarchist riot,' whenever we were deciding who was going to speak at a news conference, he would step aside," said Dan Handelman of People Overseeing Police Study Group. "He realized that he had been the target of police surveillance, and felt it would make us the subject of bad publicity because of what they were saying about him. Even if it doesn't stop you from organizing, if you get arrested like Squirrel did — if they drag out this long list of files, especially since their quality of intelligence is so bad — you may have a longer sentence." ■

— MW

1. Mitzi Waltz, "Dangerous Data," *PDXS* (Portland, Ore.), Feb. 9 1996.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Detective Frank Jolly, "Conclusion of ADL Investigation," Portland Police Bureau Inter-Office Memorandum, July 27, 1993.

4. Tony Davis, "Pacifist Pegged as Riot Organizer, Held on Huge Bail," *Portland Alliance*, Aug. 1993.

5. Court documents and author's trial notes, *Squirrel v. City of Portland*.

6. Interview, April 1997.

previously serviced the military and its contractors alone.²⁰

"Command and control" software developed by the military to enhance communications and information exchange between ground forces and their commanders can be used to manage police operations during demonstrations or

link activists with their causes, associates, employers, criminal records, mug shots and fingerprints, spending habits, and even tax information.²³ These information tools — which meld together details collected by local police and higher-level analysis and background from federal agencies — form the backbone of the taskforces' increasing power.

The computerized command and control system implemented for the \$300 million Atlanta Olympics' security system is a case in point. Tennessee's Oak Ridge National Labora-

heed Martin for the federal government; the Center for the Application of Science Toward Law Enforcement; and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, better known as the office of the "drug czar."

Why would the president's top drug-war officials and a nuclear-research lab run by a major defense contractor be involved in such a project? Bob Hunter of ORNL's Computational Physics and Engineering Division said in a corporate press release that "the Office of National Drug Control Policy also wants this system to be readily transferable to other events, such as a California earthquake, that could shatter existing infra-

structures."²⁵

The drug czar is not in charge of natural-disaster planning — that's the job of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, reporters covering the fall of Oliver North discovered that from FEMA's inception in 1979, the agency was handling domestic counterinsurgency planning as well. In 1984, it went so far as to hold national exercises for rounding up and detaining aliens and radicals in rural camps.²⁶

It is not known if the Office of National Drug Control Policy is developing tools for carrying out the same sort of mission.

Corporate Clout

A more general problem with data gathered by multi-jurisdictional taskforces is that, as noted earlier, local police are very susceptible to corporate pressure. For example, RAND found that local law enforcement agencies defined "terrorism" much more broadly than did their federal counterparts, often applying the label to environmentalist, animal rights, and union activities that affect large, powerful employers.²⁷ For example, citizens working to close down the contaminated Hanford Nuclear Reservation in southern Washington report being

(continued on p. 62)

25. *Ibid.*

26. Paul DeRienzo and Bill Weinberg, "Will Gulf War Lead to Repression at Home?" *The Guardian* (New York), Jan. 16, 1991.

27. Riley and Hoffman, *op. cit.*

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT		City of Portland, Oregon Bureau of Police													
FILE NUMBER 62-30-00058	DATE OF REPORT 07-30-92	CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL													
CASE NUMBER	DATE OF OCCURRENCE 07-26-92	SUBJECT: L.D. Stewart													
SUBJECT OF TITLE OF INCIDENT Civilian Police Review Board		SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION													
ENTERED DATE 8/1/92 BY SPST JWB		<table border="1"> <tr> <th>SOURCE RELIABILITY</th> <th>CONTENT VALIDITY</th> </tr> <tr> <td>A COMPLETELY RELIABLE</td> <td>1 COMPLETELY VALID</td> </tr> <tr> <td>B PROBABLY RELIABLE</td> <td>2 PROBABLY VALID</td> </tr> <tr> <td>C FAIRLY RELIABLE</td> <td>3 FAIRLY VALID</td> </tr> <tr> <td>D POSSIBLY UNRELIABLE</td> <td>4 POSSIBLY INVALID</td> </tr> <tr> <td>E PROBABLY UNRELIABLE</td> <td>5 PROBABLY INVALID</td> </tr> </table>		SOURCE RELIABILITY	CONTENT VALIDITY	A COMPLETELY RELIABLE	1 COMPLETELY VALID	B PROBABLY RELIABLE	2 PROBABLY VALID	C FAIRLY RELIABLE	3 FAIRLY VALID	D POSSIBLY UNRELIABLE	4 POSSIBLY INVALID	E PROBABLY UNRELIABLE	5 PROBABLY INVALID
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DETAILS OF REPORT	
People Involved:	
Organizations Involved:	
Oregon Peaceworks Portland Peaceworks Northwest Grape Boycott Oregon Community for War Tax Resistance Columbia Willamette Greens Pacific Party Womens International League for Peace and Freedom Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in the Middle East Jobs for Justice United Front Against the OCA No on Hate RATS (Radical Activists Truth Squad) Oregon Fellowship of Reconciliation Flying Focus Video Collective Northwest Military and Draft Counseling Metanoia Peace Community Don't Waste Oregon Committee Portland Central America Solidarity Committee Radical Women Anti-Prohibition League Northwest Veterans for Peace	
NARRATIVE:	
On Sunday, 07-26-92, CRI # attended a planning meeting sponsored by the Portland Peaceworks. The meeting took place at Colonel Sumner Park, and numerous people attended who	
LEAD NUMBER 1	APPROVED OFFICER: L. D. Stewart

Documents released by the Portland Police Department during Squirrel's suit against the city.

civil unrest. It may include rapid-access data banks, scene mapping (increasingly using satellite-based GIS technology), and field-command enhancements using high-tech communications.²¹

Powerful databases such as the Modernized Intelligence Data Base (MIDB) project currently being revamped by TRW Systems Integration Group for Army Intelligence;²² NCIC 2000, which is being developed by MITRE Corp. for the FBI; and others let police programmers

20. Rome Laboratory Law Enforcement Technology Team, "The New Horizon: Transferring Defense Technology to Law Enforcement," *Law Enforcement Bulletin*, April 1996. Operated through NIJ, the transfer program makes links between military tech--- or more accurately, military contractors and military-technology researchers at the federal labs--- and civilian-sector law enforcement.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Ben N. Venzke, *IWR Daily Update*, IWR-Washington, Dec. 22, 1996.

CONTINUATION PAGE — INTELLIGENCE REPORT		City of Portland, Or Bureau of Police	
SUBJECT: Ronald Reagan Protest		DATE OF OCCURRENCE 60-24-92	
NARRATIVE:		SOURCE CONTENT	
On June 22, 1992, ex-President Ronald Reagan visited Portland for a speaking engagement at the Junior Chamber of Commerce Convention at the Oregon conference center. Reagan's visit was not publicized until the night before his arrival, which caused the local activists groups to scramble for supporters for a demonstration. The local anti-republican group known as BEIRUT started calling for supporters on Sunday night at about 8:30 p.m.		A 1	
BEIRUT also placed on their hotline the following message: Information line. We are the Boisterous Extremists for the Insurrection of Republicans and Other Unprincipled Thugs. Guess what? Tomorrow morning, being Monday morning, at 8:30 a.m. at the Oregon Convention Center, Ronald Reagan, the ex-President, will be there speaking to a group of people. We'd like to do something outside, but we just found out about it, so if you could call and listen to this, please call everybody you know and tell them to tell all their friends to show up and just keep the phone tree alive, and have everybody come on down, bring a sign, bring a thing, do whatever you want. Do your own action. This is BEIRUT U.S.A., and we'll see you there.		A 1	
On the day of the visit, about six to 10 demonstrators, including the above mentioned people, did protest outside of the center. Most of the protest signs were those against nuclear war. They conducted a peaceful demonstration, including taking video pictures of the police and secret service. Some of the women in the group tried to gain access to the conference by getting press passes, but they were denied entrance. The only thing unusual about this protest was the fact that Squirrel was wearing a flowered red and white dress.		A 1	
THE INFORMATION FURNISHED IS CONSIDERED PRELIMINARY TO THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PROCEDURES OF THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU AND IS THE PROPERTY OF THAT BUREAU. IT SHOULD NOT BE CIRCULATED TO ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU.			
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL		EXHIBIT No.	
PAGE NUMBER 2	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES	REPORTING OFFICER: L. D. Stewart	

tory (ORNL) delivered it to the Atlanta Police Department well in advance of the Olympics as a replacement for the APD's paper-based scheduling system. The system included events-simulation capabilities, personnel-deployment features, interactive mapping, and various field communications features to facilitate military-style control of a large urban area.²⁴ It is based on software developed for the Gulf War's Operation Desert Storm, and prepared by a public-private partnership that included Oak Ridge, which is administered by Lock-

23. William A. Bayse, "Security Capabilities, Privacy & Integrity" (remarks presented at The First Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy on March 27, 1991), IEEE Computer Society Press, 1991.


24. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "Sprint to 96," Nov. 1995, available in electronic format <http://www.ornl.gov/publications/labnotes/nov95/olymp2.htm>.

TEXTBOOK REPRESSION: US Training Manuals Declassified

by Lisa Hangaard

Over decades, the CIA and the US military have created and disseminated manuals to teach the armies of many countries how to infiltrate and spy on civilian groups, forcibly extract information, subvert democracy, and target not only insurgency but also legal and peaceful labor unions, student groups, religious, and civic organizations. The paper trail ---- which begins with the mysterious Project X in the 1960s and leads through the classrooms of the US Army School of the Americas in the 1980s ---- reveals a consistent policy in which the end justifies any means.

Lisa Hangaard is legislative coordinator of the Latin America Working Group, a coalition of 60 national nongovernmental organizations. The views expressed in this article are her own.



A marker notes one of five skeletons exhumed from a mass grave in an attempt to solve crimes committed by the US-trained Honduran Battalion 316.

KENNETH K. LAMB/BALTIMORE SUN



US ARMY

US Special Forces at Fort Benning, Georgia — also home of the School of the Americas — train using some of the techniques that they have passed on to dozens of armies around the world.

Several recently declassified US military training manuals show how US agents taught repressive techniques and promoted the violation of human rights throughout Latin America and around the globe. The manuals provide the paper trail that proves how the US trained Latin American and other militaries to infiltrate and spy upon civilians and groups, including unions, political parties, and student and charitable organizations; to treat legal political opposition like armed insurgencies; and to circumvent laws on due process, arrest, and detention. In these how-to guides, the US advocates tactics such as executing guerrillas, blackmail, false imprisonment, physical abuse, using truth serum to obtain information, and paying bounties for enemy dead. Counterintelligence agents are advised that one of their functions is "recommending targets for neutralization," a euphemism for execution or destruction.¹

On September 20, 1996, the Pentagon released seven training manuals prepared by the US military and used between 1987 and 1991 for intelligence training courses in Latin America and

at the US Army School of the Americas (SOA), where the US trains Latin American militaries. The Bush administration withdrew the manuals in 1991 because of belated concerns about their content and conducted an internal investigation. The manuals, however, were kept under wraps.

The Pentagon press release accompanying a selection of excerpts from the manuals downplayed their significance, citing the conclusions of the 1991-92 investigation that "two dozen short passages in six of the manuals, which total 1,169 pages, contained material that either was not or could be interpreted not to be consistent with US policy." The SOA also played a damage control game, describing the manuals as merely containing several passages with "words or phrases inconsistent with US government policy."² The problem with the seven Army manuals, however, is not a few stray words but a deeply anti-democratic framework. Moreover, they were not the only ones.

In a separate quest for information on US connections to the training of Honduran Battalion 316 that disappeared some 200 people in the 1980s, the *Baltimore Sun* had filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for US training manuals used in Honduras. In

1. Dana Priest, "U.S. Instructed Latins on Executions, Torture; Manuals Used 1982-91, Pentagon Reveals," *Washington Post*, Sept. 21, 1996, p. A1. Although "neutralization" is defined in one manual as "detaining or discrediting," the term was commonly used as a euphemism for assassination.

2. From a Jan. 1997 "information paper" distributed by the SOA in response to inquiries about the manuals.

Excerpts from the Manuals: LESSONS FOR REPRESSION TEACHING TORTURE

The following collection of excerpts does not contain all the objectionable passages within the manuals, but offers a sampling, including not only the worst passages that most clearly violate human rights or democratic standards, but also passages that advise against torture. Also included are selections that reveal the simplistic and dated approach that is typical of the manuals. (Excerpts included in the Pentagon's selections are marked with an asterisk.)

"FIGURE #6 ORGANIZATIONS AND TEAMS [This list refers to targets to be detected and 'neutralized.' While the explanation of the term neutralized in this chapter includes detaining and discrediting, the term often is a euphemism for killing.]

1. Local or national political party teams, or parties that have goals, beliefs or ideologies contrary or in opposition to the National Government.
2. Para-military organizations including student teams, police, military and veterans, or ex-fighter teams that are hostile towards the National Government.
3. Teams or hostile organizations whose objective is to create dissension or cause restlessness among the civilian population in the area of operations.
4. The central offices of these hostile organizations according to what the Commander of the Armed Forces says will be immediately neutralized. Personalities related with these offices will be arrested and detained.
5. Teams that operate undercover or clandestinely and their infrastructure.
6. Intelligence networks." (*Counterintelligence*, p. 228.)

"AGE: The employees [paid government informants] worthy of greatest confidence are mature, objective and emotionally stable individuals. ... Children are, at least, very observant and can provide precise information about things they have seen and heard, if they are interrogated in the appropriate manner." (*Handling of Sources*, p. 26.)

"The CI [counterintelligence] agent should take advantage of the aid programs through which the government provides food, clothing, health care and housing for the population. As these are programs with which the government is identified, it is possible to persuade the individuals who have benefitted from them to collaborate in the search for people ready to work with the government." (*Ibid.*, p. 34.)

"Teachers, doctors, social workers and clergy

in a local area also can provide a lot of information to the CI agent. These individuals usually have a close relationship with the population and enjoy their respect. They usually maintain a variety of files that can be a useful source of information." (*Ibid.*, p. 35.)

"The CI agent must offer presents and compensation for information leading to the arrest, capture or death of guerillas." * (*Ibid.*, p. 35.)

"Before the guerillas take control: The CI agent should consider all organizations as possible guerilla sympathizers. He ought to train and locate informants inside these organizations to inform him about activities and discover any indication of a latent insurrection. We are especially interested in identifying the members of the guerillas commando structure, its political structure and base of support. By infiltrating informants in the diverse youth, workers, political, business, social and charitable organizations, we can identify the organizations that include guerillas among their members. The agent can also identify the relatives of these guerillas, their supporters and sympathizers of the insurrectionary movement. ... The CI agent also should investigate other organizations that are not yet under the guerillas' control, since doubtless these will include members who sympathize with the insurrectionary movement; for that reason, it is essential to identify those persons." (*Ibid.*, p. 75.)

"The CI agent could cause the arrest of the employee's parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the placement plan of said employee in the guerilla organization." * (*Ibid.*, p. 79.)

"The employee's value can be increased ... by means of arrests, executions or pacification." * (*Ibid.*, p. 80.)

"If the agent suspects that he could have difficulty in separating an employee, it will be necessary to make up a reason to convince the employee that the separation is to his advantage. This could be by convincing him that he has been compromised by the guerillas. That continuing working for the government could result in serious consequences for the employee and his family. If the employee does not believe this story, other measures could be taken to convince him placing anonymous telegrams or sending anonymous letters. Many other techniques could be used which are only limited by the agent's imagination." * (*Ibid.*, p. 155.)

"Guatemala and Costa Rica
Historically, the United States has had little to do with Guatemala and Costa Rica. Generally speaking, Costa Rica has always been a model of a stable democracy. In the middle of the



Alba Lisette Ordonez Serato, 7, whose uncle was disappeared, holds poster of Col. Alexander Hernandez, then-head of US-trained Battalion 316.

January 1997, right after the *Baltimore Sun* threatened to sue over lack of response to its FOIA request, the US government released two CIA manuals that contained even more heinous material than the seven Army manuals.

Then, on March 6, the *Washington Post* ran a story revealing that the seven Army manuals had even deeper roots. They were based on an older set of training materials known as "Project X," written by US Army experts starting in 1965. The Joint Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program used Project X to train US allies in Vietnam, Iran,

Latin America, and other parts of the developing world. With this parentage established, it became irrefutable that the seven Army manuals were not an aberration. Rather, they were but one part of a consistent lending library on repressive techniques used by the United States to train foreign militaries. Prepared by the US military and used between 1987 and 1991 for intelligence training courses in Latin America and at the SOA, the seven texts drew from lesson plans school instructors had been using since 1982 and incorporated material going back to the

KENNETH K. LAMB/BALTIMORE SUN

Wet Work 101

As CAQ went to press, *A Study of Assassination* was declassified. This CIA murder guide was in the "training files" for the 1954 CIA covert operation, "PBSuccess," to overthrow the elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. The manual cautions that, "it should be assumed that [assassinations] will never be authorized by any US Headquarters, though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by members of an associated foreign service. This reticence is partly due to the necessity for committing communications to paper."

The manual is a handy catalog of tips and tools. Suggestions include blunt instruments, sharp instruments, falls from 75-feet onto a hard surface, poisoning, staged car accidents, rifles, submachine guns, handguns, arson, and explosives. The manual suggests studying examples of successful and failed assassination attempts, including Lincoln, Arch Duke Ferdinand, Marat, Trotsky, and Hitler. It ends with a diagram, "Conference Room Technique": not how to lead a meeting, but how to enter a conference room and kill everyone in it, leaving behind propaganda to implicate your opponents. (See cover graphic)

Excerpts:

"Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be necessary. But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it." (p. 2.)

"The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair walls, unscreened windows and bridges will serve. Bridge falls into water are not reliable." (p. 6.)

"Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some safety if a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The propaganda value of this system may be very high." (p. 11.)

"The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised for the use of a pair of sub-machine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be 'purified' in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners." (p. 13.) ■

A Study of Assassination. Handwritten on the cover page are, "Early 50s" and "Training file of PBSuccess."

1960s.³ The manuals directly contradict the often issued official excuse that SOA graduates who perpetrated many of the worst massacres of the hemisphere were "a few bad apples" who did not reflect school teachings or US policy.

They were released as the result of extensive public and congressional pressure. The first official mention came in the president's advisory Intelligence Oversight Board's June 1996 report on Guatemala, which was made public in response to the high level of pressure from human rights and grassroots organizations. Rep. Joseph Kennedy (D-Mass.), interested because of his championship of a bill to close the SOA, then asked the administration to declassify the manuals in their entirety.

The manuals' discovery has helped reinvigorate grassroots, religious, and congressional efforts to close the US

Army School of the Americas. It proves on paper what so many have said for so long—that US training contributed to the devastating human rights violations in the region.⁴ Although Latin American militaries were perfectly capable of violating human rights and democratic principles without US sponsorship, the anti-democratic training methods advocated by the US provided — at the very least — a green light for repression. And for decades, the traffic was heavy. Techniques of control contained in the manuals were actively adopted by Latin American militaries, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s; in Chile's and Argentina's "dirty wars" in which thousands of dissidents disappeared; by military dictatorships in Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay; in the Central American wars, where tens of

4. Lars Schoultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, Jan. 1981, pp. 149-70; and A.J. Languth, *Hidden Terrors* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

3. Dana Priest, "Army's Project X Had Wider Audience," *Washington Post*, March 6, 1997, pp. A1, A16.

1950s, Guatemala was governed by a communist government. A coup d'état directed by the United States replaced the government. During this time, the international communist Ernesto Che Guevara appeared in Guatemala. Apparently, the CIA head in Guatemala, H.R. Alderman had Guevara in prison but he was freed, thinking he didn't have much importance within the communist movement. The rest is history; Guevara went to Mexico where he joined Fidel Castro's forces to invade Cuba. Now that we know a little about the history of Central America, we are going to study each country from the point of view of terrorism." (*Terrorism and the Urban Guerrilla*, p. 69.)

"Another function of the CI agents is to recommend CI targets for neutralization. CI targets can include people, installations, organizations, and documents and materials. A CI target is someone or something that fits within the previously described categories; it may or may not be hostile.

"Persons who are targets can often prove to be valuable sources of intelligence. Some example of these targets are government officials, political leaders, and members of the infrastructure. Installations that are targets can provide information of significant value. ... Organizations or groups that are able to be a potential threat to the government also must be identified as targets. Even though the threat may not be apparent, insurgents frequently hide subversive activity behind front organizations. Examples of hostile organizations or groups are paramilitary groups, labor unions, and dissident groups." (*Ibid.*, p. 112.)

"Measures of Controlling the Population and Resources

1. Surveillance. To control the movement of supplies, equipment, and people, it will be necessary to control and monitor the population's activities. Surveillance measures are used to identify insurgents, identify those who support them, and identify the manner in which aid is provided to the insurgents. Restrictive measures are those that are aimed to isolate the insurgent from the general population, physically and psychologically, denying him his principal source of supply.

1. ID Cards [are] fundamental to the program for controlling the population and resources.

2. Registration. ... This is the system of inventorying all families by house, making a list of all members of the family who live in the house along with the family's resources. One can also note the presence of insurgent tendencies and affiliations among the population.

3. Control by block. The purpose of block-by-block control is to detect the individuals who are supporting or sympathizing with the insurgents and the type of support they are providing.

4. Police patrols ... can be compared to reconnaissance patrols. Their purpose is to detect sources of insurgent support, sympathizers, and routes used by the insurgent forces for intelligence, logistics, and routine activities and to act to prevent these activities.

Restrictive Measures. Once the collection of information about the insurgents' supply system has been effective, the government forces can efficiently implement restrictive measures.

1. Control of travel and transportation. A program of control of the population and resources must include a system of passes.

2. Curfew. Curfews can be an effective method to restrict movement between specific hours through a specific area or specific routes. The purpose is to permit the authorities to identify violators and [act] on the premise that anyone who violates the curfew is an insurgent or sympathizes with the insurgents until he can prove the contrary.

3. Checkpoints. It is of little use to establish a program of passes and ID cards unless there is a system of verifying these official papers. Therefore, establishing checkpoints in all travel routes is necessary once the use of passes has started." (*Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.)

"It is essential that domestic defense intelligence agencies obtain information about the political party or parties that support the insurgent movement, the quantity of influence that the insurgents exercise, and the[ir] presence ... in the nonviolent public attacks against the government." (*Revolutionary War, Guerrillas and Communist Ideology*, 1989, p. 49.)

"... The insurgents are active in the areas of political nominations, political organizations, political education, and judicial laws. They can resort to subverting the government by means of elections in which the insurgents cause the replacement of an unfriendly government official to one favorable to their cause. The insurgent activity can include disbursing campaign funds to gain members and organizing political meetings for their candidates. They can at-



Curfew in San Salvador during the US-sponsored war, 1989. Lovers defy the manual's "premise that anyone who violates the curfew is an insurgent or sympathizes with the insurgents."

thousands of civilians were killed; and in the Andean countries, where human rights violations still abound. In most cases, the militaries being trained not only suppressed armed rebellion but also repressed democratic, civic opposition.

Paper Trail

The paper trail begins with the mysterious "Project X." Like the Army manuals, the Project X materials "suggested militaries infiltrate and suppress even democratic political dissident movements and hunt down opponents in every segment of society in the name of fighting Communism," according to the *Washington Post*.⁵

At least some of these teaching materials were pulled from circulation by the Carter administration, which was concerned they would contribute to human rights abuses in Latin America. In 1982, the Reagan administration asked the SOA to rush out a new counterintelligence course for Latin American militaries. The instructor asked to develop

5. Priest, *op. cit.*, p. A16.

the course, Capt. Vic Tise, turned to Project X materials, stored at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and updated them into lesson plans.

In 1987, the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade took the SOA lesson plans and turned them into textbooks: *Handling of Sources*, *Guerillas and Communist Ideology*, *Counterintelligence*, *Revolutionary War*, *Terrorism and the Urban Guerilla*, *Interrogation*, *Combat Intelligence*, and *Analysis I*.⁶ These manuals were then used by US trainers in Latin America and distributed to Latin American intelligence schools in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru. They came full circle back to the SOA in 1989 when they were reintroduced as reading materials in military intelligence courses attended by students from Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. The US government estimates that as many as 1,000 copies may have been distributed at the SOA and throughout Latin America.⁷

From start to finish, six of the seven Army manuals are how-to-guides on repressive techniques.⁸ Throughout their 1,100 plus pages, there are few mentions of democracy, human rights, or the rule of law. Instead, there are detailed techniques for infiltrating social movements, interrogating suspects, surveillance, maintaining military secrecy, recruiting and retaining spies, and controlling the population. While the excerpts released by the Pentagon to the press are a useful and not misleading selection of

6. The manuals do indeed appear to be older material that was inconsistently updated. A 1989 manual, for example, refers to communism as "the spectre" surrounding the whole world and ignores any changes in the Soviet Union. The *Terrorism* text refers to recent Los Angeles mayoral candidate and former 1960s radical Tom Hayden as "one of the masters of terrorist planning."

7. Department of Defense (DoD), "Report of Investigation of Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals," March 10, 1992.

8. The seventh, *Analysis I*, is a harmless text on analytical processes.

the most egregious passages — the ones most clearly advocating torture, execution, and blackmail — they do not reveal the manuals' highly objectionable framework. In the name of defending democracy, the manuals advocate profoundly undemocratic methods. Just as objectionable as the methods they advocate is the fundamental disregard for the differences between armed insurgencies and lawful political and civic opposition — an attitude that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Latin American civilians.

Opposition = Revolution

The *Counterintelligence* manual, for example, defines as potential counterintel-

only "enemy agents" but also "subversive persons," "political leaders known or suspected as hostile toward the Armed Forces or the political interests of the National Government," and "collaborators and sympathizers of the enemy," known or suspect.⁹

Throughout, the manuals highlight refugees and displaced persons as possible subversives to be monitored. They describe universities as breeding grounds for terrorists, and identify priests and nuns as terrorists. They advise militaries to infiltrate youth groups, student groups, labor unions, political parties, and community organizations.

Even electoral activity is suspect: The insurgents "can resort to subvert-

tempt to use bribes or place informants in key areas to counteract government action. They can launch propaganda attacks to discredit and ridicule political leaders and government officials. Also, insurgent leaders can participate in political races as candidates for government posts." (*Ibid.*, 1989, p. 51.)

Communism is "a kind of pseudo-religion, given that it has a founder, a mythology, a sacred book, a clergy, a place of pilgrimage and an inquisition. The founder is Marx; the mythology is communist theory; the sacred book is *Das Kapital*; the clergy are members of the Communist Party; the place of pilgrimage is Moscow; and the inquisition [by] the state (KGB) and others. Truly, as Marx said, 'communism is the spectre surrounding Europe.' Today this spectre is surrounding the whole world." (*Ibid.*, 1989, p. 128.)

"Indications of an Imminent Guerilla Attack

6. Demonstrations by minority groups.
8. In some zones, the local population, including children, don't speak or associate with U.S. troops or host country troops. This invariably indicates one of two things: that guerillas dominate the area or that they intend to launch an attack.
10. A high level of desertions among the paramilitary forces in the host country.
11. Visits of strangers to towns, cities, etc.
16. Celebration of national and religious festivals, as well as birthdays of leaders or key people in the guerilla forces or in a sponsoring power." (*Combat Intelligence*, pp. 161-62.)

"Indicators of Control [of the Population] by the Guerilla Forces

2. The local populace refuse to provide intelligence to government forces. (*Ibid.*, p. 163.)

"II. Are the insurgents carrying out psychological operations?

- a. Propaganda (indicator)
 - (1) Accusations of government corruption.
 - (2) Circulation of petitions that embrace the insurgents' demands.
 - (3) Attempts to discredit or ridicule government or military officials.
 - (4) Characterization of government and political leaders as U.S. puppets.
 - (5) Promotion of a popular front government.
 - (6) Propaganda urging youth to avoid the draft or soldiers to desert.
 - (7) Characterization of the armed forces as the enemy of the people.
 - (8) Slogans against the government, the armed forces, or the United States (spoken, posters, graffiti, pamphlets, commercial radio, etc.)
 - (9) Petitions or pamphlets that embrace Cuban or Nicaraguan philosophy.
 - (10) Appeals to people to sympathize with or participate in demonstrations or strikes.



Pres. Ronald Reagan warmly embraces Roberto Suazo, president of Honduras during the worst period of human rights abuses. Suazo appointed Battalion 316 director Gen. Gustavo Alvarez. Reagan awarded the general the Legion of Merit for "encouraging the success of the democratic process."

ligence targets "local or national political party teams, or parties that have goals, beliefs or ideologies contrary or in opposition to the National Government," or "teams or hostile organizations whose objective is to create dissension or cause restlessness among the civilian population in the area of operations." This text recommends that the army create a "blacklist" of "persons whose capture and detention are of foremost importance to the armed forces." It should include not

ing the government by means of elections in which the insurgents cause the replacement of an unfriendly government official to one favorable to their cause"; "insurgent activity" can include funding campaigns and participating in political races as candidates.¹⁰

One of the most pernicious passages, in *Combat Intelligence*, lists ways to

9. *Counterintelligence*, p. 225.

10. *Revolutionary War, Guerillas and Communist Ideology*, p. 51.

(11) Accusations that the government has failed in its responsibility to meet the basic needs of the people.

(12) Accusations that the military and police are corrupt or that they aren't with the people.

(13) Accusations of brutality or torture by the police or armed forces.

(14) Propaganda in favor of revolutionary groups, Cuba, or Nicaragua.

(15) Propaganda [aimed at] linking certain ethnic groups in a united international class.

b. Promotion of popular discontent. (indicator)

(1) Labor discontent.

(a) Energetic campaigns of union organizing or recruiting.

(b) Extremist propaganda in favor of the interests of the workers.

(c) Violent workers' demonstrations.

(d) Worker demonstrations against the government.

(e) Strikes.

(f) Changes in labor leadership.

(g) Persecution of labor leaders by the security forces or private groups.

(2) Rural Discontent.

(a) Demonstrations to demand agrarian reform. (b) Land takeovers.

(c) Persecution of peasant leaders by security forces or private groups.

(3) Economic Discontent.

(a) Peasants refuse to pay taxes or rents.

(b) Protests about high unemployment, low salaries, or against the national economic plan.

(4) Religious Discontent.

(a) Clergy embracing liberation theology.

(b) Clergy involved in activities concerning political, rural or labor discontent.

(c) Adult men receiving refuge or food from clergy or help from them. ...

c. Popular organizing. (indicator)

(1) Unusual meetings among the population.

(2) Migration of population from areas previously occupied.

(3) The population avoids travelling, working, or living in certain areas.

(4) Civilians avoid military forces or show their displeasure at cooperating with them.

... " (*Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.)

"Design and Management of a Facility [for questioning detainees]

II. Security Considerations.

A. Should be constructed in a reasonably secure area, secure from demonstrations, riots, etc.

B. Should not be easily observed from outside by unauthorized personnel.

C. Should be able to withstand an attack.

E. Overhead and bunker protection from shelling.

G. Firing ports in the outside wall of the facility.

H. External fencing of dense material to detonate rockets.



KENNETH K. LAMBALTIMORE SUN

William Hagland and Federico Reyes, forensic experts from the US and Guatemala, examine the bones of a victim shot in the head and buried in a mass grave in Honduras.

identify guerrilla presence. "Indicators of an imminent attack by guerillas" include demonstrations by minority groups, reluctance by civilians — including children — to associate with US or their local troops, celebrations of national or religious festivals, or the presence of strangers. "Indicators of control by guerillas" over a certain civilian population include the refusal to provide intelligence to government forces or the construction of new houses. Indications that insurgents are conducting psychological operations include accusations of government corruption, circulating petitions, attempts to discredit the government or armed forces, calling government leaders US puppets, urging youth to avoid the draft, demonstrations or strikes, or accusations of police or army brutality. As a helpful hint, this manual recommends drawing maps using different colors to depict the civilian population as "loyal to the government," "ambivalent," "possibly loyal to the insurgents," and "areas controlled by the insurgents."¹¹

Legal and Human Rights Considerations

The few allusions to legal and human rights considerations appear to have been added after the fact or in a superficial manner. Mention of the Geneva

Convention is inserted at the beginning of *Interrogation*, while *Counterintelligence*, when dealing with interrogation techniques, repeatedly refers to the rights of the suspect. In most of the manuals, however, discussion of rights is not integrated into the text or is contradicted in other passages. In some cases, human rights conventions are distorted. Readers are taught, for example, that an insurgent "Does not have a legal status as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention," implying that there are no international conventions covering humane treatment.¹²

In most of the discussions of techniques, however, legal considerations are simply absent. Over and over, the manuals treat detention without noting proper procedures for obtaining admissible evidence or for arresting or bringing suspects to trial. There is no mention of warrants or the right to contact an attorney or of any comparable local laws. Indeed, it is recommended throughout that detainees be kept in isolation, often—it is clear from the descrip-

12. *Revolutionary War, Guerillas and Communist Ideology*, p. 61. In fact, irrespective of status, every human being is covered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, and the Convention on Torture. Moreover, the Geneva Convention itself does cover, in Article 3, the basic human rights of prisoners and other persons taking no active part in hostilities "in cases of armed conflict not of an international character."

11. *Combat Intelligence*, p. 148.



KENNETH K. LAM/BALTIMORE SUN

Now a human rights advocate, Ines Consuelo Murillo was brutalized with shock torture by Battalion 316.

tions in several manuals—in clandestine jails. Interrogators are advised to use false names. Few distinctions are made between the treatment of armed guerrillas and civilians. At no time do the manuals state that the person detained or arrested must first be suspected of having committed a crime or even be told the reason for the arrest. The only rationale needed for arrest or detention is that the intelligence agent wants information the detainees may have.

A Purely Military Response

Civil society and government, too, are often viewed simply as impediments to military control. With no mention of the propriety of the practices, a number of the manuals advocate controlling information through censorship as well as by spying on and infiltrating civilian groups. In general, the population is a source of information at best, an enemy force at worst. The civilian government fares little better; it is one more entity to be reported on or pushed aside. Ways to impose curfews, military checkpoints, house-to-house searches, ID cards, and rationing are presented without reference to laws or the role of the legislature. Indeed, there is little discussion of the proper relationship between a civilian government and military authorities.

Much more effort is put into the role of the army in quashing revolutionary

tendencies. Several of the manuals teach militaries and intelligence services how insurgencies develop and how to control them. The description of the former is generally simplistic and dated, with few references to the role of official repression plays in fueling insurrection. The brief histories of El Salvador and Guatemala, for example, in *Terrorism and the Urban Guerilla* skip over repression, human rights violations, or problems in democratic governance that contributed to the growth of revolutionary movements. Insurgents are reduced to manipulators of popular discontent, in thrall to Soviet-style Marxism.

While *Combat Intelligence* offers a more sophisticated explanation of the underlying reasons for revolutionary movements — such as the strains created by rapid modernization, the existence of corrupt elites and government repression — neither this manual nor any other suggests steps a civilian government might take as a political response to popular discontent. There is no limitation on when to use military and counterintelligence methods.

**From Bad to Worse:
The CIA Manuals**

The two recently declassified CIA manuals make even more chilling reading. The CIA had written *KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation* in 1963 for

I. Entry and exit of all personnel must be strictly controlled by a system of badges, with photos, identifying personnel and indicating areas of access (e.g. different color backgrounds). Badges never leave the facility. They are picked up and turned at reception." (CIA's *Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983*, p. E-2.)

"Tapes [of interrogation] can be edited and spliced, with effective results, if the tampering can be kept hidden. For instance, it is more effective for a subject to hear a taped confession of an accomplice than to merely be told by the 'questioner' that he has confessed." (*Ibid.*, p. E-7.)

"I. Apprehension.

A. The manner and timing of arrest can contribute substantially to the questioner's purpose and should be planned to achieve surprise and the maximum amount of mental discomfort. ... The ideal time at which to make an arrest is in the early hours of the morning. When arrested at this time, most subjects experience intense feelings of shock, insecurity, and psychological stress and for the most part have great difficulty adjusting to the situation.

B. ...[I]t is very important that the arresting party behave in such a manner as to impress the subject with their efficiency. ...

II. Handling upon arrival at the facility.

A. Subject is brought into the facility blindfolded and handcuffed and should remain so during the entire processing.

B. Any time the subject is moved ... he should be blindfolded and handcuffed.

C. Subject should be required to comply immediately and precisely with all instructions.

F. Subject is completely stripped and told to take a shower. Blindfold remains in place while showering and guard watches throughout.

G. Subject is given a thorough medical examination, including all body cavities, by the facility doctor or nurse.

K. Total isolation should be maintained until after the first 'questioning' session. Conditions can be adjusted after this session.

L. Subject should be made to believe that he has been forsaken by his comrades.

M. Throughout his detention, subject must be convinced that his 'questioner' controls his ultimate destiny, and that his absolute cooperation is necessary for survival." (*Ibid.*, p. F-1-F-3.)

"F. News from Home.

Allowing a subject to receive carefully selected

letters from home can help create an effect desired by the 'questioner.' For example, the subject may get the idea that his relatives are under duress or suffering. A suggestion at the proper time that his cooperation or confession can help protect the innocent may be effective." (*Ibid.*, p. J-6.)

"2. A cooperative witness can sometimes be coached to exaggerate the subject's involvement or accuse him of a worse crime than the matter at hand. Upon hearing these remarks from a recording, a subject may confess the truth about the lesser guilt in order to provide himself with an alibi.

3. If the witness refuses to denounce the subject, the 'questioner' elicits and records remarks from him denouncing someone else known to him, for example, a criminal who was recently convicted in court. During the next session with the subject, these remarks, edited as necessary, are played back so that the subject is persuaded that he is the subject of the remarks." (*Ibid.*, p. J-8.)

"D. Threats and Fear

The threat of coercion usually weakens or destroys resistance more effectively than coercion itself. For example, the threat to inflict pain can trigger fears more damaging than the immediate sensation of pain. In fact, most people underestimate their capacity to withstand pain. In general, direct physical brutality creates only resentment, hostility, and further defiance.

The effectiveness of a threat depends on the personality of the subject, whether he believes the 'questioner' can and will carry out the threat, and on what he believes to be the reason for the threat. A threat should be delivered coldly, not shouted in anger, or made in response to the subject's own expressions of hostility." (*Ibid.*, p. K-8.)

"4. Are coercive techniques to be used? Have all supervisors in your direct chain of command been notified and given approval? Has headquarters given approval?" (*Ibid.*, p. L-4.)

"... [A] principal source of aid today [in extracting information] is scientific findings. The intelligence service which is able to bring pertinent, modern knowledge to bear upon its problems enjoys huge advantages over a service which conducts its clandestine business in eighteenth century fashion. It is true that American psychologists have devoted somewhat more attention to Communist interrogation techniques, particularly "brainwashing" than to U.S. practices. Yet they have conducted scientific inquiries into many subjects that are closely related to interrogation: the effects of debility and isolation, the polygraph, reactions

use by US agents against perceived Soviet subversion. (KUBARK was the CIA's codename for itself.) While it was not intended to train foreign military services, its successor, *Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual—1983*, which drew heavily on material in KUBARK, was used in at least seven US training courses conducted in Latin American countries between 1982 and 1987, according to a June 1988 memo placed inside the manual.¹³ This 1983

niques." *Human Resource Exploitation* recommends surprising suspects in the predawn hours, arresting, blindfolding, and stripping them naked. Suspects should be held incommunicado, it advises, and deprived of normal routines in eating and sleeping. Interrogation rooms should be windowless, sound-proof, dark, and without toilets. The manuals do admonish that torture techniques can backfire and that the threat of pain is often more effective



TERRY ALLEN

The manual's reference to "practical work" with prisoners, suggests that US trainers may have worked with Latin American militaries interrogating detainees. This reference gives new support to the claims by Latin Americans held as prisoners and by US nun Dianna Ortiz, tortured by the Guatemalan army in 1989, that US personnel were present in interrogation and torture rooms. Here, Ortiz consults with her lawyer José Pertierra, whose car was destroyed by a bomb in Washington, D.C., in 1996.

manual originally surfaced in response to a June 1988 congressional hearing which was prompted by allegations by the *New York Times* that the US had taught Honduran military officers who used torture. The 1988 hearing was not the first time such manuals had surfaced. In 1984, a CIA manual for training the Nicaraguan Contras in psychological operations created a considerable scandal.¹⁴

These two CIA textbooks deal exclusively with interrogation and devote an entire chapter each to "coercive tech-

than pain itself. However, they then go on to describe coercive techniques "to induce psychological regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist."¹⁵ These techniques include prolonged constraint, prolonged exertion, extremes of heat, cold, or moisture, deprivation of food or sleep, disrupting routines, solitary confinement, threats of pain, deprivation of sensory stimuli, hypnosis, and use of drugs or placebos.

According to the *Baltimore Sun*, "the methods taught in the 1983 manual and those used by [the US-trained Honduran] Battalion 316 in the early 1980s

13. The discrepancy between the 1982 use and the 1983 date on the manual is not explained.

14. CIA, *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*, available in book form (New York: Vintage, 1985).

15. *Human Resource Exploitation*, p. K-1.

show unmistakable similarities." The paper cites the case of Ines Murillo, a Honduran prisoner who claimed she was held in secret jails in 1983, given no food or water for days, and kept from sleeping by having water poured on her head every ten minutes.¹⁶

Dismissive of the rule of law, *Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual—1983* states the importance of knowing local laws on detention but then notes, "Illegal detention always requires prior [headquarters] approval."¹⁷ The manual also refers to one

D. SUCCESSFUL "QUESTIONING" IS BASED UPON A KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND UPON THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES WHICH ARE NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING TWO TYPES OF TECHNIQUES; COERCIVE AND NON-COERCIVE. WHILE WE ~~DO~~ ^{DEPLORE} THE USE OF COERCIVE TECHNIQUES, WE DO WANT ^{SO THAT YOU MAY AVOID} ~~TO MAKE YOU AWARE OF THEM AND THE PROPER WAY TO USE~~ THEM.

Pentimento mori: Excerpt from the CIA's *Human Resource Exploitation Manual - 1983* with the handwritten changes inserted in 1985.

or two weeks of "practical work" with prisoners as part of the course, suggesting that US trainers may have worked with Latin American militaries in interrogating actual detainees. This reference gives new support to the claims by Latin Americans held as prisoners and by US nun Dianna Ortiz, tortured by the Guatemalan army in 1989, that US personnel were present in interrogation and torture rooms.¹⁸

In 1985, in a superficial attempt to correct the worst of the 1983 manual, a page advising against using coercive techniques was inserted and handwritten changes were haphazardly introduced into the text. For example, "While we do not stress the use of coercive techniques, we do want to make you aware of them and the proper way to use them," has been coyly altered to, "While we deplore the use of coercive techniques, we do want to make you aware of them so that you may avoid them."¹⁹ But the entire chapter on

coercive techniques is still included, again with some items crossed out. Throughout, the reader can easily read the original underneath the "corrected" items. These corrections were made in response to the 1984 scandal when the CIA training manual for the Contras hit the headlines.

The second manual, *KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation*, is clearly the source of much of the 1983 manual; some passages are lifted verbatim. KUBARK has a similar section on coercive techniques, and includes

some even more abhorrent elements, such as two references to the use of electric shock. For example, one passage requires US agents to obtain "prior Headquarters approval ... if bodily harm is to be inflicted," or "if medical, chemical, or electrical methods" are to be used. A

third condition for obtaining prior approval is, ominously, whited out.²⁰

Much Spin, Little Oversight

Various administrations have tried to smooth the waters of public outrage when training manuals were discovered — the Nicaraguan Contra and Honduras manuals in the 1980s, now the Army and CIA manuals — with a combination of spin control and cosmetic change. In late 1991, under the Bush administration, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight launched an investigation into the seven Army manuals. The resulting report to the congressional intelligence committees concluded that the manuals' authors and SOA instructors "erroneously assumed that the manuals, as well as the lesson plans, represented approved doctrine."²¹ When interviewed by the investigators, the manuals' authors claimed

(continued on p. 63)

to pain and fear, hypnosis and heightened suggestibility, narcosis, etc. ...

"The legislation which founded KUBARK specifically denied it any law-enforcement or police powers. Yet detention in a controlled environment and perhaps for a lengthy period is frequently essential to a successful counterintelligence interrogation of a recalcitrant source. [section whited out] This necessity, obviously, should be determined as early as possible.

The legality of detaining and questioning a person, and of the methods employed, [section whited out]." (*KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation* — July 1963, p. 7.)

"Interrogations conducted under compulsion or duress are especially likely to involve illegality and to entail damaging consequences for KUBARK. Therefore prior Headquarters approval at the KUDOVE level must be obtained for the interrogation of any source against his will and under any of the following circumstances:

1. If bodily harm is to be inflicted.
2. If medical, chemical, or electrical methods or materials are to be used to induce acquiescence.
3. [whited out] (*Ibid.*, p. 8.)

"The profound moral objection to applying duress past the point of irreversibly psychological damage has been stated. Judging the validity of other ethical arguments about coercion exceeds the scope of this paper. What is fully clear, however, is that controlled coercive manipulation of an interrogatee may impair his ability to make fine distinctions but will not alter his ability to answer correctly such gross questions as Are you a Soviet agent? What is your assignment now? who is your present case officer?" (*Ibid.*, p. 84.)

"The following are the principal coercive techniques of interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis, and induced regression." (*Ibid.*, p. 85.)

"1. The more completely the place of confinement eliminates sensory stimuli, the more rapidly and deeply will the interrogatee be affected. Results produced only after weeks or months of imprisonment in an ordinary cell can be duplicated in hours or days in a cell which has no light (or weak artificial light which never varies), which is sound-proofed, in which odors are eliminated, etc. An environment still more subject to control, such as water-tank or iron lung, is even more effective." (*Ibid.*, p. 90.) ■

16. Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, and Mark Matthews, "Torture Was Taught by CIA," *Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 28, 1997.

17. *Human Resource Exploitation*, p. B-2.

18. Dianna Ortiz, "U.S. nun abducted, tortured in Guatemala escapes captors," *National Catholic Reporter*, Nov. 17, 1989, p. 1.

19. *Human Resource Exploitation*, p. A-2.

20. *KUBARK Counterintelligence*, p. 8.

21. DoD, "Report of Investigation: Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals," March 10, 1992, p. 2.

The US Arms Both Sides of Mexico's Drug War



by Lora Lumpe

Mexican narcotraffickers and other criminals easily obtain their firepower north of the border. Effectively reducing the flow of illegal arms would mean tightening laws on gun sales and ownership in the US. Instead, the Clinton administration increasingly militarizes Mexico's drug war, by providing more weapons aid and encouraging the military to become more involved.

On March 14, when federal agents opened two crates in a "left cargo" hold at the Otay Mesa border crossing near San Diego, California, they uncovered the largest illegal shipment of arms ever intercepted in the United States en route to Mexico. The weapons — thousands of unassembled grenade launchers and parts for M-2 automatic rifles — had been sitting unclaimed for two months. The discovery was a PR godsend for the Mexican government, following as it did on the heels of an embarrassing disclosure in

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February that Mexico's top drug enforcement official was on the take from *narcos*, and a messy skirmish between the White House and Congress about whether to "certify" Mexico as acting in good faith to counter drug trafficking. Mexico City quickly used news of the weapons cache to turn the spotlight away from its drug scandals and focus it on America's gun problem. No doubt stung by daily criticism from Washington, Mexican officials were less than diplomatic: "We're simply not satisfied" with US efforts to stem the flow of arms into Mexico, said Marco Provenzio, assistant undersecretary of foreign

relations.¹ The Mexican ambassador to Washington, Jesus Silva-Herzog, complained, "When we talk about drugs they say it [the problem] is supply, and when we bring up arms they respond that it's the demand. In other words, we can never win."²

Let's Outlaw Illegal Guns

It was not the first time Mexico had protested the flow of weapons. For several years now, that government has pointed

1. Clifford Krauss, "Mexico Protests Arms Inflow at Leaky US Border," *International Herald Tribune*, March 19, 1997.

2. Howard LaFranchi, "Mexicans Too Have a Problem Border: Awash in US Guns," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 11, 1997, p. 7.

out that Mexican drug cartels (and other criminals) are getting their arms north of the border; for several years, Mexico City has asked that Washington take effective steps to address this issue.

Washington has responded in several ways. First, successive administrations have downplayed Mexican concerns or labeled them as disingenuous — simply an effort to deflect attention from Mexico's official corruption and inept war on drugs.

More recently, the Clinton administration has seemingly acknowledged the link between the gray and black arms markets and narco-trafficking, at least rhetorically. In his keynote speech before the 50th UN General Assembly, for example, President Clinton focused on the global threat posed by terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. "No one is immune, not the people of Latin America or Southeast Asia, where drug traffickers wielding imported weapons have murdered judges, journalists, police officers and innocent passersby," said the president. Citing the facility with which these groups obtain the weapons needed for their operations, Clinton urged states to work with Washington "to shut down the gray markets that outfit terrorists and criminals with firearms."

In addition, over the last year, Mexican police and US agents have stepped up cooperation, communication and intelligence-sharing on gun-running and on tracing weapons used in crime. And, at their summit in early May, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo redundantly agreed to "outlaw the trafficking in illegal arms."³

Fighting Fire with Firepower

It's easy for the Clinton administration to oppose illicit arms trafficking in principle; it's a motherhood issue. But missing from the speechifying is any mention of the US role as a one-stop-shop for drugrunners' guns — or concrete steps likely to staunch the flow of

arms. Given that America's loose gun sale and gun ownership laws facilitate the vast majority of weapons smuggled across the border, the willingness of the administration to take effective action is far from clear. Domestic gun control — considered too politically sensitive, even in the context of the alleged threat to national security posed by drug trafficking — is not part of the discussion.⁴

which has resulted in Mexican soldiers training at Fort Bragg and other US bases, and in the gift of 73 "surplus" helicopters, night vision goggles, radios and other military equipment. In addition, the White House has requested \$9 million in military aid for Mexico for fiscal year 1998 (up from \$3 million in fiscal year 1996) for the purchase of new weapons from US arms manufacturers.⁵



JEFFREY D. SCOTT/IMPACT VISUALS

US Customs agent uses a drug-sniffing dog to inspect a truck crossing the Mexico-US border.

Instead, the administration has concentrated on providing the Mexican military with firepower sufficient to counter that of the drug bandits. The relationship between the two militaries has warmed dramatically in the past year, following a visit by Gen. Barry McCaffrey, the White House drug policy director, to Mexico in March 1996. His meeting smoothed the way for an agreement between the two governments

More Firepower

The links between arms and drug trafficking make the problem worse. Drug authorities estimate that up to three-quarters of the cocaine entering the United States now comes through Mexico, as do tons of marijuana annually. Mexican narcotraffickers are believed to take in as much as \$30 billion per year for their role in this trade.⁶ In March 1996, Thomas Constantine, the chief of the US Drug Enforcement Administration testified that the Mexican drug cartels were so wealthy and powerful that they now rival the government for influence and control in many regions.

Increasingly, the narcos are outgunning Mexican drug agents. Drug traffickers killed more than 200 police last year alone.⁷ The Border Patrol reported 24 armed encounters and assaults on agents in its Del Rio sector during the first eight months of 1996, including a January shootout with a Mexican drug trafficker near Eagle's Pass,

Texas in which a Border Patrol agent was killed. There were eight armed encounters during the same time period in 1995.⁸ According to a Mexican official, "The firepower of the narco-traffickers is so superior to that of the federal

3. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Mexico City), Remarks by President Clinton, May 6, 1997.

4. See, for instance, the hearing on counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 8, 1995.

5. The Secretary of State, "Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1998, p. 413.

6. Paul de la Garza, "Mexico Army Takes Police Role," *Chicago Tribune*, April 11, 1997, p. 8.

7. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Mexico City), "Remarks by the President in Address to the People of Mexico," May 7, 1997.

8. Jeff Bulta, "Mexico Faces Corruption, Crime, Drug Trafficking and Political Intrigue," *Crime and Justice International*, v. 13, n. 1, Feb. 1997, <http://www.acsp.uic.edu/oicj/pubs/cjintl/i301>.

agents that they [the narcos] have become increasingly brazen. These people are getting their weapons from the US. That doesn't mean necessarily that they are American weapons, but ... one issue that can help is lowering the access to these weapons."⁹

Not just the police are coming under fire. Thousands of Mexican citizens are getting caught in the crossfire. According to the US Centers for Disease Control, Mexico has one of the highest firearm homicide rates in the world, about 10 for every 100,000 people. (The rate for the United States is 7 per 100,000 people.)¹⁰ In addition, there has been a spate of recent high-profile political and narco-assassinations, many of them carried out with guns purchased illegally in the US. In 1993, the Cardinal of Guadalajara, José Posadas Ocampo, was gunned down in a drug-gang shootout with a weapon smuggled across the US border. A year later, PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated in Tijuana with a .38-caliber Taurus pistol also purchased illegally north of the border. Just months after Colosio's murder, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the secretary general of the ruling PRI, was shot and killed. This past January, Hodin Armando Gutiérrez Rico, a former special prosecutor on the Colosio case for the Attorney General's office, was cut down in a hail of bullets in front of his Tijuana home. Police found more than 130 AK-47 assault rifle shells and 9mm bullet casings. Five officials linked to the Colosio investigation have now been assassinated.

Gun seizures by Mexican officials have increased dramatically in recent years, but it is difficult to know whether this is because of absolute increases in numbers of weapons in Mexico, or to improved efficiency on the part of the authorities. Road checkpoints have turned up large quantities of drugs, arms, and other smuggled goods.¹¹

9. Phone interview, April 24, 1997.

10. Centers for Disease Control, 1996, cited in "Draft Statistical Tables for Microanalysis," Ad-Hoc Expert Group on Information Gathering and Analysis of Firearm Regulation, prepared for seminar of UN Economic and Social Council, Feb. 10-14, 1997.

11. "Deputy Attorney General on Arms, Ammunition Trafficking," *UNOMASUNO*, Aug. 8, 1994, as translated and published in FBIS-LAT-94-157.

Poverty on both sides of the border spurs petty crime rates and feeds the trafficking of illegal arms. Here, a young gang member in LA.

Mexican police seized 16,000 pistols and 6,000 shotguns, mostly from drug gangs in 1994-95, and more than 7,200 illegal weapons in 1995 in non-drug related crimes (up from 28 in 1992).¹² Last October, Mexican officials asked

where the shipment originates. [The guns] generally originate from US citizens and end up most of the time in the hands of gangsters, thieves, and other criminals, rather than organizations such as the Zapatista National Liberation Army." Situated in the

The White House has requested \$9 million in military aid for Mexico for the purchase of new weapons from US arms manufacturers.

the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) to trace the origin of nearly 4,300 sidearms and semiautomatic and automatic rifles confiscated from drug-related crime scenes.¹³ Since then, Mexico has submitted 1,500 additional trace requests.¹⁴

In August 1994, just months before his brother fell to an assassin's bullet, Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu (now in jail in the US, awaiting trial on drug-related charges), said, "We track the dealer and determine from

southern part of the country, Mexico's leftist rebel armies appear to be getting their arms principally from enormous stores left over from the Central American wars of the 1980s. Many of those arms were, of course, supplied by Washington, too, either through massive military aid programs or as part of covert government operations. According to a report by the attorney general's office last fall, arms from north of the border are mainly being used in street crimes, such as holdups, kidnappings, and murders."¹⁵

The Profit Motive

Proximity, liberal gun sales laws, and inadequate law enforcement have made the US Mexico's leading source of black market arms — despite Mexico's own strict gun control policy. Mexican law bars civilian ownership of any gun larger than .22-caliber; requires a permit before purchase; mandates the reg-

12. LaFranchi, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

13. *Crime and Justice International*, *op. cit.*

14. Clifford Krauss, "Mexico, Harried Over Drugs, Presses Own Peeve: US Guns," *New York Times*, March 19, 1997.

15. *UNOMASUNO*, *op. cit.*

istration of firearms with the Ministry of Defense; and bans carrying weapons in public. Although Mexico has produced military-style assault rifles under license from European gun manufacturers, it does not make or sell weapons approved for the general population.

Just over the border, however, regulation is loose and manufacture of guns is big business. In 1990 alone, civilian firearms sales amounted to a staggering \$2.1 billion, with wholesale ammunition sales of \$491 million in 1992.¹⁶ There are an estimated 250 million firearms circulating, and over 245,000 federally licensed firearms dealers selling guns to the general public. Ten percent of these (24,567) licensed gun sellers are in the four states bordering Mexico, and more than 6,000 sit along the border between the two countries.¹⁷ While it is illegal in the US for any person or company to export or conspire to export a weapon without obtaining a license from the government (either the Commerce or State Department, depending on the type of weapon), the US is a major source of small arms and light weapons for illicit buyers around the world.

16. US Census Bureau, *US Statistical Abstract* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1995), table 406.

17. LaFranchi, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Of the five or six million firearms purchased annually in the US by private buyers, a certain percentage is acquired by middlemen working on behalf of arms traffickers who smuggle them across the US-Mexican border in violation of both countries' laws and regulations.

Many of the arms used by Mexico's insurgencies were supplied by Washington either through massive military aid programs or as part of US covert operations that left enormous arsenals behind.

Gun trafficking entails significant risk of punishment for those caught, but rewards those who succeed with big, or at least relatively easy, money. The going rate to smuggle one gun into Mexico is reportedly about \$100,¹⁸ and annual reports by the BATF's International

18. A Mexican lawyer ordered an illegal 12-gauge Perazzi from a Laredo, Texas gun dealer and paid an American

Traffic in Arms program indicate that the task is not overly difficult. In 1994, foreign governments reported 6,238 unlawfully acquired US-origin firearms to the BATF. Over half — 3,376 — were discovered in Mexico.¹⁹ The chances of being prosecuted for arms trafficking on the north

side of the border appear pretty low. Despite the enormous quantities of US-origin guns illegally circulating in Mexico, a US Department of Justice (DoJ) document listing "Significant Export Control Cases" from January 1981 to June 1995 shows that, in this 15-year span, the DoJ prosecuted only two cases. One, in 1989, involved a conspiracy to export 190 AK-47 as-

sault weapons and a large quantity of ammunition, and the other concerned a conspiracy to purchase and export a large quantity of weapons, including M-16 rifles, grenades, and antitank rockets, for use by drug traffickers in Mexico in 1990.²⁰ Mexico's Firearms and Explosives Act stipulates harsh penalties for crimes connected with the possession and use of all types of weapons, as well as their illicit trade.

Shipping Through Customs

Gunrunners, like their product, come in all calibers. Some are free-lance petty criminals looking for a quick buck. But much of the traffic is just one part of large-scale organized criminal operations. According to a report last fall by the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico, gunrunning is the third richest source of

\$100 to smuggle it into Mexico. (*Ibid.*)

19. Other countries reporting a significant number of confiscated US-origin firearms included Colombia (604), Jamaica (210), and Canada (167). US Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, *ITAR: International Traffic in Arms* (Washington, D.C.: BATF, 1994), Annual Report for FY 1993, p. 22.

20. US Department of Justice, "Significant Export Control Cases, January 1981 to May 31, 1995," obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Federation of American Scientists.



Zapatista combatant in the Lacandon jungle in southern Mexico.

JACK KURTZ/IMPACT VISUALS

Global Gun Glut

The problem of the proliferation of illicit arms is drawing fire from numerous international regulatory bodies. International police and customs entities (Interpol, the World Customs Organization, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States) have recently undertaken useful initiatives to gather data, educate policymakers and find consensus on steps that can be taken to regulate firearms and curb illicit trafficking. The US has been participating in all of these efforts, and apparently welcomes them.

The United Nations has also become concerned with the impact of small arms and light weapons on the maintenance of peace. In September 1995, the secretary-general called for direct action "to deal with the flourishing illicit traffic in light weapons, which is destabilizing the security of a number of countries." In December of that year, the General Assembly established a panel of experts to study the matter (the UN's idea of direct action). The panel will make its final report in June and is expected to call for greater self-restraint and information-sharing in exports of such weapons.

Also in 1995, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) undertook a study of "firearms regulation for the purposes of crime prevention and public safety." In March 1997, the secretary-general issued a report with the phrase "measures to regulate firearms" in the title. Needless to say, the National Rifle Association (NRA) is sweating. In fact, in late 1996 the gun association applied for and was accredited as an officially recognized "non-governmental organization" with the UN, precisely so that it could keep closer tabs on and influence the UN's efforts. In a statement prepared for a May ECOSOC commission on crime prevention, the NRA complained that the "current orientation of these [UN] efforts regarding firearms regulation is dissipating energy and effort from more pressing and relevant problems, *i.e.*, illegal arms smuggling as it relates to criminal activity and terrorism." When asked specifically what the NRA proposes to do about gun-smuggling, a spokesman said he didn't know what legislation could be passed to curb the problem, given that criminals break the law. "That's what criminals do."¹

The Organization of American States (OAS) is involved in two efforts to tackle the illicit arms traffic in the hemisphere. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) provides assistance to OAS member states on supply and demand reduction, legal development, institution-building, and information exchange. As part of its le-



JEFFREY D. SCOTT/IMPACT VISUALS

gal development program, CICAD is drafting model regulations to standardize and "when appropriate, periodically revise laws, regulations, administrative procedures and the means of applying them in order to eliminate the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related material."² The model regulations should be completed this summer. In a second and more recent initiative, the OAS is drafting a convention against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related material. The proposed treaty originated with the Mexican government, and the current draft calls on states to adopt legal or other measures necessary to "prevent, combat or eradicate" the illicit production and transfer of firearms and ammunition. According to Carlos Rico Ferrat of the Mexican Foreign Relations Secretariat, the OAS draft convention will develop a consensus about what kinds of arms are to be considered illegal for international trade, and set rules for notification of arms shipments for both sending and receiving countries, including an annual assessment of efforts by each state party on progress in curtailing illicit arms trafficking. According to another official, "At this point the exercise is about enhancing the capability of countries to track the issue. More stringent gun control laws in the US are not on the table right now." ■

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1. Interview, April 1997.
2. LaFranchi, *op. cit.*


profit for organized crime in Mexico, after drug trafficking and robbery/extortion. The report states that no criminal group has been found to be "strictly and exclusively dedicated to arms trafficking" but, rather, that drug trafficking organizations are running guns through the routes to/from the US un-

der their control. It cites flourishing gun/drug routes along the Pacific coast, the Gulf coast, and Central Baja and adds that a "significant" amount of arms trafficking originates out of central Florida, crossing through the Caribbean and entering Mexico through the Yucatan Peninsula. The narcos gen-

erally traffic in AK-47, AR-15, and M-1 assault rifles.²¹

Large and well-organized arms shipments like that uncovered near San Diego in March are thought to be unusual, but no one really knows, since

21. *La Jornada*, Sept. 27, 1996, as translated and published in FBIS-TDD-96-029-L.



Mexican police set up a roadblock in the Yucatan and search all vehicles, 1996.

understanding of black market gun-running is based largely on transactions that have failed. In this case, several months before their Otay Mesa discovery, the weapons had entered the

Before the Vietnam-era arms returned home to America, they had gone from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore to Bremerhaven, Germany, through the Panama Canal and up to Long Beach.

US through the port of Long Beach, California, in two large, sealed containers. The shipment originated in Vietnam, where America, as part of its war legacy, had left behind large quantities of weapons, including M-2 automatic rifles.²² Before the arms returned home, they were well-traveled, having gone from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore to

Bremerhaven, Germany, through the Panama Canal and up to Long Beach.²³

The contents of the containers were falsely represented as hand tools and strap hangers. US Customs at Long Beach did not inspect the cargo since the shipment was "in-bond" — that is, the items were simply transiting the US en route to another country, in this instance Mexico. In such cases, cargo containers typically remain sealed as they move from ship to truck to border. According to a Customs source, "in the normal course of business, no one would have ever opened them. [The arms] were discovered through a fluke."²⁴

(The shipment was held up at the border because the Mexican freight forwarder commissioned to get the crates to Mexico City did not have an address for the purchaser.) The in-bond system is built on trust, and on the Customs Service's lack of resources. Customs has fewer than 135 inspectors at the port of Long Beach, the nation's busiest port, to

sift daily through the equivalent of 8,400 20-foot cargo containers.²⁵

The Trail of Ants

The most routine way of smuggling arms, however, is the *hormiga* (ant) run: repeated trips across the border with one or a few guns. A legally eligible or "straw" purchaser buys a few weapons (often cheap .22- and .25-caliber pistols, "38 specials," and 9mm pistols) from gun stores in El Paso and other US border towns and hands them over to the trafficker, who sneaks them across the border, generally either on foot or in the trunk of a car. A smuggler can repeat this process hundreds of times a year, making multiple trips to gun stores in Florida, Texas, and California, in particular.

Some legal constraints are now in place, but lack of investigative and regulatory resources reduces their efficacy. The "Brady Bill" mandates a five-day waiting period, and a recently enacted rule requires purchasers to show that they have lived for at least three months in the state where they are buying a gun. In addition, the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986 (sponsored by the NRA) requires that multiple sales be reported to the BATF and local law enforcement agencies, so that they can monitor multiple gun purchases and investigate if they suspect criminal intent. But currently only three states — Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina — have laws that prevent people from buying more than one gun a month. In all other states, straw purchasers can buy significant quantities of guns and ammunition from gun dealers at one time and pass them on to smugglers for clandestine shipment. A 1991 BATF report describes a number of such transactions, including a 1989 case in which three Arizona residents purchased 93 assault rifles and 22 handguns for a well-known Mexican narcotics trafficker, who then transported them into Mexico.²⁶

22. The M-2 is a World War II-era rifle, identical to the M-1 which is used by the Mexican police, except that it has a small selector switch that converts it into a fully automatic weapon.

23. Valerie Alvord, "Illegal Weapons Were Well-Traveled," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, March 21, 1997.

24. Valerie Alvord, "2 Truckloads of Illegal Arms Found," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, March 14, 1997.

25. Anne-Marie O'Connor and Jeff Leeds, "US Agents Seize Smuggled Arms," *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1997.

26. BATF Firearms Division, *International Traffic in*

And once the guns are acquired in the US, there is little to keep them from crossing the 2,000-mile-long border. Because Mexican border officials have a general policy of not checking people who enter on foot, many Mexican smugglers hide guns in suitcases, backpacks, or duffle bags. Gunrunners who drive across conceal weapons under seats or inside false compartments. Although border police run random spot checks of cars coming south, these traffickers run relatively little risk. Firearms are also smuggled on commercial flights. According to a US Customs survey conducted at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), gunrunners often wrap the firearms in foil and then put them in their checked baggage. Smugglers also hide weapons in television sets or other electronic components and ship them either as air freight or as personal luggage. In 1989, US Customs officers recovered 463 firearms at LAX.²⁷ It can probably be assumed that many more guns escaped detection there and at other US airports.

Where the Guns Are

Willie Sutton explained, when asked why he robbed banks, "because that's where the money is." In that spirit, many gunrunners go to military and police facilities on both sides of the border to get arms. In 1993, the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that small arms parts were routinely stolen from a number of military repair shops and warehouses. The hot parts were then sold to gun dealers or to walk-in customers at gun shows around the US. GAO investigators were able to purchase military small arms parts at 13 of 15 gun shows they visited. They were able to buy everything needed to convert a semiautomatic AR-15 rifle into a fully automatic M-16, as well as 30-round M-16 magazine clips still in their original packages.²⁸ Some of these arms undoubtedly end up south of the border.

In Mexico, narcotraffickers and other criminals probably also get a substantial amount of US arms from Mexican police and military depots, either through theft or purchases from corrupt state servants. In 1991, the Pentagon gave Mexico nearly 50,000 M-1 rifle

carbines,²⁹ and during 1989-93, the State Department approved 108 licenses for the export of more than \$34 million of small arms to Mexico. The Department performed only three follow-up inspections to ensure non-diversion of these arms.³⁰ During 1991-93, the Commerce Department approved an additional 34 licenses for the export of over \$3 million of shotguns and shells.³¹ End use checks are even rarer on Commerce-licensed arms.

Supply and Demand, American Style

Shutting down an illicit market is, of course, difficult: Reducing supply, without also reducing demand, might simply make the market more lucrative and encourage more people to enter it. Nevertheless, there is much that the US could do to make it more difficult for

These steps address supply, but ignore the root causes of the tremendous demand for lethal firepower. Crime, and related gun use, among small-time criminals is often fueled by desperate social conditions ---- lack of jobs, hopelessness, and poverty.

Mexican and other criminals to obtain firearms in America. The "Brady Bill" (requiring a five-day waiting period and criminal check prior to gun sales) and the current ban on sales of assault rifles have complicated business for gunrunners. A national law limiting customers to one handgun purchase per month would, according to BATF findings, help curb the multiple-gun straw purchases that often end up on the black market. There is also a need to increase resources for Customs intelligence and inspections, and for the State Department and Customs

Service to undertake more frequent "end use" inspections to ensure that legally transferred small and light arms are not diverted.

All of these steps address supply, but ignore the root causes of the tremendous demand for lethal firepower. Crime, and related gun use, among small-time criminals is often fueled by desperate social conditions — lack of jobs, hopelessness, and poverty. In Mexico, every year 158,000 babies die before 5 years of age because of nutritionally related disease. With the country gripped in its worst recession since 1932, as many as 40 percent of all Mexicans suffer from some degree of undernutrition. A report by the nation's top private bank, Banamex, found that as a result of the economic crisis, half of Mexico's 92 million people get less than the 1,300 minimum daily requirement

of calories.³² Not unexpectedly, the crime rate in Mexico has soared since the collapse of the national economy in 1995, with an average of 543 crimes per day reported in Mexico City.³³ And organized crime, the biggest traffickers and consumers of illicit weapons, thrives on the drug trade.

Meanwhile, gathering information on gun violence and gun ownership laws within the hemisphere is an important step (see p. 43), as

are devising common export guidelines and enhancing Customs surveillance and cooperation. But as long as the United States has by far the most permissive gun sales policies in the hemisphere, it will continue to supply drug-runners and criminals of all stripes. ■

32. Cited in Norman Solomon, "Poor Journalism South of the Border," *Creators Syndicate*, May 8, 1997.

33. "Growing Security Problems," *Criminal Justice in the Americas*, <http://www.acsp.uic.edu/oicj/pubs/cja/090311.htm>.

Arms, Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: BATF, 1991), p. 132.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-24.

28. US General Accounting Office, *Small Arms Parts: Poor Controls Invite Widespread Theft*, GAO/NSIAD-94-21 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993).

29. Paul F. Pineo and Lora Lumpe, *Recycled Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1996), p. 33.

30. See Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs hearing, *A Review of Arms Export Licensing*, June 15, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 37.

31. Information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

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Did NSA Help Russia Target Dudayev?

by Wayne Madsen




PHOTO: ITAR-TASS; GRAPHIC: B.C.P. VICK

The former Soviet Air Force general knew the rules. When talking on the portable satellite telephone bought for him by his Islamist Refah Party allies in Turkey, he had to keep conversations to an absolute minimum. Nothing less than his life depended on it. Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was especially aware of the capabilities of the Ilyushin-76 aircraft and its A-50 "Mainstay" radar to pinpoint his phone's signal. The plane and its suite of equipment was the So-

viet version of the more sophisticated US AWACS electronic warfare aircraft.

Four times during the first three months of 1996, the Russians had tried unsuccessfully to lock onto Dudayev's phone signal. But the general never gave the Russian army's vast array of signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft and mobile vans enough time to conduct radio direction finding ("DFing") to determine his exact location.

Dudayev had good reason to be nervous. Both Moscow and the West wanted a quick end to the Chechens' two-year long war for greater autonomy. The conflict had become a mini-Afghanistan. It was draining the lives of hundreds of Russia's young soldiers, the country's

precious cash reserves, and Yeltsin's chances for winning the June 16, 1996 presidential election against Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. The West, too, was eager to keep the Chechen conflict from contributing to a Communist victory at the polls. For President Clinton, who also faced reelection, a Communist win was especially unwelcome. The rallying cry of "Who lost Russia to the Communists?" would be heard over and over again at the Republican convention and campaign rallies and would certainly be used against him in the televised debates.

To make matters worse, the Chechens were dealing the Russians some devastating battlefield blows. In

Wayne Madsen is an Arlington, Virginia-based journalist who specializes in intelligence matters, communications, computer security, and privacy. **Photo:** Dudayev votes in 1991 elections which seated him as first president of the Chechen Republic; **Graphic:** Vortex satellite.

mid-April, Dudayev had severely bloodied the noses of the Russians when his forces (including some *mujahedin* volunteers from Pakistan) attacked the Russian Army's 245th Regiment convoy with anti-armor grenades from hillside perches near the town of Yarysh-Mardy. After the attack, some 90 Russian troops were dead and another 50 wounded. A few civilian women and children who were traveling with the convoy were also killed. The Yarysh-Mardy attack would become Russia's worst defeat of the Chechen conflict, topping even the bold Chechen attack of June 1995 on Budenovsk, within Russia itself, and assaults within the neighboring republic of Dagestan. It was also making Yeltsin and the army look impotent.

Yeltsin, Clinton, and Yeltsin's other close ally, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, all needed a quick fix to the Chechen problem. Yeltsin blamed the Russian military for the defeat at Yarysh-Mardy and began to extend peace feelers to Dudayev. While the president was huddled with Clinton and other Group of Seven leaders in Moscow, he told the press that he was ready to cut a deal. King Hassan II of Morocco agreed to act as an intermediary. But face-to-face meetings with the Russians were too dangerous for Dudayev; negotiations would be conducted over the rebel leader's heretofore stealthy satellite telephone.¹

Yeltsin's peace gestures sounded good to Dudayev. Perhaps too good. Soon he was on his satellite telephone to discuss Yeltsin's peace offerings with Hassan and Konstantin Borovoi, a liberal Duma deputy who served as Dudayev's Moscow intermediary.

During the evening of April 21, Dudayev went outside his headquarters, a small house near the village of Gekhi Chu, some 20 miles southwest of Grozny, the Russian-occupied Chechen capital. At 8:00 p.m., he phoned Borovoi in Moscow to discuss Yeltsin's latest olive branch. "Soon, it could be very hot in Moscow," he told Borovoi. "Do you live in the center?"²

1. Joseph Albright, "Tit-for-tat Revenge May Have Killed Chechen Leader," *Austin American-Statesman* (Texas) April 28, 1996, p. A17.

2. Agence France Presse, "Rebel Leader Alluded to Terrorism in Moscow Moments Before Death," April 26, 1996.

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Pres. Yeltsin's Communist rival for the 1996 elections, Gennady Zyuganov.

"In the center. And even next to the Interior Ministry," Borovoi responded. "You should probably move out for the time being," Dudayev warned. Dudayev may have been telling Borovoi that a Chechen attack on the Interior Ministry was imminent.

"That's out of the question, Dzhokar Mussayevich," Borovoi responded, using the familiar Russian term of address.

Then Dudayev said, "Russia must regret what it is doing." Borovoi's line suddenly went dead.³ This time, Dudayev had stayed on the phone too long.

Dead Shot

Just seconds before what were to be the Chechen's last words, a Russian Sukhoi Su-25 jet, armed with air-to-surface missiles, had received his coordinates. It locked on to Dudayev's phone signal and fired two laser-guided missiles. As one exploded just a few feet away, shrapnel pierced Dudayev's head. He died almost immediately in the arms of one of his bodyguards.

There was immediate speculation that the signal from Dudayev's satellite phone had been beamed directly into the sensitive ears of a satellite which relayed his coordinates to the jet. According to Agence France Presse, a source inside Chechenya's rebel government charged that, "The attack was carried out by the Russian secret services with the partici-

3. *Ibid.*

pation of the spy satellite services of certain Western countries."⁴

Martin Streetly, editor of *Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems*, thought that the state of the Russian armed forces would preclude it from accurately pinpointing Dudayev's location.⁵ The Russians had previously tried some less advanced methods to kill Dudayev and failed. On one occasion, Dudayev had been given a knife with an electronic homing device embedded in the handle but it was discovered before Russian aircraft could lock in on the signal.⁶


Suspicion centered on the US and the National Security Agency's Vortex, Orion, and Trumpet, the world's most sophisticated (SIGINT) spy satellites. They were partially designed to intercept the mobile telephone systems used by the big brass in the Soviet and Warsaw Pact high commands. The NSA SIGINT birds were, therefore, extremely useful against the kind of telephone Dudayev had been given by his Turkish friends.

Furthermore, the US and Britain were the only Western countries with sophisticated SIGINT satellite capabilities. (In fact, Britain's Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] merely "rents" time on the NSA's Vortex

4. Agence France Presse, "Dudayev's Satellite Phone Was His Doom," April 24, 1996.

5. Patricia Reaney, "Defense Experts Question How Dudayev Was Killed," Reuters World Service, April 24, 1996.

6. Phil Reeves, "The Best Thing I Could Do Is Die," *The Independent* (London), April 25, 1996, p. 11.



satellite — so it is arguable whether London has its own independent SIGINT satellite capability.) According to intelligence analyst Mark Urban, the NSA and GCHQ SIGINT coverage of Chechnya was more comprehensive than that of Bosnia. The NSA has concentrated some of its Vortex and Orion SIGINT birds over Iraq and Kuwait since the Gulf War.⁷ It would not have taken much to steer some of the orbiting SIGINT satellites eavesdropping on Iraq to a position slightly north over the Russian Caucasus mountains.

A French counterterrorism specialist concurred that the US was the only country with satellite technology that could pinpoint Dudayev's location within a few meters of his satellite telephone transmission. After Dudayev was reported killed by the Russians, a US State Department spokesperson scoffed at rumors that the Chechen president might still be alive. He stated unequivocally that he was "certain" that Dudayev was dead.⁸ Clinton's presence in Moscow on the day Dudayev was killed did little to curb suspicions.

7. Jeffrey T. Richelson, *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 418.

8. Agence France Presse, "Dudayev's Satellite Phone..." *op. cit.* The specialist is not identified in the Moscow-filed report.

Partners in Crime

If in fact, the NSA did share SIGINT with Boris Yeltsin, it would not have been a first. Before the abortive coup against Gorbachev in 1991, the NSA had reportedly intercepted and decrypted messages transmitted by anti-Gorbachev coup plotters Vladimir Kryuchkov of the KGB and Dmitri Yazov, the defense minister. President Bush reportedly ordered the messages delivered to Yeltsin who placed so much faith in them that he warned Gorbachev to expect a coup before year's end. Gorbachev ignored Yeltsin's advice.⁹

Clinton had also shared SIGINT information with Yeltsin. On a May 1995 visit to Moscow, the US president showed Yeltsin intelligence reports on Iran's nuclear weapons program gleaned from NSA eavesdropping on Iranian communications with foreign companies that had also sold nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. NSA also routinely provides sanitized signals intelligence information to the commander of the Russian contingent within NATO's Implementation Force in Bosnia. The Russian military has apparently been quite impressed with the quality of the NSA intelligence it is receiving.¹⁰

9. Seymour Hersh, "The Wild East," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 16, 1994, pp. 84-86.

10. For Iran: Jim Hoagland, "How Pakistan Helped Iran, and Clinton Alerted Yeltsin," *International Herald*

Nor is Russia the only country to be so favored. According to Professor Desmond Ball of Australian National University, US intelligence is actively training Chinese SIGINT specialists in the Second Department of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission in the finer science of communications intelligence gathering. The training facility, states Ball, is located near San Francisco.¹¹ This cooperation is hardly good news to the pro-democracy Hong Kong, Tibetan, Inner Mongolian, and Eastern Turkistani activists who are fighting against Beijing.

There have also been reports of NSA and CIA providing high-grade intelligence to help Peru and Mexico battle their respective insurgencies. The most recent example to come to light is in Peru. According to *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, after Túpac Amaru rebels seized the residence of the Japanese ambassador, a CIA-operated spy plane tracked their movements and monitored the hostages. The Air Force RG-8A aircraft which used a forward-looking infrared camera at night also detected rebel-planted mines and booby traps. The 29-foot single engine aircraft are very quiet and carry high resolution television cameras or multispectral sensors that observe non-visible light. They have been used for years in secret operations and by the US Coast Guard in anti-drug operations.¹²

In 1988, NSA helped its Australian counterpart, the Defense Signals Directorate, to set up a remote SIGINT station at Bamaga, on the tip of Cape York in northern Queensland. One of its main purposes is to listen in on the radio transmissions of the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The BRA has been fighting for independence from Papua New Guinea since 1975 when Australia granted Papua New Guinea independence.¹³


NSA has reportedly maintained a SIGINT liaison and advisory relationship with Sri Lanka's Directorate of Military Intelligence and National Intelligence Bureau since the early 1980s. Sri Lanka's SIGINT

Tribune (May 18, 1995); and for NATO: Rick Atkinson, "GIs Signal Bosnians: Yes, We're Listening," *Washington Post*, March 18, 1996, p. A14.

11. Desmond Ball, "Signals Intelligence in China," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, v. 7, n. 8, Aug. 1995, p. 367.

12. Agence France Presse, "CIA Operated Spy Plane Reportedly Aided Peru Embassy Rescue," May 5, 1997.

13. Interview with Desmond Ball, Feb. 1996.





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agencies have used US-manufactured SIGINT and DF equipment to intercept the citizens' band radios and walkie-talkies used by Sri Lanka's insurgent groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam.¹⁴

14. Desmond Ball, "Signals Intelligence in Sri Lanka," *Strategic Intelligence*, v. XVIII, n. 8, Nov. 1995, pp. 1089, 1105.

Russian tank rolls through ruins of Grozny, Chechnya, in the war that sapped Yeltsin's popularity and threatened to become Moscow's second Afghanistan.

NSA's sharing of cellular phone SIGINT with Russia and other countries not noted for their human rights records, including China, Peru, and Mexico, may become more commonplace if Washington gets its way. According to David Banisar of the Electronic Pri-

vacy Information Center in Washington, D.C., the FBI, under the provisions of the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), is trying to force cellular communications companies to ensure that their cell phones will be able to locate users within 500 feet. "This will turn everybody's cell phone into a bugging and tracking device," Banisar contends. The popularity of cell phones is rising in countries with poor communication infrastructures. Not surprisingly, then, pro-independence, human rights, and democracy movements are also relying on this dependable means of communications. However, given the current and future ability of the NSA and other intelligence agencies to eavesdrop on cellular calls and pinpoint their locations, these groups are obviously putting themselves in jeopardy.

Furthermore, the sharing of such SIGINT information with regimes that target political leaders for murder calls into question the presidential prohibition which unequivocally bans the US government from using political assassination. ■

Shhhhh!

The sensitivity surrounding possible US intelligence-sharing with the Russians was evident at an Information Warfare Conference held in McLean, Virginia, on May 14, 1996, just weeks after Dudayev's assassination. During a speech, I told the assembled military and intelligence officials that the age-old art of radio direction finding was far from dead. As an example, I cited the direction finding used to locate Dudayev's INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite) phone transmission. After the session, an Air Force lieutenant colonel assigned to the NSA approached the lectern to berate me for discussing sensitive matters in an open forum.

"Don't you realize that we have people on the ground over there?" he protested. "You're talking about things that could put them [NSA employees and contractors] in harm's way. They could be targeted by terrorists!"

I responded that I was merely repeating information from a Reuters news story. "You shouldn't believe that bullshit!" he shot back.

A diplomatic security source in Britain with ties to GCHQ reports that he received a slightly similar, if less rude, response from a US Air Force intelligence officer in London. "He pretty much confirmed the Chechen thing [US involvement] but was generally very evasive." ■

— WM



NATO Moves East

by Andreas Zumach

Why did NATO ---- despite predictable problems and complications ---- come up with the idea of expansion in the first place, and why is it so tenaciously sticking with the plan?

“This is the most stupid thing the US president could have done,” said a high-ranking official of the German Foreign Ministry.¹ He was angrily referring to an October 1996 speech by Bill Clinton made during the US presidential campaign. In it, the “leader of the free world” announced a specific timetable to name at least three Eastern European states for membership in an expanded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With this declaration, the US solidified the stance articulated by Clinton two years earlier during the November 1994 congressional campaign that NATO would spread right up to Russia’s own western borders to include states in the territory of NATO’s former Eastern counterpart, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) (e.g., Poland or Hungary) or even the former Soviet Union itself (e.g., the Baltic states or Ukraine).

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Photo: SACLANT. NATO helicopters in an exercise.
1. Interview in Bonn, Germany, Oct. 30, 1996.

This policy, a direct reversal of the previous US stance, had surprised, even shocked Washington’s Western European partners in the treaty organization. And it effectively ties NATO’s hands. Until then, the idea of extending the alliance east — and thereby bestowing the automatic security guarantees spelled out in Article 5 of the April 4, 1949 NATO treaty — was met with deep skepticism in most Western European member countries and with open rejection in Washington.² Until that time, the Western states all seemed to have been committed to offering the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program to the Eastern European and formerly neutral countries. Providing for loose co-operation with NATO, PfP was designed

2. In Article 5 of the NATO treaty, the 16 member countries committed themselves to “automatically come to the support” of any member that is attacked by an outside force. What level of support is not defined in Article 5. Rather, each nation is free to determine its response to a specific situation and is not obligated to provide military support. At the same time, Article 5 has been interpreted over the last 50 years as the core of the nuclear guarantee given by the US to its Western European allies in case of a military attack by the former Warsaw Treaty Organization nations.

by the Clinton administration in 1993 to stop all further discussion of formally adding new members to the alliance. Then came the US decision that rather than follow the example of the WTO — which dissolved six years ago after the fall of the Berlin Wall — NATO would expand east and do so quickly. According to the US timetable announced at a summit meeting in Madrid in early July, Clinton and the government leaders of the other 15 NATO states will announce — in time for NATO’s 50th birthday on April 4, 1999 — that at least Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and possibly one or two more Eastern European countries will join the “most successful military alliance in history.”³

Strategic Interests at Work

The 180-degree shift by the Clinton administration has still not been fully explained. There was certainly growing pressure from members of Congress

3. Clinton used this formula in his Detroit speech on Oct. 29, 1996, when he outlined a timetable for NATO expansion; the formula has since become the standard rhetoric of many NATO politicians.

representing states and districts with a large Polish, Hungarian, or Czech immigrant population. And the decision to announce the new members timetable during the presidential election campaign was undoubtedly inspired by concerns in the Clinton camp that Republican candidate Bob Dole might come out as a strong champion for NATO expansion. But there are also indications, though as yet no sufficient proof, that contributions by Eastern European businesspeople to the election fund of the Democratic Party might have played a role in Clinton's sudden shift.

One obvious factor key to US enthusiasm for the project is the fact that expansion of NATO promises new markets for US arms. This multibillion dollar industry, which watched its profit margins fall significantly with post-Cold War defense budget cuts, is now a driving force behind expansion. Because the armies of proposed new member states are still equipped with Soviet-made weapons, these nations will have to make massive purchases to become "compatible" with the West and come up to NATO standards. The opportunity for profit is not lost on Western Europe either. Even though the 16 NATO members originally had no common interest and no grand design for expansion of the alliance, the new configuration offers obvious economic and strategic opportunities. In the run to conquer these markets, US companies started early and currently have an edge over their Western European competitors. They have already secured large orders for tanks, artillery, helicopters, fighter aircraft, and other types of new conventional weapons.

The purchases have come not only from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, but even from Romania and Bulgaria, countries unlikely to make the first cut. In many cases, the US companies secured long-term contracts that bind these Eastern European countries for the foreseeable future to the US. They not only cover the delivery of a first generation of new weapons but also their maintenance and replacement through future arms technologies. The US aircraft company McDonnell Douglas is negotiating the sale of the F-18 Hornet fighter to Poland. Just before its merger with Boeing in December 1996, McDonnell Douglas opened an office in Warsaw. Meanwhile the Clinton administration

tried to get NATO membership applicants to commit to order Lockheed Martin's F-16 fighter aircraft. German arms companies and the defense ministry in Bonn are already taking future exports to Eastern Europe into their cost calculations for the production of new generations of weapons. A new armored infantry vehicle to be delivered to the German army in 2004 will also be exported to Poland and other Eastern European countries. A study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in Washington predicts that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (which until early last year was considered a leading candidate for NATO membership) alone would spend at least \$42 billion for new weapons and other military equipment by 2010.⁴

Everybody Wants Something

But beyond the arms industries' obvious agenda, there are also political interests pushing for an enlarged NATO — most clearly, but not only, in Washington. The US, Europe (East and West), and Russia all see this expansion as the most important step in the alliance's history. In Eastern Europe, the goal of NATO membership today undoubtedly

4. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), *Cost of Expanding NATO* (Washington, D.C.: CBO, March 1996).

enjoys majority support in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and a number of other countries. But the impression of unanimity is false. Since Western media and politicians reference only the political establishment in these Eastern European countries, they have overlooked the significant doubts and in some cases outright opposition to NATO membership that percolates outside the political establishment. Popular skepticism aside, Eastern European elites look to NATO to provide military and strategic security.

NATO's "Civilized" Roots

But the often used argument, that NATO's willingness to accept new member countries from Eastern Europe responds only to the security needs of these countries, reflects only half the historic truth. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the preferred option of the Eastern European countries for a future European security institution was the pan-European Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), renamed Organization SCE in 1994. At the November 1990 CSCE summit in Paris, the leaders of all 35 CSCE member countries agreed on a "Charter for a New Europe." They pledged to solve all future problems within the CSCE framework and to strengthen the organiza-



tion by giving it additional political and institutional power as well as financial resources. Only after the Eastern European governments realized that the West had reneged on its pledge and chosen NATO as its preferred institutional option for European security, did the East express interest in joining the alliance.

The initial impetus for taking on new members was made in late 1991 by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and by his successor as German defense minister, Volker Ruehe. More than others in NATO, the two German politicians had realized that after the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved, the Western military alliance needed a new legitimization for its continued existence. It was also Woerner who more clearly than others spelled out the underlying political, ideological, and cultural limitations of expansion. Asked how NATO would react to a Russian application for membership (against which there is no clause in the NATO founding treaty of April 1949), Woerner responded: "We can only accept those countries as new members with whom we share the same democratic values, history, culture and religion. This excludes Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria." Woerner's successor as NATO's secretary general, former Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes, went even further: "All the orthodox countries which emerged from the former Byzantine Empire have not reached the level of our civilization and they will not be able to."⁵

If the two former NATO secretary generals' logic actually drives future developments on the Eurasian continent, the result would be a new East-West divide, this time marked not by a wall, but rather by economic, cultural, ethnic, and religious divisions. The Western side would be comprised of countries with a predominantly Catholic and Protestant populations as well as regions with "moderate," "Europeanized" Muslims (*e.g.*, parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina); the Eastern side would hold the orthodox Christian nations together with the "non-European," "fundamentalist" Muslims (*e.g.*, Turkey and some of the former Soviet republics).

According to this logic, current NATO members Greece (Europe's most Orthodox country) and Turkey would end up on the east side of the new divide. In the case of Greece, the process of disinte-

gration has already begun. After the end of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Greece lost its importance as NATO's southeastern flank country. Compared to the other poorer countries of the European Union (EU), Greece is falling back economically. Most certainly it will not fulfill the economic criteria necessary for the next step of EU integration and become a member of the common European currency union by January 1999. Turkey is still being considered by the West to be of strategic importance vis-à-vis Iran and the former central

"[Countries] from the former Byzantine Empire have not reached the level of our civilization and they will not be able to."

Asian republics of the Soviet Union. But despite this Western interest, there are also signs of beginning disintegration. Earlier this year, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and leading Christian Democratic politicians from other Western European countries made it clear in very blunt public statements that Turkey's membership application to the EU (put forward 22 years ago) has no chance for the foreseeable future. Kohl even went so far to define the European Union as a "Christian project to which Muslims and therefore Turkey don't belong."⁶ In addition to the dubious honor of joining the "civilized" world, and falling under NATO's military umbrella, those eager to join expect to benefit economically. They may end up instead with huge additional financial burdens.

Breaking the UN

As the driving force behind the expansion of NATO, the US has the most to gain. And despite transatlantic quarrels over burden sharing and the French challenge to US control of NATO regional headquarters in the Mediterranean, Washington is pushing hard. Eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the alliance enjoys firm US bipartisan support and remains Washington's best instrument for exerting its influence in Europe. The US political and strategic power elite look to NATO to become

the centerpiece of a "global security system" that will advance US and Western interests not only in Europe but beyond.

This view is increasingly shared in most of the other 15 NATO capitals — despite all the rhetoric and lip service paid to UN and other regional security institutions such as the trans-European Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE and its predecessor CSCE never found much support in Washington. Since the end of the Cold War, the conference has been kept frail and inefficient while the UN has been systematically weakened by Washington and its major Western European allies — Britain, France, and Germany. At the same time, these nations have successfully blamed the UN for their own failure in Somalia and Bosnia and blocked all efforts to allow the UN to develop a peacekeeping/enforcement capability independent of the interests and

resources of the main member countries.⁷ And by withholding more than \$1.6 billion in mandatory contributions, Washington is crippling the UN to the brink of collapse.

NATO As Global Cop

As these institutions languish, Washington is increasingly using NATO to bolster US influence over both the UN and the region. A still confidential NATO document obtained by CAQ describes in detail how the alliance envisions its future "cooperation" with the UN. It states that NATO will not share any intelligence gathered by one of its member countries with the UN; NATO will keep full control and command of the operation; and NATO will decide when to stop or escalate an operation.⁸

The effect of this strategy is evident. Since early 1996, NATO, under US leadership (and already with participation from Eastern Europe), has replaced UN forces in Bosnia. This move is now being praised as a model for future peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions — at least in all those regions of the world where NATO or a sufficient number of its most important member countries have national interests. And as

7. In Sept. 1992, the US, France, and Britain rejected all proposals of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali for strengthening the UN peacekeeping/enforcement capabilities and establishing a permanent UN force which Boutros Ghali had outlined in his "Agenda for Peace" in May 1992.

8. "MC 327" — document first drafted by NATO's Military Committee in fall 1993; later slightly revised and adopted by NATO's defense and foreign ministers in fall 1995.

5. For Woerner: Conversation with author, March 1992, Vienna, Austria; for Claes: at a conference, "The Future of Europe," Austria, fall 1993.

6. Helmut Kohl, March 1997, in several discussions with leading members of his Christian Democratic Union Party which became public.

long as the interests of key members are served, NATO is prepared to carry out peacekeeping/enforcement operations politically mandated by the UN Security Council (comprising the US, UK, France, China, and Russia).

With its increased power and scope, NATO is emerging as a global policeman. By the end of 1997, it will have restructured and reequipped its force and command structures — originally designed to respond to an attack by the USSR in Europe — into “crisis reaction forces” capable of global intervention. The new structure of “combined joint task forces” will give the alliance far more flexibility than in the past. Until now, military actions by NATO required consensus and participation by all European and North American members. The new structure allows some members (e.g., the Europeans without the US and Canada) to use NATO’s weapons and infrastructure when other members have insufficient interest to intervene in a particular region.

Provided, of course, that Washington doesn’t veto the action. There are difficulties inherent in the new configuration. One concern — especially in conservative military and security circles in the US — is that, as a result of expansion, NATO might in the long run lose its current strength and coherence and become increasingly insignificant.

With its increased power and scope, NATO is emerging as a global policeman.

Since the end of the Cold War and the large-scale withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe, the quarrel over burden-sharing within the alliance has increased significantly. It is possible that, after the intended withdrawal from Bosnia in July 1998, the US will curtail participation in NATO actions in Europe. This limitation, as well as the new role of NATO as global policeman, will further intensify the burden-sharing dispute. More than ever, then, it is in the interest of the Western Europeans to broaden the financial and material basis of NATO by admitting new members from Eastern Europe.

Russia’s NATOization

In Russia, the prospect of the Western military alliance breathing down its

borders has sparked strong opposition. On May 27, to appease Moscow, NATO signed a bilateral agreement with the government of President Boris Yeltsin. The “Founding Act” describes areas of future NATO/Russia bilateral cooperation and lays out institutional arrangements as well as some terms for NATO’s expansion. The document contains declarations of intent by NATO: It will limit construction of military infrastructure (air bases, munitions depots, etc.), the stationing of troops, and the use of conventional weapons; and it will bar the deployment of nuclear weapons in the new member countries. But on NATO’s insistence, the whole document and consequently these declarations of intent, are not legally binding. The agreement and the six-months-long negotiations leading up to it reflect the current imbalance of power between the “winners” and the “losers” of the Cold War. NATO had made it clear from the beginning that even without any prior agreement with Russia, new members would be admitted to the alliance on the West’s schedule. And the Yeltsin administration knew from the start that it was in no position to prevent the expansion.

But it would be a mistake to interpret Yeltsin’s forced consent to the non-binding agreement as Russia’s “green light” for NATO expansion and to assume that the issue was settled. According to George F. Kennan, Washington’s former ambassador to Moscow and a key Cold War architect, NATO’s expansion will “fuel the nationalistic, anti-Western, and military tendencies in Russia’s public opinion.” Kennan predicts a “negative impact on the development of the Russian democracy and a revitalization of the Cold War atmosphere in the relations between East and West.”⁹

The impact on East-West relations is already being felt. For a start, NATO’s ex-

9. George Kennan, “A Mistake With Terrible Consequences: NATO Expansion Is Unnecessary and Will Make Russia Bitter,” *Die Zeit* (German weekly, Hamburg), May 3, 1997.



SEAN SPRAGUE/IMPACT VISUALS

Eastern Europeans face the contradictions of joining the West. Here, the main square in Kraków, Poland.

pansion will further enhance its superiority in conventional weapons. To counterbalance this advantage, the Defense Ministry in Moscow has already announced plans to deploy new tactical nuclear weapons near Russia’s western border. This decision was based on the same arguments NATO used for more than 40 years vis-à-vis the USSR, when the US stationed nukes on Europe’s borders with the USSR. Russia’s National Security Council also intends to drop Moscow’s longstanding doctrine of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.

The proposed expansion has also affected Russia’s domestic political landscape. The claustrophobic encroachment on Russian borders has strengthened the influence of nationalistic forces in the Russian parliament (Duma). Contrary to expectations raised at the summit meeting between presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in March, the Duma will not ratify the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) with the US. This rejection in return prevents the resumption of negotia-

tions for a START III treaty designed to further reduce strategic arsenals on both sides. Ironically, NATO expansion could help bring to power in Moscow those nationalist forces which might then withdraw from the agreement Yeltsin signed with the organization. But even if this scenario is not realized, the expansion of NATO does not solve any of Europe's security problems. It might even lead to new frictions and insecurities and — in the worst case — to a new East-West division. The most problematic aspect of expansion: Russia is again excluded from equal participation in a European security architecture.

For now, the most problematic aspect of the expansion is that it does not solve the fundamental question of Russia's role in Europe. For the third time this century, Russia/USSR would be prevented from joining a European security institution as an equal partner, with the same rights and responsibilities as all other members. But there are additional difficulties. Although 13 of 27 states in Eastern Europe and in the territory of the former USSR have already formally applied for membership, not all will be chosen — despite rhetorical declamations by Clinton and other NATO leaders that the alliance is open to everyone. This exclusivity will create new imbalances and divisions.

Price Tag

Financial considerations are also raising fears. It seems likely that NATO expansion will become a huge drain not only on the still rather weak economies of the prospective new members in Eastern Europe, but also on the 16 current member countries. It will take only a few years for the enormous financial cost of alliance membership to emerge fully and become a burden for the population of the new NATO countries. At that point, new applicants may become wary, and newly-joined members restless.

The CBO published the most comprehensive cost estimate in March 1996.¹⁰ It predicts that by 2010, costs for the four countries — Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (originally among the first group of new NATO members) — would reach \$42-51.8 billion. (The low figure counts only modernization of existing national forces; the higher number includes construction of infrastructure for the deployment of forces and weapons from

10. CBO, *op. cit.*

Western NATO countries.) For the 16 old NATO countries, the costs would be between \$13.8 billion and \$54 billion.¹¹ A later RAND study came to similar conclusions. If poorer Eastern European countries such as Romania and Bulgaria were admitted to NATO, the overall costs would be even higher. Romania's Ministry of Defense estimated that if the country joined in 1997, the price tag for integration into NATO would reach \$3.8 billion by 2000.¹² NATO has so far avoided officially addressing the cost issue and has not published any estimates for fear of negative influence on public opinion in both prospective and old NATO member countries. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, in his latest statement to Congress on the issue of NATO enlargement, presented cost estimates between 50 and 70 percent below those of the CBO study.¹³

NATO's Unsolvable Dilemma

The political dynamic created over the past five years has left NATO with an unsolvable dilemma, one which alliance representatives admit to, at least off the record. A high-ranking officer in the planning staff at NATO's Brussels headquarters admits that the alliance has "no concept for the expansion and will not find objective and convincing criteria for the selection of new members out of the already 13 applicants."¹⁴ According to NATO's official propaganda, its enlargement should create stability and therefore "contribute to the broader

By 2010, costs for the four new NATO members would reach \$42-51.8 billion.

goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe."¹⁵ But the planning officer at NATO headquarters adds a big question mark. "If we were really seri-

11. *Ibid.*

12. Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "White Book on Romania and NATO," April 1997, p. 38.

13. Testimony of Defense Secretary William Cohen to the US Senate Armed Services Committee on the administration's proposal on NATO enlargement, April 23, 1997.

14. In an off-the-record interview with the author and other journalists, Brussels, Belgium, Oct. 30, 1996.

15. State Department, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, *Report to Congress on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications* (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 1997), p. 1.

ous about creating stability where this is actually necessary, we should immediately accept the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the whole Balkan region as new members instead of fairly stable countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic."¹⁶ Two other possible candidates for the first round are Slovenia and Romania.

They are on the shortlist not because of their security needs, but because of internal NATO rivalries and Cold War era military considerations. The former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia is considered to be the necessary land-link to the otherwise territorially unconnected future NATO member Hungary. And since the admission of Slovenia would be perceived as strengthening the weight of Germany (which forced through Slovenia's and Croatia's recognition by the European Union as independent countries in late 1991), France is now pushing hard for the first-round admission of Romania, to which Paris has traditionally strong cultural and economic ties. If Romania is accepted, NATO will find it very hard to argue against the simultaneous admission of Bulgaria. Despite the military arguments in favor, strong political reservations against early admission of

Slovenia are being raised — even within the German government. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel fears this scenario would immediately put the issue of membership for Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics on the agenda. To extract NATO from

this dilemma and create some alternative land connection to Hungary, some Western countries now strongly encourage the new Austrian government to give up its longstanding neutrality and apply for NATO membership as soon as possible.

Those countries that do not make the first round of admissions have been promised a chance to apply in the next millennium. But so far, NATO has been unable to convince Eastern European governments that there actually ever

16. In an off-the-record interview ..., *op. cit.*



SONJA ISKOV/IMPACT VISUALS (l.); LOCKHEED MARTIN (r.)

Imre Mecs, chair of Hungary's Parliamentary Defense Committee (below in bow tie) inspects Lockheed Martin's F-16 in Texas. The defense contractor has also recently hosted delegations from the Czech Republic and Poland. Although the costs of "compatibility" with NATO will be staggering, much of the population of Eastern Europe, like these Romanians (l.), still live in poverty.



will be a second round. And since it is unlikely that NATO will come up with a convincing formula before the Madrid summit in July, those countries that don't make it into the first round will feel shunned. This exclusion could have a number of repercussions and create new insecurities and instabilities. Romania, in a document recently submitted to NATO, has already openly threatened a deterioration of its only recently improved relations with its neighbor Hungary over border and minority issues. "A differentiated treatment of Romania and Hungary in their drive to be admitted into NATO would be contrary to the fundamental process of NATO enlargement, i.e., to enlarge the area of security, and democracy in Central Europe. If this happens, the process of rapprochement and partnership-building between Romania and Hungary could be slowed down if not compromised altogether. Thus, the ground would be prepared for those nationalistic and extremist politicians who opposed all along the development of normal partnership relations between Romania and Hungary."¹⁷

The most sensitive issues are the membership applications of the former

Soviet republics, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Because the possibility of their first round admission drew Moscow's strongest reservations, their inclusion has always been totally out of the question, even though NATO will never officially admit it. The three Baltic states will most likely interpret their exclusion as renewed rapprochement between Moscow and the West over their heads and to their disadvantage. This perception might spark new resentments and discriminatory measures against the large Russian population in these three countries.

Rather than provide "more stability and security for Europe," as its proponents promise, the process of NATO's expansion east will be a cause for irritation, destabilization, and possible open crises on the Eurasian continent for years to come. Precious resources, desperately needed to strengthen the economies in the Central Eastern European states and in Russia, will be wasted for military purposes. The long-term result remains unknown. Under US leadership, NATO may succeed in binding its former Eastern European adversaries (and at some point even

Russia) to Washington's global interests and future military operations — most of which will be directed against perceived "threats" from the South. If that happens, the alliance could emerge as a strategic player, unchallenged and stronger than ever before. But it is also possible — as conservative supporters of NATO in the US fear — that the expansion process will significantly increase internal contradictions and weaken the "coherence" and "resolve" of the Western military alliance. Then we will see a power vacuum that will either create further instability and regional conflict, or may open the possibility for the formation of organizations that are more responsive to the needs of the populations of Europe and less inherently exploitive of the peoples of the South. ■

17. Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 19.



Spooks and Brass Work the Hill

by Jeremy Weir Alderson

Call them "fellows," dub them "detailees," dozens of eager helpers are burrowing into the Capitol Hill bureaucracy, blurring the lines between the branches of government and raising questions of conflict of interest and separation of powers.

On October 30, 1996, the *New York Times* gave front-page coverage to claims by Patrick and Robin Eddington, two married former CIA employees, that the agency had withheld

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thousands of documents indicating that US soldiers were exposed to chemical weapons during the Gulf War. What the *Times* mentioned only in passing was how the Eddingtons had gotten wind of this alleged cover-up in the first place.

In 1993 Mrs. Eddington was placed in a fellowship program that singles

out fast-rising women employees and offers experience in other areas of the Government. She found work on Capitol Hill in the office of the Senate Banking Committee, which was then led by Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., a Michigan Democrat who was interested in the question of why so many Gulf War veterans

were falling ill. ... She was assigned to interview the gulf war veterans who were calling the committee. ... She took home one of [the] early reports. She handed it to her husband ... 'It was powerful,' he recalled — and decided to start his own unauthorized investigation.¹

We know about this incident only because the Eddingtons became whistleblowers whose charges were part of a cascading series of revelations on possible causes of Gulf War Syndrome. But what was also revealed was that Robin Eddington worked on the Senate Banking Committee, reviewing sensitive information — while still a CIA employee.

How many other employees of the intelligence services are serving on Capitol Hill? What other sensitive reports might they be funneling back to their agencies for reasons which may never become public? On these questions, the security agencies are tight-lipped.

Responding to an inquiry from CAQ about programs that might place employees from intelligence agencies in the executive branch, Zoe Humphreys, a National Security Agency (NSA) public affairs officer, would say only that, "We do participate in those programs." Asked if her refusal to comment further was linked to security concerns, she responded, "I believe so."² The CIA, too, failed to provide details of its participation in fellowship programs and other schemes that might get its employees into legislative offices. Some details, however, are matters of public record.

In August 1995, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report listed 17 widely-varied programs that place fellows in congressional offices.³ These fellowships, which generally last for no more than a year, are supposed to be a win-win situation: They provide an educational opportunity for the fellows and free labor and expertise to Congress.

"It's such a good thing to do," enthuses Patty Iglarsh of the Brookings Institution in explaining why that think tank sponsors the LEGIS program which, for a fee, places fellows from the executive branch in positions on Capitol Hill. Personnel

come from just about every department. The 18-year-old program "forges an information link," Iglarsh says, that is a government "enhancement."⁴ Participants pay \$3,750 for a seven-month "tuition" or \$4,950 for 12 months.⁵

Unlike lobbyists, who must seek entry into the legislative process, fellows have full-time access handed them on a platter from the moment they assume their posts. Some participants may have a far greater impact on the legislative process than is generally associated with a mere learning experience.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which oversees fellows who are provided with stipends from non-profit scientific organizations, refused to provide a list of

"There's no reason to doubt [that] assigning paid agency employees to work in congressional offices potentially jeopardizes the integrity of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches."

its past or present fellows. In a pamphlet on the program, however, it proudly quotes Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.): "I'm not a scientist, but having a science and engineering Fellow in my office gives me the confidence to hold and espouse views because I trust the expertise and unbiased advice of that fellow."⁶

Of course, such influence is inevitable given that fellows are often experts and legislators can't master every subject. But, sometimes that influence may be problematic. According to Dr. Jill Snowden, a microbiologist who served as a science fellow on the Senate Agriculture Committee in 1987: "They pointed out to us to not be shy, to speak

beyond our specialty, so that if you're a biologist but the issue is nuclear disarmament or something involved with physics or the space station, to not be afraid to voice an opinion on the subject. And they said [this is] because if you don't talk to the member, he's going to ask the elevator operator on the way down the floor to the vote."⁷

Such advice may be relatively innocent when directed at the many fellows who, like Snowden, go to work in Congress fresh from the university. But would we want LEGIS fellows from various intelligence agencies to feel the same sense of empowerment? In 1996, that program's 68 fellows included:

- Russell Bruce Flowers, Chief Architecture and Engineering Division, NSA, placed on the staff of Rep. Jack Kingston (R-Ga.);
- Claude E. Garmon, Office of Information Security, General Services Administration, placed on the staff of Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.);
- Paul Havrilko, senior program analyst, Operation Directorate B Group, NSA, placed on the staff of Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.);
- Philip D. Kosmacki, branch head, Submarine Warfare Operations Research Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, placed on the staff of Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.);
- Roxanne Bresko Potosky, intelligence analyst, NSA, placed on the staff of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii); and
- Linda Darlene Taylor, manager, NSA, previously on the staff of Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), and currently serving at the Senate Intelligence Committee.⁸

Intelligence Moves In

As a rule, fellowship-sponsoring organizations deny having problems with undue influence. "There's no reason to doubt," said Catherine Rudder, executive director of the American Political Science Association (APSA), "[that] assigning paid agency employees to work in congressional offices potentially jeopardizes the integrity of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches."⁹ But, Rudder insists,

1. Philip Shenon, "Ex-C.I.A. Analysts Assert Cover-Up on Risk from Chemicals in Gulf War," *New York Times*, Oct. 30, 1996, pp. A14.

2. Interview, Jan. 17, 1997.

3. CRS Report for Congress, "Internships and Fellowships: Congressional, Federal and Other Work Experience Opportunities," Aug. 1995, pp. 8-11. One of the 17 is now defunct and another, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), is an umbrella for several other listed organizations.

4. Interview, April 16, 1997.

5. Government Affairs Institute, Brookings Institution, "The LEGIS Fellows Program," flyer (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, n.d.). This year, fellows are from all over the executive branch, including the Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, and Transportation departments, as well as from EPA, SSA, FDA, and NASA. Candidates must have a minimum civil service grade level of GS/GM-13 and at least two years of federal service in the executive branch.

6. AAAS, "AAAS Congressional Science and Engineering Fellowships," flyer (Washington, D.C.: AAAS, n.d.). The association was founded in 1948, has 143,000 members, and according to its literature, is "the world's largest federation of scientific and engineering societies with more than 300 affiliates."

7. Interview, March 31, 1997.

8. Government Affairs Institute, "1996 LEGIS Fellows Roster," *op. cit.*; and interviews, May 1997.

9. Rudder was actually speaking of "detailees," who function much like fellows but are assigned to their Capitol Hill positions directly by their federal agencies rather than through competitive exams or independent evaluations.

there is a "right way for agency employees to gain useful experience in Congressional offices," and APSA has found it. According to Rudder, APSA, which has operated its program since 1954 — making it the oldest such program on the Hill — is a "model" for others. Its fellows are chosen by "independent evaluators," meaning that nominating agencies (such as the CIA), "do not have final say as to which nominees will become Congressional fellows."¹⁰

APSA's new crop of 34 fellows includes:

- Anne M. Parsons, senior operational staff officer, NSA, was placed on the staff of Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.);
- Richard D. Ponder, senior operational staff officer, NSA, was placed on the staff of Rep. Rick Lazio (R-N.Y.);
- J. David Todd, chief, Western-Central Europe Division, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was placed on the staff of Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.);
- Brian C. Hufker, supervisory intelligence officer, Global Division, DIA, was placed on the staff of Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.);
- Barbara Ramey, chief, Missile Proliferation Branch, Office of Weapons, Technology and Proliferation, CIA, was placed on the staff of Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.);
- Michael J. Witbeck, executive assistant to the deputy director for administration, CIA, was placed on the majority staff of the House International Relations Committee; and
- Robin R. Gaul, CIA, was placed on the staff of Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).¹¹ Gaul is listed by APSA as the deputy chief of the CIA, but CIA denied that such a post exists. Jim McCartin of APSA explained the discrepancy in a May 27 interview: "We had it mislabeled and I think it was for security reasons. ... I remember her saying once, she just made up a title because she needed to."

These regulations are supposed to "preclude fellows from working on finance and personnel issues that have bearing on their agencies."¹² The concept of conflict of interest apparently has a narrower meaning to APSA and, indeed, to Congress, than it does elsewhere.

According to Lisa Foust, APSA's director for Congressional Fellowship Pro-

grams, a current fellow who, Foust believes, is "from the CIA," is working in the office of a senator who "needed somebody to help him with the budget and she, of course, has no experience or expertise with the budget process or budget policy, but she was eager to extend her horizons and took the job, and it seems to be working out."¹³

Leaving aside the prohibition on CIA involvement with domestic affairs, is conflict of interest avoided because the fellow involved has no experience in budgetary matters? What part of the federal budget voted on by Congress does not represent a conflict of interest for a CIA employee, given that the federal budget is the source of the agency's funds and that the agency is known to con-

APSA listed Gaul as deputy chief of the CIA, but CIA denied such a post exists. Jim McCartin of APSA explained: "I remember her saying once, she just made up a title because she needed to."

ceal appropriations by scattering them inside the budgets of other agencies?

According to Marian Shipwright, human resource manager at the Defense Intelligence Agency, when DIA fellows come back, they serve a year in the legislative liaison office, so obviously the possibility that these fellowships might be a useful way of influencing Congress has not been lost on that agency. Furthermore, the mere presence of fellows from the intelligence community with their particular worldview would influence the Congress differently than would a cadre of fellows from, say, anti-poverty or environmental organizations.¹⁴

13. Interview, March 1997. In a subsequent interview on April 17, 1997, she identified this fellow as Barbara Ramey.

14. In fact, advocacy groups have little presence in fellowship programs. (The Women's Research & Education Institute, [WREI]) claims that approximately 131 of its 178 alumni over the past 17 years have gone to work for "non-profit agencies," but one has to wonder how radical these nonprofits are likely to be, given that, in addition to the AFL-CIO, WREI's sustaining patrons include American Express, AT&T Foundation, Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Coca-Cola, Eastman Kodak, Eli Lilly & Co., Ford Motor Co., Lockheed Martin Corp., Time Warner, Inc. and many other corporate giants. (Fax from Angela Wilbon of WREI, April 1, 1997.)

And then there's the not-so-little question of how to know if the intelligence services are playing straight with the fellowship-sponsoring organizations. APSA claims that its fellows "individually seek positions in Congressional offices and are not assigned by their agencies."¹⁵ But it is certainly possible that agencies specializing in deception secretly assign their operatives to apply for positions in the hope that some of them will slip through the LEGIS or APSA selection process and wind up in a position to influence or spy on Congress.

Foust, who says APSA manages its fellowship programs "for altruistic reasons,"¹⁶ answers, "I don't think they want to do things like that. I think they realize the risks, the jeopardy they would be placing themselves in."¹⁷ But, she conceded, "it would be possible for them to slip by us, just as they slip by other places."¹⁸

Nonetheless, APSA really may provide the top-of-the-line protection against what Rudder calls "legally and ethically questionable" behavior.¹⁹ It's a long way to the bottom.

Corporate Fellows

In addition to programs that place intelligence and defense personnel as fellows on

Capitol Hill, others, most notably that of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), award fellowships to the employees of defense contractors and other industrial giants with interests in federal legislation, according to ASME literature. These corporations, which have included General Dynamics, General Electric, The Aerospace Corp., U.S. Steel, AT&T, and DuPont, often continue to support their fellows with health insurance, pension payments, and even salary.

Although conflict-of-interest rules governing corporate fellows are supposed to be especially stringent, three energy companies (Gulf Oil in 1979, Southern California Edison in 1982, and Pacific Gas and Electric, [PG&E], in 1987) have sponsored employees who served as fellows on the House Committee on Energy and Commerce or its Subcommittee on Energy and Power.

15. Rudder, *op. cit.*

16. Interview, April 17, 1997.

17. Interview, March 27, 1997.


18. *Ibid.*

19. Rudder, *op. cit.*

10. Catherine E. Rudder, "The Devil Is 'Detailing': Agency Employees Don't Belong on Hill," *Roll Call* (Washington, D.C.), March 10, 1997, pp. 5, 17.

11. American Political Science Association (APSA), "1996-1997 Congressional Fellows," list (Washington, D.C.: APSA, n.d.).

12. *Ibid.*



Similarly, little attention seems to be paid to rules governing the remuneration for corporate fellows. Although Senate ethics rules (more stringent on this point than those of the House) require strict reporting,²⁰ the rules don't seem to be widely followed.

The Senate Public Records Office can't find a filing for Harry Armen, whose tenure on Sen. Bingaman's staff was sponsored by Grumman Corp. in 1990.²¹ Nor is there the required filing for payment to James Laszlo, a PG&E-sponsored fellow who worked on Sen. Chic Hecht's (R-Nev.) staff in 1994.²² There is so little oversight, in fact, that according to Phil Hamilton, ASME's managing director of public affairs, "The Hill has not really raised questions about, well, who they are sponsored by. ... I don't know who would review it. ... I don't know that it's ever been reviewed."²³

Despite the lack of mandated records, we do know that corporate sponsorship can be comparatively lucrative. Stipends paid to fellows by nonprofit organizations range from \$15,000 for those placed by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation (which has employees of Sony, AT&T, Time Warner, Prudential, Coca-Cola, Anheuser-Busch, and RJ Reynolds on its board,²⁴ to up to \$50,000

a year for participants (often MDs) in the Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Fellowships program.²⁵ By contrast, David K. Reese had his ASME stipend supplemented by the Boeing Company for a total of \$65,000, when he worked on the staff of Sen. D'Amato in 1989.²⁶

D'Amato was also the recipient of campaign contributions from Boeing's Political Action Committee amounting to \$1,000 per year in 1984 and 1985 and \$3,000 per year in 1991 and 1992.²⁷ In fact, corporate-sponsored fellows and campaign contributions often travel in the same direction.

Sen. Bingaman, who hosted a Grumman Corp. fellow in 1990, received a total of \$13,000 from PACs associated with Grumman from 1987-94.²⁸ Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), who received \$3,000 from the E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. Good Government Fund in 1983,²⁹ hosted a DuPont fellow the next year.³⁰

This is not to say that there was an overt *quid pro quo* relationship between hosting a corporation's sponsored fellows and getting PAC money. But having corporate fellows and the PACs travelling to the same legislators does raise a potential conflict of interest. After all, common sense suggests that corporate PACs tend to donate where they *do*

have interests, while fellows are supposed to go only where their corporations *don't* have an interest.

The Pentagon Presence

While fellows from corporations dot Capitol Hill like carefully planted blooms, Pentagon transplants flourish like weeds. In 1996 alone, the Department of Defense (DoD) placed 31 fellows in Congress through the LEGIS program and eight through APSA,³¹ putting the total Pentagon presence through these two programs alone at 39. (These figures include the previously mentioned NSA and DIA personnel under DoD aegis.) Yet, the *Washington Post* reported that "a Pentagon official who has researched the matter" said there were "about 30." A congressional source with direct knowledge of the fellows/detailees issue told CAQ that there are "more than 50 of them from DoD now working on the Hill."³²

In fact, additional DoD personnel and others closely allied with the Pentagon have been placed through ASME, including employees of the Sandia National Laboratories. The lab, according to the Department of Energy (DoE), has as its mission a "primary emphasis on nuclear weapons research and development."³³

What marks the Defense Department placement programs is that they sometimes dispense with the niceties of fellowships altogether, sending representatives to the Hill without the benefit of competitive exams or independent evaluations. Personnel placed in Congress by federal agencies as a matter of

20. "The supervisor of any person working for a Senate office for more than four weeks and receiving compensation for those services from anyone other than the United States Government must publicly report the amount or rate and source of compensation to the Office of Public Records when persons begin service, when he or she ends service, and on a quarterly basis in between." (Select Committee on Ethics, *Senate Ethics Manual* [Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, Oct. 1994], Chap. 4.)

21. Fax from Susan Morgan of the Senate Public Records Office staff, April 8, 1997.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Interview, April 12, 1997.

24. Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc., "Educational Programs Application Booklet" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, n.d.).

25. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, "Call for nominations: Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Fellowships 1997," brochure (Princeton: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, n.d.).

26. Select Committee on Ethics, "Supervisor's Report on Individuals Who Perform Senate Services for David K. Reese," Oct. 24, 1989, document on file with the Senate Office of Public Records. There is a discrepancy between this report and the list from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), which places Reese's fellowship in 1988. (ASME, "ASME Federal Government Fellows and Their Sponsors," list, Washington, D.C.: ASME, n.d.)

27. Federal Election Commission (FEC) D-Index.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. ASME, *op. cit.*

31. Government Affairs Institute, "The LEGIS Fellows Program," *op. cit.*, and APSA, *op. cit.*

32. For the 30, see Dana Priest, "Pentagon to Review Hill 'Fellowships,'" *Washington Post*, Oct. 10, 1996, p. A19. The number 50 was from an interview, May 30, 1997.

33. Department of Energy, "Profile of Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico" (Washington, D.C.: DoE, May 1996).

assignment, not educational advancement, are called "detailees." Although the Departments of Energy and State, and other federal agencies occasionally detail personnel, the DoD has gained a dubious reputation for sending them in swarms. The same Pentagon official who said there were only about 30 fellows, estimated that there might be twice that many detailees in Congress.³⁴ But despite inquiries, not even Congress knows the extent of Pentagon presence. In 1996, after she wrote three times asking Defense Secretary William J. Perry for a count, Rep. Pat Schroeder (D-Colo.) complained of not getting a reply.³⁵

Schroeder's interest had been sparked by the involvement of House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). She charged that the Pentagon had "magnanimously given" Gingrich "four military officers to help him analyze votes."³⁶ (*Roll Call* reported that he had "at least six.")³⁷ When challenged about these officers, Gingrich first insisted that "my office established a fellowship program" and that they were, therefore, fellows, not detailees.³⁸ But, when the *Washington Post* pointed out that House rules require fellows to come from "an established mid-career educational program" operated by "an entity not affiliated with a Congressional office," Gingrich's chief of staff, David Meyer, said he was "not aware of any limitations" on fellowship programs.³⁹

What's not clear from Meyer's statement is why Gingrich chose to refer to his Pentagon staffers as "fellows," not "detailees" in the first place. Perhaps, it had something to do with the House Ethics rule which states, unequivocally, that "there is no ... provision for allowing detailees to serve on the personal staffs of Members."⁴⁰ Then again, it is possible that Gingrich was so busy defending himself from other ethics violation charges that he failed to turn the four pages that separate rules about detailees from those about fellows in the *House Ethics Manual*.⁴¹

Rep. Schroeder was not the only one concerned. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-

Iowa) has fumed that having military officers in Congress "has the potential for undermining and eroding two sacred constitutional principles of American national government — the separation of powers and civilian control of the military."⁴² Meanwhile, the DoD inspector general is conducting a (slow-moving) investigation of possible



leged use of a Marine lieutenant colonel to write a training manual for Republican lawmakers.⁴³ (Similarly, Sen. Robert Byrd [D-W.Va.], used an ASME fellow to serve on the Democratic Policy Committee, which Byrd chaired from 1977-88.)⁴⁴

A more spectacular case illustrating the dangers of an inappropriate military role occurred when the Clinton White House was caught gathering hundreds of FBI files. While the media concentrated on charges that the administration was spying on the Republicans, they virtually ignored the fact that the man conducting the investigation, Anthony Marceca, was an Army detailee presumably on the Pentagon payroll.⁴⁵

A few feeble efforts at reform have been initiated. The Senate Armed Services Committee ordered former Defense Secretary Perry to report on the role of military detailees by May 1, 1997.⁴⁶ But that date came and went with only a one-page interim report (that failed to give the number of detailees) delivered to the Committee.⁴⁷ Meanwhile the Pentagon continues to be gung-ho. On February 24, Deputy Defense Secretary John White signed a regulation asserting that "DoD benefits from the assignment of its personnel to the Legislative Branch of government. ..."⁴⁸ and affirming the Pentagon's intention to continue sending fellows and detailees to Congress.

The Eddingtons

The CIA, too, uses detailees. As far back as 1976, the House Select Committee on Intelligence, better known as the Pike Committee after its chair Otis Pike (D-N.Y.), reported that "CIA personnel may be found in a host of US departments and agencies, in the National Security Council, and in the White House itself. ... Typically, their Agency affiliations are unknown to colleagues and to all others, except one or two leadership figures. ... These individuals are 'detailees'— CIA employees on loan to the Executive, usually at the latter's request. They include all types, from gardeners and typists to intelligence analysts and practitioners of covert action."⁴⁹

It is difficult to determine if the CIA currently has detailees in Congress. But what is clear is that there is more than one way for a CIA employee to get there, a point proved by Robin Eddington's service on the Senate Banking Committee. Contrary to the *New York Times* report mentioned, Eddington was not under a "fellowship" program at all, at least not according to her husband, Patrick, who says she worked in Congress under the auspices of the Women's Executive Leadership (WEL) Program. WEL, currently administered by the Department of Agriculture Graduate School, describes itself as a "developmental program" sponsoring "participants," not fellows.⁵⁰

34. Priest, *op. cit.*

35. Al Kamen, "Pentagon Detailees Dig in on Hill," *Washington Post*, Aug. 7, 1996, p. A17.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Damon Chappie, "Pentagon Issues New Rules Allowing Military Fellowships to Continue in Capitol Hill Offices," *Roll Call*, March 20, 1997, p. 14.

38. Priest, *op. cit.*

39. *Ibid.*

40. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, *House Ethics Manual* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 200.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-200.

42. Chappie, *op. cit.*

43. *Ibid.*

44. Select Committee on Ethics, "Supervisor's report on Individuals who perform Senate Services for Gary D. Smith," March 30, 1985, document on file with the Senate's Office of Public Records.

45. Robert L. Jackson and Ronald J. Ostrow, "White House Aide's Papers Are Handed Over," *Los Angeles Times*, June 26, 1996, p. A10.



46. Kamen, *op. cit.*

47. Interview with Chris Cimko, Armed Services Committee staff, May 26, 1997.

48. Chappie, *op. cit.*

49. "The CIA Report the Government Doesn't Want You to Read," *Village Voice*, Feb. 16 and 23, 1976.

50. Women's Executive Leadership (WEL), "Women's Executive Leadership Program for 1997-1998," flyer, (Arlington, Va.: WEL, n.d.). All quotes from Patrick Eddington come from an April 14, 1997 interview.



PHOTOS: NANCY SHIA/IMPACT VISUALS

Senators Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) are among those who turn a blind eye to questions of conflict of interest raised by the fellowship and detailee programs.

What's more, WEL, which is open to federal employees at the GS-11 or GS-12 civil service level and currently charges a \$3,650 tuition, involves assessments and training followed by "developmental work assignments" (not fellowships) of 30 and 60 days.⁵¹ Delron Gant, program assistant for WEL, says that in her two years on the job, a time during which there have been approximately 850 WEL participants (about 85 percent of them women), she can't recall any work assignment lasting for longer than 120 days.⁵² Yet, Mark Zaid, Robin Eddington's lawyer, says his documents show that Ms. Eddington worked on Riegle's staff for nine months, a term that ended only with the senator's retirement in 1994. Stranger still, Gant can't recall a single case of a WEL program participant serving in Congress on a developmental assignment, although David White, a former associate director of the WEL program, allows that "there may have been one or two."⁵³

51. WEL, *op. cit.*
52. Interviews, April 17, 1997.
53. *Ibid.*

Donald Riegle might be able to explain why Robin Eddington's tenure on his staff was so peculiar, but he has failed to respond to numerous requests for an interview. Nor has there been any answer from Tom Crispell, a CIA public affairs officer who said he would "check into" the legal basis on which CIA employees are able to work in Congress.

Ironically, the Eddingtons, too, have reason to complain about yet another form of executive branch presence on the Hill. Patrick Eddington asserts that the large number of "retired military and retired intelligence community people" serving on various House and Senate armed services, national security, and intelligence committees was a major reason why, when he and his wife went to speak with committee staffs, "we got a hostile reception right out of the box."

"I think it is a fundamental conflict of interest for there to be retired [officers], or in some cases, still-serving reserve senior officers on committees that have oversight jurisdiction," Eddington complains. And, of course, the number

of retired Pentagon or CIA personnel serving in Congress doesn't show up in statistics any more than does the number of retired teachers, carpenters, or dental assistants. Patrick Eddington describes congressional staffs as "packed with people from the executive branch," but we will probably never know just how packed.

At the very least, the presence of numerous representatives of the security services, the military, and the major munitions makers in important posts in the legislative branch poses serious questions about conflict of interest. At worst it threatens democratic institutions.

When he saw the CIA Gulf War documents covering up chemical exposure, Patrick Eddington knew he would not keep quiet — and understood what the cost of whistleblowing would be. "I knew from the day that my wife ... gave me the first Banking Committee report to read, [that] my career with the Agency was over."

The question is, how many CIA or other intelligence agency employees have gotten hold of congressional reports and known that their careers were just beginning? ■

trailed and harassed by local police working in concert with private security officers. Another instance of the incestuous relationship that can develop between police and corporations was presented by the year-long Detroit newspaper strike. The newspaper companies involved actually reimbursed the local police to the tune of \$2.1 million for services rendered in helping break the strike.²⁸ Couple this with the Anti-Terrorism Act — which redefines any form of violent crime and many types of previously lawful political advocacy as “terrorism” for the purposes of federal prosecution — and the possibilities are truly chilling.

Large corporations such as IBM and Westinghouse have their own powerful security and counterterrorism divisions. These companies have high-level clout and, more importantly, they have government connections through their military subsidiaries. While in the past, corporations have had more influence over other federal intelligence agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Intelligence Assessment Team, the Department of Energy’s intelligence unit and various military intelligence entities, they have recently found an increasingly sympathetic ear at the FBI. One of the Bureau’s most important recent projects was a complete survey of potential terrorist targets that included hundreds of privately owned facilities. It has pledged to come up with plans to protect such targets and to respond to emergencies, tasks that will necessitate working even more closely with corporate and military security.²⁹

In addition, both the federal government and its partner corporations have privatized many security and surveillance functions, such as guarding military facilities and handling international airport security. A few elite companies get the nod from both government and corporate clients for these sorts of jobs, most notably the Wackenhut Corporation, which is in charge of details ranging from Exxon oil facilities to the Nevada nuclear test site. Such firms maintain their own extensive databases, and can undertake projects on behalf of their clients outside the

purview of laws on political intelligence-gathering.

Beyond Basic Intelligence

Transfer of military tools, many of which seem tailor-made for illegal political eavesdropping, is also putting a variety of new surveillance technologies into police hands. Speech-enhancement devices for monitoring faraway or muffled conversations, speaker-identification software similar to the “voice-print” devices used in some corporate security systems, software-based language translation, passive sensor systems and long-range radar surveillance technologies are just some of the projects on tap at the Northeast Regional Center, one of the four Government

Police programmers link activists with their causes, associates, employers, criminal records, mug shots and fingerprints, spending habits, and even tax information.

Technology Transfer Program centers run by National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Centers at the Rome, Ames, Sandia, and Los Alamos National Labs.

Computer technology has also facilitated quick and cheap surveillance of vast numbers of electronic communications, from phone calls, to faxes, to e-mail. A quick browse of police-technology web sites reveals surging interest in the acquisition and use of pen registers, which collect phone numbers called but don’t record conversations. The Supreme Court decided in *Smith v. Maryland* (1979) that pen registers do not perform a search as defined under the Fourth Amendment, and can even be used without demonstrating probable cause, much less obtaining a warrant — a simple subpoena to the phone company will do.³⁰

Federal use of such devices doubled between 1987 and 1993.³¹ With its low cost and easy accessibility, pen register

data has been embraced even more fervently by local and state police — for example, the Nassau, New York Enterprise Crime Unit, which covers organized crime activities, more than doubled its use of pen registers in 1995 alone.³² Most police database systems for criminal intelligence are now set up to store and cross-reference pen-register data routinely, and this information is not subject to the DoJ regulations governing RISS databases that were mentioned earlier.³³

Scrutiny of phone records is also made easier through technology. In the Oklahoma City bombing case investigation, the FBI examined nearly 10,000 telephone calls to or from radical-right figures, including a lawyer suing the FBI over the Branch Davidian deaths at Waco, Texas.³⁴

The taskforce structure itself dictates how such powers are brought to bear on local activists. These technologies are put into the hands of local officers who have been assigned the point position in a national “war on terrorism” by their federal taskforce partners. When the data and permission to use them are coupled with pressure from corporations and their front groups to watch particular types of activists, not to mention the availability of budget-padding grants for pursuing political targets, you have a recipe for repression. And oversight, if any, will depend largely — as it did in the days of the Red Squads — on the vigilance of citizens and their effectiveness in fighting back. ■

32. William J. Dempsey, Jr., “Enterprise Crime Bureau,” available in electronic form at http://www.da.co.nassau.ny.us/ec_unit.html.

33. DOJ, “A Final Revision ...,” *op. cit.*

34. Kevin Flynn and Lou Kilzer, “FBI Checked 10,000 Phone Calls in Bombing Case,” *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, April 15, 1997.

28. David Bacon, “Labor Slaps the Smug New Face of Unionbusting,” *CAQ*, n. 60, Spring, 1997, p. 36.

29. FBI, “Frequently Asked Questions about ANSIR,” <http://www.fbi.gov/ansir/ansirfor.htm>.

30. Mary Kate Cary, “How States Can Fight Violent Crime: Two Dozen Steps to a Safer America,” Heritage Foundation, 1993; available electronically at <http://www.heritage.org/heritage/library/categories/crimelaw/bg944.html>.

31. Electronic Privacy Information Coalition (EPIC), from a chart available in electronic form at <http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/penreg.html>.

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tigators, the manuals' authors claimed that they believed intelligence oversight regulations applied only to Americans and not to the training of foreign personnel — in other words, that US instructors could teach abusive techniques to foreign militaries that they could not legally perform themselves.²²

The Bush administration ordered the retrieval and destruction of the manuals, and the US Southern Command advised Latin American governments that the handbooks did not represent official US policy. However, the whole episode was treated as an isolated incident. The individuals responsible for writing and teaching the lesson plans were not disciplined, nor were the authors and instructors — who believed teaching human rights violations was consistent with US policy — retrained.

In 1992, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight did issue recommendations that "the Joint Staff should establish a policy to ensure that intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign military personnel by Combatant Commands is consistent with US and DoD policy," and that training materials should go through proper channels for approval.²³ However, these recommendations were never enforced.²⁴

Ignorance as a Defense

While none of the manuals was written or used on the Clinton administration's watch, the administration so far has

22. A 1991 Army review of the manuals conducted in connection with this investigation offers insight into the limited nature of oversight, even once a problem was identified. This review was conducted by teams of "linguistically qualified subject matter experts" from Headquarters US Army Intelligence and Security Command and the US Army Intelligence Center and School. Some of the teams produced a thorough critique of the manuals assigned to them — for example, the team assigned to review *Revolutionary War* showed a knowledge of human rights conventions and noted that "Careful consideration must be given to the interpretation of the contents of this manual because Latin American armies often conduct human rights violations and activities under the pretext of fighting international communism." However, teams reviewing several other manuals did not recognize any impropriety in the manuals teaching Latin American armies to spy on civilians and to ignore any laws regarding civil liberties, arrest, and detention. The teams reviewing these manuals pointed out a few egregious passages and then stated that while there might be some obsolete material, the rest was consistent with US policy. (Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Memorandum Thru Judge Advocate General," Dec. 2, 1991.)

23. DoD, *Report of Investigation*, op. cit., p. 4.

24. Office of the Inspector General, DoD, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel — Phase I," Feb. 21, 1997.

failed to send a clear message repudiating such training methods and to take decisive action to ensure that such materials are never developed again. On February 21, 1997, the Department of Defense's inspector general completed another investigation. It admitted that in creating and using the seven army manuals "from 1982 through early 1991, many mistakes were made and repeated by numerous and continuously changing personnel in several organizations from Panama to Georgia to Washington, D.C." Without apparent irony, the report concludes that there is no "evidence that a deliberate and orchestrated attempt was made to violate DOD or U.S. Army policies."²⁵

The report claims that because these numerous US personnel did not know

All the investigations into the manuals have been hampered by their basic premise: the disingenuous assumption that these manuals did not represent official US policy.

that it was against US policy to train Latin American militaries to use threats or force with prisoners, "neutralize" opponents, hold prisoners in clandestine jails, and infiltrate and spy upon civilian organizations and opposition political parties — all techniques described in the manuals — no disciplinary action was deemed necessary. The report, which Rep. Kennedy termed a "whitewash" and "hogwash," does not examine any systemic problem that might have led to "numerous and continuously changing personnel" over a ten-year period lacking a working knowledge of human rights.²⁶ Thus, the report fails to assign either individual or collective responsibility for training Latin American militaries to violate human rights and use profoundly anti-democratic methods.

While the report concludes that the lesson plans and manuals somehow escaped oversight and could not be read

because they were in Spanish, Rep. Kennedy's own investigation reveals these as mere dog-eat-my-homework excuses. Kennedy's report states that SOA instructors sent their lesson plans to Fort Huachuca and to at least two offices in Washington to be reviewed, although the question of whether they were approved in Washington continues to be disputed. Moreover, the materials were approved for use in English before being translated into Spanish.

The report does demonstrate that little was done to implement the recommendations stemming from the 1991 investigation. In three agencies to which they were simply circulated as a memo, there was no record of it having even been received. In three others, it was received but did not result in any increase in oversight of foreign military and intelligence training. However, the report merely calls for the memo to be reissued as a "directive," rather than stimulating a serious discussion within the military and setting up workable oversight mechanisms.

All of the investigations into the various sets of manuals have been hampered by their basic premise: the disingenuous assumption that these manuals did not represent official US policy and somehow slipped through the cracks. But it *was* official US policy to train and arm repressive forces in Latin America, Vietnam, and other developing countries. The manuals fit squarely within that framework.

The slow, piecemeal surfacing of these manuals and the limited investigations at each point suggest that there may be many other inappropriate training materials still in circulation. Materials from the most intense days of the Cold War in the 1960s, which should never have been created in the first place, kept on being repackaged and reused despite a series of scandals and investigations that should have forced a full-scale review. That these manuals were used until recently in this hemisphere, however, is hardly shocking. They merely confirm what many long knew about US support for repressive militaries in Latin America. They prove that the United States not only provided the guns and the money for repression; the United States also supplied the textbooks. ■

25. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Off the Shelf:

CAQ'S BOOKS OF INTEREST

The Antifa Info-Bulletin

edited by Tom Burghardt

AVAILABLE ONLY VIA EMAIL BY FREE SUBSCRIPTION FROM: tburghardt@igc.apc.org

No, "antifa" has nothing to do with the *intifada*, or Palestinian uprising — at least not directly. Instead, it is shorthand for "antiracist-antifascist," and the *Antifa Info-Bulletin* takes as its beat the global struggle against racism and fascism. Basically an information-age clipping service, *Antifa Info-Bulletin* compiles tidbits from mainstream media (e.g., *Times* [London], *Philadelphia Inquirer*), activists' newsletters and updates, and frankly revolutionary milieus. It is the latter two general sources that are particularly useful. After all, anyone with sufficient time and resources can scour the mainstream press, but publications such as *Arm the Spirit* (Toronto anarchists), *Green Left Review* (Australian green reds), or *Workers' Vanguard* (Spartacist League) are a bit more difficult to find.

And despite their sometimes heavy rhetorical baggage, such sources provide much-needed balance to the bland and ideologically blindered coverage of the mainstream press. The *Chicago Tribune*, for example, turns a blind eye toward police harassment of abortion rights activist Jeff Lyons, but the Sparts don't. And the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* has little to say about knuckle-dragging Cleveland cops assaulting anti-Nazi protestors, but the International Socialist Organization does. Similarly, major press outlets are loath to make the connections between the Klan's or the Nazis' racist terror and the tide of anti-abortion violence, but *Antifa Info-Bulletin* draws the links and names names.

Longtime San Francisco activist and CAQ contributor Tom Burghardt is well-respected for his work in the Bay Area Coalition on Reproductive Rights (BACORR). He deserves more kudos for his efforts with the *Info-Bulletin*. Subscribe. It won't cost you a cent, and you'll know more than Dan Rather will ever tell you.

Surviving Indonesia's Gulag: A Western Woman Tells Her Story

by Carmel Budiardjo

CASSELL ACADEMIC, 1996, 213 PP., \$17.95 PB.

East Timor's Unfinished Struggle:

Inside the Timorese Resistance

by Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine

SOUTH END PRESS, 1996, ENDNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, INDEX, 324 PP., \$16.00

Bitter Paradise:

The Sell-Out of East Timor

a film by Elaine Briere

SNAPSHOT PRODUCTIONS (33659 FIFTH AVE., MISSION, BC V2V1X1, CANADA), 1997, 56 MINUTES, 604-820-3699 INDIVIDUALS/\$40; INSTITUTIONS/\$100

It has been more than 30 years since Indonesian ruler-for-life Suharto clambered over a huge pile of corpses to reach his throne and more than 20 years since his invading troops roared into East Timor. Despite its horrendous record in East Timor and a history of human rights abuses throughout the archipelago, Suharto's Indonesia has long been a darling of Western governments and investors. Now, however, the regime is starting to slip. May's parliamentary elections left a toll of some 300 dead as Suharto's opponents mobilized in a vain effort to achieve a democratic opening. And much to the annoyance of Suharto and his supporters, East Timorese activists José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo won the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize for their work on behalf of their occupied homeland.

It appears that East Timor — and the very nature of the Suharto regime — are finally showing up on the global agenda, and the people involved in the works reviewed here deserve much of the credit. All have been involved in the painfully protracted campaign to embarrass their respective governments

into imposing sanctions on Indonesia. To the extent that Western governments have acted at all, it is the result of such private citizen pressures — governments and corporations are perfectly happy with Indonesia.

Carmel Budiardjo, author of *Surviving Indonesia's Gulag*, was the only British citizen imprisoned during the bloody purges following Suharto's 1965 anti-communist coup. Her tale, made of equal parts prison memoir and political narrative, is a compelling story of personal courage and perseverance. The book ends with Budiardjo's release in 1968, but her path since then is worth a second volume. Inspired by her experiences at Suharto's hands, Budiardjo returned to Britain and founded TAPOL, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, the first group focused solely on Indonesia's practices, and one of the most consistent.

Despite its original focus on political prisoners in Indonesia proper, Suharto's invasion and annexation of East Timor soon led TAPOL to become an early clearinghouse for information on the murderous campaign unleashed by the Indonesian army. Budiardjo's group has since been joined by numerous solidarity groups, including ETAN, the East Timor Action Network, which have dedicated themselves to reversing the invasion. As the networks have grown, the Westerners have joined hands with Timorese activists.

One result is *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle*, a searing yet uplifting account of the Timorese resistance movement as lived by Constancio Pinto, a former professor turned movement leader. Pinto, one of the organizers of the 1991 demonstrations in Dili where Indonesian troops massacred hundreds, escaped Indonesia and now resides in the US, where he continues to speak and organize on behalf of East Timor. Pinto's story is nicely bookended by US writer Matthew Jardine, whose foreword and epilogue provide a quick introduction to Timorese culture and society.

From Canada comes *Bitter Paradise*, an hour-long film which examines that country's craven acceptance of Suharto's brutality. Elaine Briere, the film's producer and director, is a longtime activist on the subject, and if her documentary is any indication, a real

thorn in the side of the Canadian foreign ministry and corporate PR offices. After briefly admiring Timorese culture prior to invasion and describing the horrors of occupation, Briere devotes the meat of her film to exposing how Canadian governments and corporations alike turn a blind eye to Indonesian excesses when corporate interests are involved. Although her context is Canada, Briere's work has wider resonance, for there is enough Western complicity with Suharto's crimes to go around.

Mexican Postcards

by Carlos Monsivais

VERSO, 1997, INDEX, 202 PP., \$18.00 PB.

Endangered Mexico: An Environment on the Edge

by Joel Simon

SIERRA CLUB BOOKS, 1997, ENDNOTES, INDEX, 275 PP., \$27.00 HB.

The Late Great Mexican Border: Reports from a Disappearing Line

edited by Bobby Byrd and
Susannah Mississippi Byrd

CINCO PUNTOS PRESS, 1996, 224 PP., \$13.95 PB.

In the post-NAFTA era, the economic integration of North America is a *fait accompli*: Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans now constitute a single market. But the process of economic integration is, by capitalism's inexorable logic, ragged and uneven, and brings with it messy social and political upheavals. Of the three nations in NAFTA, Mexico, with its juxtaposition of the pre- and post-modern, has suffered the most from the slings and arrows of capitalist fortune.

For a US press unwilling to exert itself, Mexico seems to consist solely of guerrillas, drug-runners, hungry immigrants, and crooked politicians. Meanwhile, US academics continue to publish soon-to-be dusty tomes on the wonders of the Mexican political system. Information gleaned from press accounts and scholarly studies is, of course, necessary, but hardly sufficient for a deeper understanding of our southern neighbor. Mexico deserves better, and fortunately, several recent works provide excellent paths beneath the surface.

Mexican Postcards marks the long overdue first English language translation of the works of Carlos Monsivais, one of Mexico's intellectual stars and a world-class social and cultural critic. In this collection taken from his numerous books of essays (although, disappointingly, not including any excerpts from *Días de Guardar*, his classic memoir of 1968 and its aftermath), Monsivais deftly flits across the Mexican cultural landscape, hovering above the "funky dives" where Mexico City's *rockeros* pay homage to the gods of amplified instrumentation, zooming in the social origins of the film comedian Cantinflas' strange popularity, or dissecting the baroque rituals of pain and penitence at the Basilica of the Virgin of Guadalupe.

Monsivais' vision is an x-ray of the Mexican soul, and his voice is elegant with a biting, satirical edge. Clearly, he is theoretically sophisticated, but that does not prevent him from cramming his pages full of feeling. And this is the key to Monsivais' greatness: Theory never becomes a wall behind which to hide; instead it is a framework upon which he can display the human in all its tragedy and grandeur.

In his survey of the state of Mexico's ecology, US environmental writer Joel Simon pulls off a similar trick in *Endangered Mexico*, albeit without Monsivais' high literary flair. Simon has traversed the country from the polluted waters of the Rio Grande to the exhausted lands of the indigenous south, talking all the while to farmers, ranchers, environmentalists, government officials, and anyone else affected by the dramatic environmental changes of the last few decades. Together with his evidently rigorous research and clear affection for his subject, Simon's facility at getting people to talk makes *Endangered Mexico* a book both affable and enlightening. Unlike many environmental writers, who fill their screeds with dire doomsday scenarios, Simon identifies the problems, notes the dangers, and then offers up appropriate solutions. His thoughtful, levelheaded approach works.

Simon is particularly adept at unraveling the complexities of Mexico's various environmental crises. Take, for instance, the Zapatista rebellion, a movement with broad support among


US progressives. Simon explains that the Zapatista base is among peasants who flooded into the Lacandon rain forest at the urging of a national government desperate to relieve pressures for land reform. Once in the rain forest, settlers rapidly depleted weak jungle soils, impelling them to move deeper into the forest in search of new, fertile land. The settlers' demand for more land has brought them into direct conflict both with ecologists determined to save the rain forest and the Lacandon tribes who traditionally peopled it — not to mention politically connected cattle ranchers. Whom to support? Simon shows that there are no easy answers.

While Monsivais focuses on popular culture and Simon on the environment, the contributors to *The Late Great Mexican Border* draw a bead on that amorphous, bi-cultural transition zone, the US-Mexico frontier. Filled with the likes of such well-known border watchers as Dick Reavis, Debbie Nathan, Tom Miller, Richard Rodríguez, and Guillermo Gomez Peña (the "high-tech Aztec"), this volume also succeeds by allowing its subjects their own voices. To take but one example, Alan Weisman's "The Deadly Harvest of the Sierra Madre," about marijuana and opium production in Chihuahua and Sinaloa, was in clear danger of being a simplistic "drugs are bad" piece until he (and we) heard from the Tarahumara Indians whose lands were threatened by illicit growers. Not only did they blame drug eradication policies for pushing growers into their pristine forests; they could not grasp the notion that any plant could be "illegal." All Weisman and the Tarahumara could do was gaze at each other in mutual befuddlement. And there is a metaphor for Mexican-US relations.

Whether it's Mexican *rockeros* and LA Latin hip-hop, poison-spouting *maquiladoras* in Matamoros and babies born without brains in Brownsville, dying lands in Oaxaca, and immigrant worker camps in California — Mexico and the US are part of a single unitary North American economy, and increasingly, culture. These three volumes help us to know our in-laws. ■

--- Phillip Smith

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
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
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